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I. Introduction**
We live in a world made small by the wonders and dangers of
technology. Chernobyl,1 Bhopal,' and Three Mile Island' are syno-
nyms for workplace accidents that can affect not only workers in the
** The best scholarly treatment of German occupational safety standard-setting is Peter
Marburger's Die Regeln der Technik (1979). An exhaustive descriptive analysis of the entire
occupational health and safety system - standard-setting and enforcement - is the five vol-
ume study published by the Federal Institute for Labor Protection and Accident Research
(Federal Institute) (Bundesanstaitfuer Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung) in 1980, Arbeitss-
chutzsystem: Untersuchung in der Bundersrepublik Deutschland.
English-language publications on this subject are rare. The International Labor Organiza-
tion published in 1984 in English the report of a visit by three non-German specialists on
enforcement of standards: Report of the Tripartite Mission on the Effectiveness of Labour
Inspection in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The ILO in the International Labor Review also on occasion carries brief articles about
one aspect or another of German occupational safety and health.
The German Research Society (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) publishes in English
several publications, including Maximum Concentrations at the Workplace and Biological
Tolerance Values for Working Materials - 1985. The Federal Institute has published a short
overview, Occupational Safety and Health in the Federal Republic of Germany (1979).
While every effort has been made to cite books, articles, cases and statutes according to
the Uniform System of Citation (14th ed. 1986) a note on citation form is due.
The current text of the most important codes, statutes, and regulations are published in
compact volumes according to general subject. Each volume is known by their original editor,
e.g., H. Schoenfelder (for civil and criminal laws), C. Sartorius I (for constitutional and ad-
ministrative laws), H. Nipperdey I and II (for labor and technical safety laws). There is no
official code comparable to the United States Code. These volumes are updated regularly and
clearly indexed so that the title or abbreviation of the law is an adequate reference. There are
also numerous paperback editions of relevant laws, organized similarly by subject and title. It
is misleading to give a citation to the official Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt), be-
cause it contains the law as passed, and does not reflect other parts of the same law or later
amendments. The Bundesgesetzblatt is similar in this respect to the United States Statutes at
Large. However, citations are given to the Reichsgesetzblatt for laws that are no longer in
effect.
The German court system in terms of federal-state relations is unitary. It is divided into
five jurisdictions according to subject matter: ordinary (civil and criminal branches), adminis-
trative, labor, fiscal matters, and social welfare. Each jurisdiction has trial, appellate, and su-
preme courts. The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) is the final au-
thority in constitutional disputes. Only the decisions of the five supreme courts, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, and some courts of appeals are published in official collections.
Court decisions are frequently published in abridgement with annotations by professors in vari-
ous law journals. Such decisions are referred to by giving the abbreviation of the court, the
abbreviation of the journal, the year of publication of the journal, the volume, and the page.
Finally, unpublished decisions are cited by giving the date of decision, the court's abbreviation,
and the case number.
I. In 1986, an explosion in a nuclear reactor caused a meltdown and fire that burned for
twelve days. The fire spewed radioactive particles into the air and far beyond the borders of
the Soviet Union. Over thirty-one fatalities occurred in the immediate aftermath of the explo-
sion and fire. Note, The International Fallout From Chernobyl, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 319-20
(1987).
2. In 1984, a chemical leak of methyl isocyanate at Union Carbide's pesticide plant in
Bhopal, India killed at least 1,758 people and may have injured up to 300,000 others. Thumbs
Down: India Spurns Carbide's Offer, TIME, Apr. 7, 1986, at 48. A civil suit in New York was
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens, and a civil and criminal action are pending in
India against the company and several former executives. Union Carbide Charged in '84 Leak,
Facts on File World News Digest, Dec. 4, 1987, at 902, col. A2.
3. In 1979, an accident at Three Mile Island, a nuclear power plant near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, resulted in a near meltdown of a nuclear reactor. More than 1,300 lawsuits
claiming emotional or physical damage have been filed. TMI-I Restarted, Facts on File World
New Digest, Oct. 18, 1985, at 780, col. Al.
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plant, but also the local and international environment. Regulation
in the areas of occupational safety and health affects the
macroeconomy of a nation in a more subtle fashion: regulation may
encourage industry to move certain activities to less regulated coun-
tries and may inhibit trade by setting standards that are difficult for
foreign manufacturers and suppliers to fulfill. Despite the interna-
tional effects of accidents and regulation, standard-setting and en-
forcement in the field of occupational safety and health remain pri-
marily at the national level.
Little is known outside technical expert circles about compara-
tive occupational safety and health regulations." Consequently, this
article presents one foreign system from an American perspective.
Initially, the article addresses the linguistic and historical hazards of
comparing these regulations. Thereafter, several major problems in
American occupational safety and health regulation are compared
with the German system. Subsequently, a discussion of the basic di-
visions in the two countries' systems follows, exploring the descrip-
tion of the regulatory system, the procedures for adopting standards,
and their enforcement. Finally, recommendations are made for both
the United States and West Germany.
II. Hazards of Comparison
A. Language and Values
1. Language.-It is difficult to translate into English those
German concepts lacking American counterparts. A literal transla-
tion may not be understood; a functional explanation risks confusion
and mistaken assumptions.' For example, in German, the term for
law or jurisprudence (Rechtswissenschaft) includes the word for sci-
ence (Wissenschaft), whereas Americans generally consider science
and law to have little in common with each other. Hence, the link
between language and social values defies facile translation, as cul-
ture often determines usages.
Another word with different value connotations is "the Adminis-
tration" (Die Verwaltung). In the United States, it indicates the cur-
rent President and his policies, while in Germany it signifies the civil
service rather than the daily policies of the executive branch. Simi-
4. Occasionally, reports about a foreign country, agency or program in a particular field
of occupational safety and health appear, but they rarely place the topic within that country's
overall system of regulating occupational safety and health.
5. For example, the Bundesministerium fuer Arbeit und Sozialordnung, literally trans-
lated, is the Federal Ministry for Work and Social Order; a functional translation would be
the Federal Department of Labor and Social Welfare. Translated functionally, the reader is
tempted to believe that the foreign entity has the same functions as its domestic equivalent.
This assumption is incorrect. In addition, a functional translation may confuse others when the
reader seeks further information about the entity or deals with it directly.
Winter 1988]
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larly, the topic of this article - occupational safety and health regu-
lation - lacks a direct counterpart term in German." Such differ-
ences in language are warnings against simple comparison.
2. Values.-The differing connotations of science and adminis-
tration convey a sense of the contours of occupational safety and
health regulation in the two countries. In the United States, a single
federal agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), creates and enforces primarily mandatory standards. As a
federal agency, OSHA is the object of political pressure from both
labor unions and employees. Scientific work is judged by a jury of
lay persons in product liability litigation, which frequently concerns
occupational accidents or diseases. On the other hand, West Ger-
many has no federal standard-setting or enforcement agency in occu-
pational safety and health matters,' and science is viewed by judges
with deference to technical expertise.9 Furthermore, administrative
enforcement in West Germany is primarily local and less subject to
the shifting fortunes of politics. 10 Consequently, differing values re-
sult with different applications of safety and health standards. Vol-
untary compliance with standards may be the norm in one country
while another country must enforce the same standards coercively
with sanctions."
There are tremendous differences between American and Ger-
man values towards regulation. The American orientation"2 posits
6. The equivalent German legal fields are called technical labor protection (technischer
Arbeitschutz), technical safety (technische Arbeitssicherheit), occupational medicine
(Arbeitsmedizin), and accident prevention protection (Unfallverhuetungsschutz).
7. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)
[hereinafter OSHA], imposed certain requirements on the Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Labor, leading to the creation of OSHA in 1971 as a division of that Department. Besides
establishing and enforcing mandatory job safety and health standards, OSHA awards grants
for research and training in occupational safety and health, evaluates and approves the state
occupational safety and health programs, and maintains a reporting and recordkeeping system
to monitor job-related injuries and illnesses. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, PUB. No. 2056, ALL ABOUT
OSHA 2 (1985).
8. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz), West Germany's Constitution, assigns federal law en-
forcement to the states (Laender) with limited exceptions. These exceptions include the foreign
service, the railroads, the armed forces, and the postal service. See Grundgesetz (Basic Law)
Arts 83-91. German commentators view this division of responsibility between legislation and
enforcement as an example of separation of powers (Gewaltenteilung). E.g., H. ERICHSEN,
STAATSRECHT UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT I1 64 (2d ed. 1979). The Constitution is
postponed until the reunification of Germany. Grundgesetz Art. 146. Functionally, the Basic
Law provides fundamental rights and establishes the framework of government.
9. See infra notes 484-503 and accompanying text.
10. Federal elections do not lead to changes in local administration, personnel or policies
since enforcement of state and federal law rests primarily with the Laender, see supra note 8.
11. Something other than the threat of a sanction makes garage mechanics in West
Germany attach vacuum ducts over each car's exhaust pipe before turning on the car motor.
Similarly, German consumers do not save used paint thinner and batteries for deposit in spe-
cial containers because they fear an OSHA citation. In West Germany today, approximately
40% of paper products are made from recycled paper.
12. Traditional American values of independence and liberty are rooted in the philoso-
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the freedom of the individual to do what he wishes, imposing social
control only as to actions that injure others. Regulation in the
United States is attacked from the ideological right 3 as well as from
the ideological left.' 4 In general, patriotism in the domestic context
in the United States means the exaltation of individual freedom.
The German orientation' 5 tends to favor absolute moral values
and social order over the individual or his freedom. Despite the radi-
cal abuse of these theories by Germany in the twelve years under
Hitler, 6 that terrible experience has indelibly stamped West Ger-
many's institutional dedication to a system of normative values.' 7
3. Additional Considerations.-In addition to the differing
values given to individual freedom and social order, concepts of tech-
nology, openness, and social welfare differ in West Germany and the
United States. In West Germany, technology is regulated by techni-
cal experts who are assumed to reach an objective view of the cur-
phies of Hobbes, Locke, and Mills. However pessimistic Hobbes' view of the life of man ("soli-
tary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short"), he maintained that sovereigns acquire their authority
by agreement of individuals to relinquish their individual rights to one person or institution. T.
HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 144-54 (Everyman ed. 1950). Locke proclaimed that men "by na-
ture" are "free, equal, and independent." J. LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Sec-
ond Essay, reprinted in THE GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 344 (M. Curtis ed. 1967). Mills
extended individualism farthest in stating that the sole justification for interfering with an
individual's liberty is to prevent harm to others. J. MILLS, ON LIBERTY, chs. 4-5 (1849) re-
printed in THE UTILITARIANS 582-97 (1961).
13. E.g., The Chicago School advocates using microeconomic transaction cost theory to
avoid undertaking social redistributive measures.
14. E.g., The Critical Legal Studies group criticizes the government as controlled by
industry. The group advocates vague worker and community control concepts without indicat-
ing institutional measures other than totalitarian control in the name of the common man and
the state.
15. Traditional German values of thoroughness (Gruendlichkeit) and systematic order-
ing (Ordnung) are illustrated by the theories of Kant and Hegel. Kant posited the "categorical
imperative"; rules of conduct should only be those that we would want consistently to be uni-
versal laws of nature. See H. AIKEN, THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 38 (1956). Hegel conceived of
history as a relentless unfolding of an absolute spirit. Id. at 77, 96.
16. The National Socialists incorporated absolutism into politics with slogans such as
"common benefit before self-benefit" (Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz) and "everything that bene-
fits the people is law; everything that damages it is unlawful" (Alles, was dem Volk nuetzt, ist
Recht; alles was ihm schadet, ist unrecht). B. RUETHERS, DIE UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG
ZUM WANDEL DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 119, 378 (1973). The
path for totalitarianism was justified with facile statements: "(w)ith the overcoming of the
separation of law, customs, and morals, the statute as a source of law will be put once again in
connection with the will of the people." K. LARENZ, Grundfragen der neuen Rechtswissen-
schaft 9, 59 (1935), quoted in B. RUETHERS, supra at 120 n.30.
17. The Grundgesetz, see supra note 8 contains and enumerates basic individual rights
in Articles 1, through 19, the most comprehensive of which is the individual's right to the free
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend
against the constitutional order or the moral code." Art. 2(l). A jurisprudence based on values
is today "practically undisputed and is especially recognized in judicial decisions." K. LARENZ,
METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTWISSENSCHAFT 10 (1983). Nevertheless, obedience to the state
ruler, even if a local one, characterizes German history to an extent similar to the influence of
the pioneer attitude in the United States. The German version of social sacrifice and "law and
order" finds mixed review among the youth in West Germany. However, in matters of safety
and health, it has maintained an untarnished reputation.
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rent state of technology. 8 The regulatory system is premised on an
objective notion of truth-finding, delegating almost total authority to
groups of experts in standard-setting activities.1 9 In the United
States, the government is viewed as the sole responsible authority to
make technological choices in regulation. Accordingly, technical ex-
perts in West Germany set binding standards whereas in the United
States, binding standards are issued by understaffed administrative
agencies. German standard-setting, consequently, reflects greater
productivity and scope.2 0
To the extent that German standard-setting groups of experts21
and political bodies22 discuss and vote on occupational safety and
health regulation, the proceedings are not usually available to the
public. Openness and publicity of debates and proceedings about
proposed regulations are the exception and almost never occur until
after a decision or vote is taken.2"
In contrast, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration, a part of the United States Department of Labor, is re-
quired to give notice and opportunity for public comment before it
promulgates occupational safety and health standards.2" The Secre-
tary of Labor files an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register, the daily official publication of the federal govern-
ment. This notice invites the public to submit written comments, cre-
ating a record that often fills thousands of pages. Hearings may be
held and a proposed standard published in the Federal Register.
18. Technical standards issued by public committees have no force of law but become
binding through their adoption in judicial decisions. On the other hand, technical standards
issued by the vocational insurance associations as accident prevention regulations or which are
published as general administrative regulations, are legal standards of their own accord. P.
MARBURGER, DIE REGELN DER TECHNIK IM RECHT 616-17 (1979).
19. E.g., Challenging the adequacy of technical standards is a very recent and still un-
common phenomenon. See infra note 470 and accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 104-18.
21. E.g., The Technical Committee for Dangerous Substances. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 424-30.
22. E.g., The Bundesrat (The Council of Constituent States or Federal Council). See
infra text accompany notes 438-46.
23. E.g., Technical standards (Technische Regeln) developed by the technical commit-
tees of the Bundesarbeitsministerium are published in the official monthly journal of the min-
istry, the Bundesarbeitsblat. Drafts or proposed standards are not published. Although the
meetings of the full Bundesrat are open and recorded, the main debates over regulations re-
quiring Bundesrat approval take place in the committee sessions, which are secret in order to
make agreement possible, K. REUTER, BUNDESRAT UND BUNDESSTAAT 32 (5th ed. 1985). Nev-
ertheless, the government publishes petitions by individual Laender, see supra note 8, for
amendments to the government's draft, and the changes advocated by each committee to
which the draft has been referred. On controversial issues, individual Laender or political par-
ties often give the press information about markup sessions.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1982). Cf. Emergency temporary standards may be issued,
which take immediate effect upon publication. However, they are valid only six months. Id. §
655(c). Ten emergency temporary standards have been issued by the federal Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, many of which were replaced by issuing standards after
notice and opportunity to comment. Congress of the United States, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace 229 (1985).
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Publication of the final standard is accompanied by a description and
evaluation of the comments received by the agency."
Additionally, the level of social welfare payments and service is
much higher in West Germany than in the United States." Public
subsidy for reductions in working hours (Kurzarbeitergeld) and pub-
lic wage reimbursement for missed workdays due to bad weather
(Schlechtwettergelt) are examples of German social welfare pay-
ments. American social security provisions pale in comparison."
These contrasting attitudes towards individual freedom, social order,
technology, governmental openness, and social welfare illustrate the
framework of German occupational safety and health and its reli-
ance on technical experts and the state.
B. Historical Background
In order to effect a proper study of German occupational safety
and health regulation, it is imperative to understand its history in
general. The roots of occupational safety and health regulation in
West Germany lie in three institutions: the occupational factory in-
spectorates (Gewerbeaufsicht)'28  the vocational insurance associa-
tions (Berufsgenossenschaften),29  and the work councils
25. See, e.g., Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records - Final Rules and
Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 35,212 to 35,276 (1980); Access to Employee Exposure
and Medical Records; Proposed Modification; Request for Comments and Notice of Public
Hearing, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,420 to 30,438 (1982).
26. In the United States, studies show that social security, not worker compensation, is
the source of most occupational disability payments. However, it is estimated that four-fifths
of occupational disease victims are ineligible for social security disability income (SSDI).
HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, Occupational Illness Data Collection, H.R. REP. No.
1144, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 passim (1984). The absence of obligatory insurance leaves
many Americans without wage replacement and without even medical coverage in the event of
serious illness or injury. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 598-605.
27. American social security provisions are intended to provide minimal protection
against unemployment, occupational injury or illness, and poverty. SSDI awards resulted in
1978 in an average annual award of $3,900 in the form of periodic payments rather than the
lump sum paid by worker compensation. Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Dis-
eases, June 1980. If unemployment compensation, worker compensation, or a special benefits
program such as black lung benefits for miners are not available, the remaining social security
consists of income maintenance programs: federal social security and medicare costs for quali-
fying persons over sixty-five years, and state administered public welfare payments for persons
below a minimal income.
28. The occupational inspectorates began in Prussia in 1853 as a consequence of a law
restricting child labor and providing for factory inspections by state authorities to check for
compliance. A. MERTENS, Der Arbeitsschutz und seine Entwicklung 6 (Bundesanstalt fuer
Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung, No. 15, Schriftenreihe Arbeitsschutz, 1978). By the end
of the nineteenth century, the responsibilities of the occupational inspectorates had expanded
to cover social labor protection, industrial hygiene and technical labor protection. Id. at 9; see
infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
29. Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck introduced obligatory health insurance, acci-
dent insurance, and old age and disability insurance in 1883, 1884, and 1889, respectively.
Accident insurance was established through the creation of vocational insurance associations.
All employers of a particular industry in a given area became obligated to join an association,
and they paid insurance premiums to this association. The 1884 law also authorized the voca-
tional insurance associations to issue accident prevention regulations, binding on their mem-
Winter 1988]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:2
(Betriebsraete) .30
1. The Occupational Inspectorates.-The occupational inspec-
torates have their origins in the police law (Polizeirecht) of the Mid-
dle Ages and in the absolutist rule by the princes of the German
states before creation of the Reich at Versailles in 1871.31 The func-
tion of the police in the Middle Ages and the Age of Absolutism32
was to promote welfare as well as maintain order.33 The duty of re-
pelling danger (Gefahrenabwehr)" included the prevention of disor-
der in sanitation, health, safety, and other fields. The gradual disap-
pearance of the concept of the welfare functions of the police is
illustrated by the use of the term "police" for virtually all local gov-
ernment functions until after World War I1.11 The contemporary re-
action against absolutist police law is represented by the constitu-
tional requirement of statutory authorization for administration
bers. A. MERTENS, supra note 28 at 7.
30. Work councils composed of representatives elected by employees of the establish-
ment were mandated by the Work Council Law (Betriesbsraetegesetz) in 1920. 29 RGBL 147.
In the turbulent years of 1918-19 the demand for councils (Raete) in the workplace and econ-
omy was insistent. The 1920 law was encouraged by moderate representatives of the Socialist
Party who wrote part of the constitution for the Weimar Republic in 1919 after Germany's
defeat in World War I and led its early cabinet governments. In 1934 the Nazis abolished the
Work Council Law, and introduced the "Law for the Ordering of National Work " (Gesetz
zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit). 35 RGBI.1 45. The Trust Council (Vertrauensrat) took
the place of the work council, and it was headed by the plant manager. I W. DAEUBLER, DAS
ARBEITSRECHT 334-35 (8th ed. 1986). The rights of work councils are regulated by the 1972
Workplace Constitution Law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). See infra text accompanying notes
338-54.
31. The Reich Police Law (Reichspolizeiordnung) of 1530 made the police responsible
for creating "a good order of the community." This included enforcement of regulations con-
cerned with food weights and prices, religion, morals, guardianship, occupational restrictions,
and inheritance. The German princes in the eighteenth century also gave the police a welfare
role.
The concept that the police were only responsible for safeguarding "peace and order"
(Ruhe und Ordnung) was first introduced into law by the Prussian Legal Code (Aligemeines
Landrecht) of 1794. Not until 1882, however, did a court explicitly hold that police powers
were limited. In the Kreuzberg decision, the Prussian Administrative Court of Appeals (OVG)
set aside a police ordinance that restricted heights for buildings near a war memorial. OVGE
9, 353. The court held that the ordinance was an attempt to protect aesthetic interests, a
welfare measure over which the police did not have jurisdiction. V. GOETZ, ALLGEMEINES
POLIZEI- UND ORDNUNGSRECHT 11-14 (7th ed. 1982).
32. The princes of German states in the eighteenth century practiced absolutist rule, as
did their more centralized neighbor, the French monarchy. This meant that the ruler had
limitless power. FACTS ABOUT GERMANY 49 (H. Bulka & S. Luecking eds. 1985).
33. V. GOETZ, supra note 31, at 11.
34. This is defined by numerous police laws of the Laender as the duty "to repel dangers
to the individual or the public that threaten public safety or order." V. GOETZ, supra note 31,
at 31, quoting statutes. One commentator states, "the concept of danger in technical safety
law is identical with that concept in police law." F. HANSEN-DIx, DIE GEFAHR IM
POLIZEIRECHT, IM ORDNUNGSRECHT UND IM TECHNISCHEN SICHERHEITSRECHT 187 (Recht
Technik Wirtschaft Schriftenreihe Vol. 24 1982). Others caution against relying on concepts
from police law in technical safety law. E.g., P. MARBURGER, supra note 18, at 112.
35. Even today, four states name various subdivisions of local government concerned
with statistics, health and welfare "police authorities" while the remaining seven call the same
subdivisions "public order authorities" (Ordnungsbehoerde). H. WOLF & 0. BACHOF, 3
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 19 (4th ed. 1978).
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action (Gesetzesvorbehalt).a3
Analogous to the early welfare role of the police is the principle
of "caring for" (Fuersorge) under which both the state and the em-
ployer have a duty to "care for" the welfare of the people dependent
on them.37 The medieval guilds (Die Zuenfte) 38 and public authori-
ties traditionally provided social and health benefits to citizens.39
Twenty years after England introduced state factory inspectors, the
local governments of Aachen, Arnsberg, and Duesseldorf in 1854 es-
tablished the first German occupational inspectorates.' ° Originally
charged with enforcement of protective child labor laws, occupa-
tional inspectorates became mandatory throughout the Reich in
1878 with the adoption of amendments to the Trade Law (Gewerbe-
ordnung)." The amendments gave factory inspectors the same au-
thority as local police authorities." However, administrative instruc-
tions severely limited the authority of the inspectors. All violations of
regulations had to be referred to the local police for prosecution, and
violations of duties not derived from specific regulations had to be
referred to upper level administrative officials."3
2. The Vocational Insurance Associations.-A second source
36. The Grundgesetz, see supra note 8, art. 80(1), for example, states that "[tihe fed-
eral government, a federal minister, or the state governments may be authorized by statute to
issue regulations having the force of law (Rechtsverordnungen). Content, purpose, and extent
of the authorization must be set forth in the statute."
37. "The care (Fuersorge) for the poor was a matter basically for church and private
activity in the Middle Ages . . .[I]n the nineteenth century a thoroughgoing system of care
(Fuersorge) arose that relied on the local community and was supplemented by so-called wel-
fare associations." H. ZACHER, EINFUEHRUNG IN DAS SOZIALRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 14-15 (2d ed. 1983). This principle remains one of the employer's duties today.
W. ZOELLNER, ARBEITSRECHT 173 (3d ed. 1983). Examples are scattered throughout the Civil
Code and statutes, e.g., the employer has a duty to protect his employed against danger for life
and health as far as the nature of the work permits. Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [hereinafter
BGB] (Civil Code) § 618(1).
38. Guild members and apprentices were part of a hierarchical society that contained
different ranks within nobility, townspeople, and farmers. The guilds controlled handcrafts and
economic life in the cities. Each guild member was permitted to use only a designated quantity
of raw material and apprentices. The guilds were organized by product and carefully watched
that no one competed with them. FRAGEN AN DIE DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE 31, 35 (Deutscher
Bundestag, llth ed. 1985).
39. Hans Hattenhauer, a legal historian, writes: "The system of social security that de-
veloped . . . was self-enclosed, determined by the principles of hierarchical caring (obrigkeit-
liche Fuersorge) and unfranchised subjects (unmuendige Untertanen)." H. HATTENHAUER, DIE
GEISTESGESCHICHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS 247 (3d ed. 1983).
40. A. MERTENS, DER ARBEITSSCHUTZ AUF DEM PRUEFSTAND 11 (Bundesanstalt fuer
Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung, No. 25, Schriftenreihe Arbeitsschutz, 1980). The inspec-
torates were run by local governments (Regierungsbezirke), mostly municipalities. Today they
are still run by local governments but are supervised by the Laender, see supra note 8.
41. The Trade Law issued in 1869 by the North German Federation (Norddeutscher
Bund) established detailed requirements for the exercise of specified occupations through re-
gistration, supervision, and other limitations. At the same time it guaranteed the free establish-
ment of the terms of individual employment contracts (§ 105). The Trade Law remains a
federal law, although it has frequently been amended and supplemented by other laws.
42. A. MERTENS, supra note 40, at 28.
43. Id.
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of occupational safety and health regulation are the vocational insur-
ance associations established by Reich Chancellor Otto von Bis-
marck in 1884. 44 Prior to establishing the vocational insurance as-
sociations, Bismarck tried without success to abolish the
occupational inspectorates."' The vocational insurance associations in
conjunction with the occupational inspectorates have competitively
maintained overlapping jurisdiction in preventing occupational acci-
dents and illnesses. 6
In introducing the Accident Insurance Law on January 9, 1882,
Bismarck stated in the Reichstag4 "An organization is necessary
that draws together the interested parties, that combines compensa-
tion of the injury with the task of preventing and limiting injuries
through inspection. ' 48  The insurance system created by Bismarck
has survived almost intact to this day.49 The vocational insurance
associations have continued to prevent work accidents, to rehabilitate
accident victims, and to compensate the victim, family members, and
survivors.5 0 Governed originally only by employer representatives,
the insurance associations gradually opened their boards to employ-
ees. Consequently, since 1952, an equal number of employer and em-
ployee representatives have governed them.51
44. See Accident Insurance Law of 1884, REICHSVERSICHERUNGSORDNUNG [RVO] (So-
cial Insurance Code) §§ 636(1), 637. As with American worker compensation statutes, the
Accident Insurance Law substituted for the fault liability of the employer to his employees a
no-fault recovery against the statutory insurance carrier.
45. Bismarck wrote in 1877:
I . . . consider it an error, which we have made on account of opinions of
some personalities, when we believe that the difficulties which the relation of
employer and employee creates will be solved through creation of a new class of
government officials (Beamienklasse), which carries in itself all the seeds of a
proliferation of bureaucratic interferences (Missgriffe).
S. POERSCHKE, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER GEWERBEAUFSICHT IN DEUTSCHLAND 73 (1911),
quoted in A. MERTENS, supra note 40, at 27.
46. This overlap remains a lively subject of a debate and is an exception to the generally
systematic organization of law and administration in Germany.
47. The Reichstag, the parliament or "imperial assembly," assembled for the first time
in 1871. It could neither nominate the chancellor nor oust him.
The Reichstag was elected by general suffrage. Although it had no say in the formation of
the cabinet, the Reichstag did influence the government by its participation in lawmaking.
FACTS ABOUT GERMANY, supra note 32, at 56 (1984).
48. A. MERTENS, supra note 40, at 30.
49. See supra note 29. It is constitutionally grounded in Art. 20(1) of the Grundgesetz
see supra note 8, which provides that "(t)he Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and
social federal state."
50. RVO § 537.
51. A. MERTENS, supra note 40, at 20. Elections for employee representatives to the
boards of the vocational insurance associations are called social elections (Sozialwahlen) and
are conducted in all member enterprises biannually. The governance of vocational insurance
associations is referred to as self-administration (Selbstverwaltung) This principle derives from
local government law. It was introduced by Count Karl von Stein in 1808 in the Prussian
Staedteordnung (Municipal Code) to foster popular participation in local government and thus
reduce the absolute administrative power of the local princes. The term Selbstverwaltung first
became used in the middle of the eighteenth century. Maschinenbau und Kleineisenindustrie
Berufsgenossenschaft, 100 Jahre 1885-1985 Maschinenbau und Kleineisenindustrie Berufsge-
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3. The Work Councils.-The third institution that handles oc-
cupational safety and health regulation is the work council.52 After
World War I, the German government required factories to establish
these councils at the workplace (Betriebe) a. 5  They consisted of all
the employees, and often the employer joined as well.
Contrary to the expectations of those advocating work coun-
cils, 54 however, the work councils concentrated on the needs and
goals of the enterprise.5 5 The nature of worker participation became
one of cooperation with the employer, rather than conflict. Conse-
quently, as early as 1929, the work councils were criticized as orga-
nizations from which fascism could develop. 6 In fact, the work
councils may have undermined resistance to fascism by fostering re-
liance on the group rather than the individual. However, the lack of
support for fascism in the workplace is evinced by the election statis-
tics. In 1930, not a single National Socialist party member had been
elected to a work council despite the fact that there were 156,145
work councillors in that year. In 1931, there were only 710 National
Socialist members among 138,418 work councillors. 7
The federal Workplace Constitution Law" continues the em-
nossenschaft 7 (n.d.).
52. See supra note 30.
53. This word is translated as establishment, workplace, or plant. The scope of the es-
tablishment (Betrieb) was not defined in the 1920 law and remains undefined in the 1972
Workplace Constitution Law. The Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG), the highest labor court, de-
fines it as an "organizational unity in which an employer alone or with employees pursues
certain technical work purposes (arbeitstechnische Zwecke) that are not fulfilled in the satis-
faction of his own need." Bundesarbeitsgerichtsentscheidungen (BAGE), 175, 178. In practice,
the employer determines the size of the establishment, subject to review by the labor court
(Arbeitsgericht). Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz § 2a(l)[l] (Labor Court Law) 1979 BGBI.I 853, as
amended 1985 BGBI.I 2355 (labor courts have exclusive jurisdiction for matters arising out of
the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Workplace Constitution Law] except for criminal sanctions
and fines); G. SCHAUB, ARBEITSRECHTSHANDBUCH 1242 (5th ed. 1983). The Workplace Con-
stitution Law recognizes establishment branches and parts (§ 4), joint work councils
(Gesamtbetriebsraete) where an enterprise has more than one work council (§§ 47 et seq.),
and conglomerate work councils (Konzernbetriebsraete) where a conglomerate (Konzern), as
defined in the Stock Law (Aktiengesetz), exists. Participation at the level of the establishment
is to be distinguished from that occurring at the enterprise (Unternehmen) through employee
election of members of the management board (Aufsichtsrat). See infra note 58 and text
accompanying notes 338-54.
54. See supra note 30.
55. Writing in exile during World War II, the sociologist Franz Neumann wrote that
"the collective ideology (Gemeinschaftsideologie) in work relations is one of the worst and at
the same time significant relics of the Weimar Republic. F. NEUMANN, BEHOMOTH 485 (G.
Schaefer trans. & ed. 1984).
56. See generally, 0. KAHN-FREUND, THE SOCIAL IDEAL OF THE REICH LABOUR
COURT: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRACTICE OF THE REICH LABOUR COURT (1931),
reprinted in 0. KAHN FREUND, LABOUR LAW & POLITICS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 108, 155
(R. Lewis & J. Clark eds. J. Clark trans. 1981).
57. F. NEUMANN, supra note 55, at 490.
58. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972 (BETRVG) (Workplace Constitution Law), BGBI.I
13. This law permits work councils to exercise varying rights of codetermination, consultation,
and information with regard to designated areas in social, personnel, and economic matters.
See. e.g., id. § 87 (social), §§ 99, 102 (personnel), §§ 111-12 (economic). The 1972 law largely
replaced the first federal Workplace Constitution Law of 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
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phasis on cooperation. Work councils are forbidden to take part in
strikes. 9 The overriding statutory duty of the work council is to co-
operate with the employer in the interest of the enterprise.6" The
union movement has adopted collective bargaining at the industrial
and regional levels, with the right to strike, on the one hand, and
cooperative worker codetermination (Mitbestimmung)61 with the in-
dividual employer at the levels of the establishment and the enter-
prise (Unternehrnen),62 on the other hand. Health and safety issues
are handled primarily at the establishment level.
III. Comparative Inquiries
A. Method
Mindful of the language, values, and historical differences be-
tween Germany and the United States, this article shall examine
whether certain problems in occupational safety and health regula-
tion in the United States similarly appear in West Germany, and if
so, how they are resolved. To understand and improve our own legal
system, it may be helpful to "crawl out of our skins" and view it in
the context of a foreign legal system, as a foreign observer himself
might see it.63
The methodology used here is functionalism; one looks behind
the form of the law to see whether identical problems exist and how
they are resolved.64 Sociology of law is as important for the com-
paratist as the law itself. Understanding the identity of the institu-
tional actor and the method by which it operates often explains more
1952), BGBI.I 681, which restricted workplace codetermination rights largely to social mat-
ters. W. DAEUBLER, supra note 30, at 340.
59. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BETRVG] (Workplace Constitution Law) § 74(2) "Acts
of industrial dispute [ArbeitskampJ] between the employer and the work council are not per-
mitted; industrial disputes of collective bargaining parties are not affected by this provision."
60. BETRVG § 2(1) "Employer and work council shall work together in a spirit of mu-
tual trust having regard to the applicable collective agreements [Tarifvertraege] and in coop-
eration with the labor unions and employers associations represented in the establishment for
the good of the employees and of the establishment."
61. In practice, the union movement influences work councils greatly; about three-
quarters of elected work councillors are union members. E.g., P. HANAu, K. ADOMEIT,
ARBEITSRECHT 101 n.8 (7th ed, 1983). (In 1975, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [DGB]
"won" 77.5 percent of all work council seats - 148,102 of 191,015). In a few industries, union
representatives act at the workplace as shop stewards (Vertrauensleute), however, they have
not obtained statutory or judicial recognition. W. ZOELLNER, ARBEITSRECHT 414 (3d ed.
1983); W. DAEUBLER, supra note 30, at 528.
62. The codetermination laws do not define an enterprise. The labor courts have distin-
guished it from an establishment according to its purpose: the "establishment" pursues a tech-
nical labor purpose, the "enterprise" an overriding purpose, usually an economic one. W.
ZOELLNER, supra note 61, at 400.
63. The plebians in Rome achieved one of their most important successes when they
compelled the patricians to consent to the appointment of a commission to write down the laws
and thus to make their knowledge generally accessible.
64. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOETZ, I EINFUEHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF
DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 34, 38-39 (1984).
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than a detailed examination of the law's contents.6 5 Two hundred
years ago, Montesquieu warned against one country borrowing the
institutions or laws of another.66 Technologically speaking, the world
has since become more closely linked. Besides the academic delight
of learning about another system and gleaning greater knowledge
and understanding for one's own legal system, a comparative analy-
sis is useful for developing international legal principles and harmo-
nization of national law.67
B. Scope
The scope of occupational safety and health regulation is ex-
amined here in three ways. The groups affected by the regulation are
described first, followed by the institution that implements the regu-
lation. Lastly, the substantive fields of regulation are outlined.
1. The Affected Groups.-In the United States, the federal
and state occupational safety and health laws target almost exclu-
sively the workplace. 68 Important elements of public health goals ap-
pear in the efforts to collect epidemiological information69 for re-
search purposes by the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH).70 However, this is not part of the regulatory
or enforcement apparatus. Environmental and consumer protection
laws are not promulgated or enforced by the same agencies that are
responsible for workplace safety and health. 1
In West Germany, there is a pronounced overlap of workplace
protection laws with consumer and public health regulations.72 For
65. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT: AN INAUGU-
RAL LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 12 MAY 1965, at 18
(1965) (copy on file with author).
66. Montesquieu wrote: "The political and civil laws of each nation are so completely a
part of the people for whom they are made that it is a grand hazard to adapt those of one
nation for another." C. MONTESQUIEU, I DE L'EsPRIT DES LOiS 12 (R. Derathe ed. 1973).
67. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 8-10
(2d ed. 1978).
68. One exception are particular state and local "right to know" laws that also are di-
rected at the public at large or the local community.
69. Epidemiology is "the study of the relationships of the various factors determining
the frequency and distribution of diseases in a human community." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 451 (26th ed. 1985) [hereinafter DORLAND].
70. NIOSH is presently part of the federal Center for Disease Control, itself under the
supervision of the Department of Health and Human Services. NIOSH conducts workplace
studies and issues recommendations for mandatory health and safety standards. See, e.g.,
Center for Disease Control, United States Dep't of Health & Human Services, NIOSH Rec-
ommendations for Occupational Health Standards (32 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep.
No. 15, 1983).
71. For example, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Consumer
Protection Safety Commission (CPSC) are independent agencies, entirely separate from
OSHA. OSHA promulgates and enforces most mandatory occupational health and safety
standards.
72. E.g., the Equipment Safety Law requires compliance with technical standards to
assure safe operation of manufacturing machines as well as consumer goods.
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example, the Equipment Safety Law (Gesetz ueber technische
Arbeitsstaetten)" primarily concerns consumer issues. The Work-
place Sanitation Regulation (Verordnung ueber Arbeitsstaetten)
covers public health concerns addressed by municipal housing codes
in the United States. As in the United States, environmental goals
are not contained in labor protection rules.74
2. The Implementer.-There exist clear differences between
the United States and Germany in the implementation of the regula-
tions. The vocational insurance associations, 75 which are public bod-
ies established under federal law, 76 have an explicit legal role in
standard-setting and enforcement in West Germany." In the United
States, for the most part, insurance bodies are not required to make
inspections and rarely are involved in standard-setting activities.78
Furthermore, individual states have little input into the development
of federal occupational safety and health rules. 9 In West Germany,
however, the states' counterparts, the Laender,80 occupy a central
role in approving similar regulations through the Bundesrat.81
Consistent with most administrative functions, enforcement of
occupational safety and health regulations is carried out by the
Laender in West Germany.8" In the United States, the federal gov-
73. Also called the Geraetesicherheitsgesetz.
74. There are separate statutes concerned with protection of water, waste removal, air,
nuclear energy, and dangerous substances. Regulations address some environmental aspects for
labeling and handling dangerous substances. See infra text accompanying notes 244-306.
75. See supra note 29.
76. Art. 87(2) of the Grundgesetz, see supra note 8, states: "social insurance carriers
whose jurisdiction extends beyond the area of one Land are federal bodies of public law." See
also H. WOLFF, 2 VERWALTUNGSRECHT 156 (4th ed. 1976).
77. RVO §§ 546(1), 708. See infra text accompanying notes 375-405, 549-66.
78. Insurance regulation in the United States is an area regulated chiefly by the states,
not the federal government. Six states make public insurance carriers the exclusive provider of
worker compensation insurance, the rest permit private insurance companies or employers to
offer such insurance. L. Darling-Hammond & T. Kniesner, The Law and Economics of Work-
ers' Compensation XIV (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, No. R-2716-ICJ, 1980).
Texas, Oregon and Florida are apparently the only states that require worker compensa-
tion insurance carriers to provide loss prevention services. Id. No insurance carriers issue acci-
dent prevention regulations, although some advise their insureds to provide loss prevention
services, such as an independent company safety inspector. See, e.g., Thompson, Disaster: A
Loss Control View, National Underwriter, Aug. 17, 1987, at 33.
79. There is no institutionalized flow of comment from the states to the federal govern-
ment on occupational safety and health matters. Unions generally oppose state takeover of
federal occupational authority on the grounds that states are less effective and more suscepti-
ble to local political influence. Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace, supra note 24,
at 241.
80. There are three city-states (Bremen, Hamburg, and the special case of West Berlin).
The other eight, in north to south direction, are Schleswig-Holstein, Niedersachsen,
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Bayern
(Bavaria).
81. See infra note 438.
82. The planned Amt fuer Strahlenschutz (Office for Radiation Protection) within the
federal Umweltministerium (Environmental Ministry) will be an unusual instance of federal
safety enforcement. It will have 500 employees, who will oversee radiation protection, waste
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ernment enforces the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act8"
in twenty-seven states while the remaining states enforce the state
standards under federally approved plans.8' American courts exer-
cise a much stronger role than their counterparts in West Germany
in reviewing the validity of occupational safety and health
regulations.8"
Two other institutional actors occupy important roles in setting
and enforcing standards in West Germany. Industry and academic
technical experts in conjunction with government experts write the
regulations and are largely responsible for their interpretation
through their published work and affidavits on which the courts
rely.86 In the United States, the drafting process is more open, yet
the, final decision rests with the administrative agency and the re-
viewing courts.87 Privately set standards in the United States are not
accorded as much weight in the determination of legal standards as
they are in West Germany. 88 Furthermore, the work councils ex-
isting in most large West German enterprises have no American
counterpart.89 Likewise, the German statutory provisions for techni-
cal engineers, doctors, and safety stewards at the workplace have no
equivalent in American occupational safety and health law.9" Thus,
management, and safety in nuclear technology. Das Amt fuer Strahlenschutz wird mit 500
Mitarbeitern ausgestattet, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b)-(h). In 1987, California returned to federal enforcement and
South Carolina received final approval for its state program.
85. American courts are also involved in occupational safety and health disputes in an-
other context: private compensation lawsuits under product liability theories bring large dam-
age awards along with increasingly higher insurance premiums. Product liability litigation does
not exist on the same scale in West Germany; social health insurance and accident pensions
provide compensation on a broader basis without providing the occasional large awards that
receive so much publicity in the United States.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 406-36, 484-94.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1982) accords to the Secretary of Labor the determination of
priority for establishing standards. Section 655(f) permits any person "who may be adversely
affected" by an OSHA standard to challenge its validity in a federal court of appeals where he
resides or has his principal place of business. All but four of OSHA's eighteen health stan-
dards have been so challenged. See Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace, supra note
21, at 363 (table A-I, Dates of Completed OSHA Rulemakings for Health Standards, col. 7).
88. This is a subjective judgment borne out by product liability litigation in the United
States that as yet lacks substantial counterpart in West Germany. Many states prohibit evi-
dence of "state of the art" or of industry standards in such litigation. See, e.g., Santiago v.
Johnson Machine & Press Corp., No. 87-1230, slip op., at 5 (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 1987) (Pennsyl-
vania law, "state of the art" evidence not admissible in product liability case), relying on
Lewis v. Coiling Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., Inc., - Pa. _ 528 A.2d 590 (1987) (same
for industry standards).
89. Company-inspired plant committees with more than advisory powers have often been
enjoined as an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). Section 8(a)(2) makes it an "unfair labor practice" for an em-
ployer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organiza-
tion or contribute financial or other support to it ... "
90. Occupational medicine and safety engineering are small but growing professions in
the United States. These professions, however, lack the benefit of statutory requirements that
their services be used.
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compared to the United States, West Germany has many more insti-
tutional actors involved in standard-setting and enforcement of these
standards.
3. Substantive Fields.-The substantive fields regulated in the
two countries are similar: chemical exposure,9" equipment safety92
and medical testing93 are key areas of regulation. However, ergo-
nomics9 has yet to be incorporated into the American system of gov-
ernmental safety and health regulation. In West Germany, only the
work councils address ergonomic issues.
The definitions used for collecting data on occupational injuries
and diseases are different in both countries. A comparison of the oc-
cupational injury and illness statistics in an absolute sense is thus of
questionable utility. Methods of collection also differ. Nationwide
figures in the United States are derived from surveys; in West Ger-
many, each reported and compensated injury or illness is tabulated.95
There is no comparable unified data base in the United States, since
worker compensation is primarily administered by the individual
state.
At first glance, West Germany employing a workforce about
one-third the size of the American workforce, suffered nearly as
many fatal occupational accidents and injuries in 1984 as did the
United States.98 However, a comparison of the raw numbers is mis-
leading because statistical coverage of the workforce is much larger
in West Germany. Students, public sector workers and all private
sector workers are included in German tabulations, while in the
United States the figure is only an estimate for private industry es-
tablishments with eleven or more employees. 97 Moreover, nonfatal
injuries and illnesses are reported differently. In the United States,
estimates are made by industry and based upon days of work lost
due to occupationally related injury or illness.98 The German figures
91. See infra text accompanying notes 244-313.
92. Id. notes 234-43.
93. Id. notes 284-94, 395-405.
94. Ergonomics, also called human factors engineering, is "the science relating to man
and his world," and embodies "the anatomic, physiologic, psychologic, and mechanical princi-
ples affecting the efficient use of human energy." DORLAND, supra note 69, at 459.
95. See Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace. supra note 24, at 29-38 (United
States); Bericht der Bundesregierung ueber den Stand der Unfallverhuetung und das Un-
fallgeschehen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Unfallverhuetungsbericht) (Report of the
Federal Government on the Condition of Accident Prevention and Accident Occurrence in the
Federal Republic of Germany) (Accident Prevention Report), at 14-16, 20, 22-24, 28-35 (ta-
bles) (Bundestag, Drucksache No. 10/4601, 1985) (West Germany).
96. 3,125 fatal occupational accidents and injuries were reported as compared to an esti-
mated 3,740 in the United States. See Unfallverhuetungsbericht, supra note 95, at 5; News
Release at I (United States Dep't. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Nov. 13, 1985).
97. Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace, supra note 24, at 29.
98. Id. at 31.
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are based upon filed and awarded claims for insurance payments due
to occupational injury or illness. 9  Studies demonstrate that the Ger-
man conception of work accidents covers accidents not treated as oc-
cupationally related in the United States. 00
On the other hand, occupationally related illnesses' may be
undercounted in Germany more often than in the United States. The
official figures for fatalities due to occupational illnesses in West
Germany in 1984 totaled only 229.102 This figure is misleading, since
fatalities are reported in this category only where the deceased per-
son did not have a pension for occupational illness.'
C. American Problems
Eight problems in American occupational safety and health reg-
ulation will be used as benchmarks for comparison to the German
system. In the standard-setting process, recurring issues include: (1)
the relation of technology and the relation of scientific knowledge to
99. Unfallverhuetungsbericht, supra note 95, at 23.
100. A comparison of accidents in West Germany and the United States found that
5,625 school children in West Germany were injured in school bus accidents in 1983 while
only 4,300 school children in the United States were injured in school bus accidents the same
year. These numbers are dramatic in light of the fact that 21 million American school children
rode buses daily while the German figure was merely 1.6 million. The difference was ascribed
to German school bus drivers, who are part-time moonlighters, not full-time employees; to
traffic regulations in the United States that require motorists to stop behind a stopped school
bus; and to better markings on school buses in the United States. The German author reported
with astonishment that school bus design has not changed in 50 years in the United States.
Kamps, Arbeitsbelastungen und berufsbedingte Strassenverkehrsunfaelle, AMTLICHE MIT-
TEILUNGEN DER BUNDESANSTALT FUER ARBEITSSCHUTZ 3 (July 1986).
101. The most frequent occupational disease according to official statistics in both coun-
tries is noise-induced trauma. The United States Bureau of Labor Standards states that 66%
of occupational illnesses are due to skin diseases or noise-related trauma. News Release at 2
(United States Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Nov. 13, 1986). The largest cate-
gory of compensated occupational illness in West Germany in 1984 was noise (1,268 of 4,407).
Unfallverhuetungsbericht supra note 95, at 34-35. Such claims are challenged in both coun-
tries. In the United States, NIOSH considers that five other occupational diseases are more
frequent: occupational lung diseases, occupational cancers other than lung cancers, cardiovas-
cular diseases, reproductive disorders and neurotoxic disorders. Union representatives in West
Germany make similar claims regarding occupational cancers. E.g., Konstanty,
Berufsgenossenschaften und praeventive Gesundheitspolitik, 38 WSI Mitteilungen. Zeitschrift
des Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes
(WSI Communications - Magazine of the Economic and Social Science Institute of the Ger-
man Confederation of Labor [DGB]) 193, 195-96.
102. Unfallverhuetungsbericht supra note 95, at 16.
103. Fatalities due to an occupational illness for which the deceased person has already
received a pension are not counted. For example, a miner who retires and receives a pension
because of silicosis caused by his occupation will not be counted as a fatality even if he dies a
few months after receiving the pension. Annually, these deaths average about 1,800, according
to union representatives. Kaiser & Konstanty, Unfaliversicherung: Der Reformbedarf ist
gross- Bilanz unter Ausblick nach 100 Jahren, 34 Soziale Sicherheit - Zeitschrift fuer Sozi-
alpolitik (Social Security-Magazine for Social Politics) 161, 163 (1985). Additionally, esti-
mates of occupationally related cancer deaths are excluded and average five percent of all
deaths due to cancer (about 8,000). Konstanty, supra note 101, at 195. OSHA has used an
estimate of five percent of all cancers as work-related. See Hazard Communication, Final
Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1983).
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mandatory standards, (2) the role economic considerations should
have in determining the contents of occupational safety and health
standards, (3) the effect of judicial review of standards, and (4) the
rules governing preemption of state standards by federal standards.
Within the enforcement process, the most common problems include:
(5) enforcement methods at the administrative level, (6) the desira-
bleness and form of worker participation in enforcing occupational
safety and health rules, (7) the proliferation of product liability and
toxic tort litigation from occupational exposure as well as environ-
mental exposure, and (8) the preemption of federal enforcement by
state enforcement and vice versa.
1. Technology.
a. United States.-In the United States, technical experts do
not draft legal mandatory standards."" Technical judgments are
made after lengthy public hearings by administrative agencies with
limited resources. 0 5 Their judgments are then reviewed if challenged
by any person.106 On one hand, there is uncertainty in the validity of
the standards until they are judicially confirmed. However, on the
other hand, since the standards are usually drafted with specific ex-
posure limits and procedures for compliance,107 there is certainty in
application. The quantity of occupational safety and health regula-
tion is considerably less in the United States than in West Germany.
There is no legal relation in the United States between the public
standard-setting process and private voluntary standards set by tech-
nical experts.' 0 8
The lack of incorporation of technical experts and rules in the
administrative decision-making process results in perennial delay
which is called priority-setting. 0 9 Due to lack of resources, only a
104. Preventing Illness and-Injury in the Workplace, supra note 26a, at 275-94.
105. Id.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982).
107. E.g., the standards for toxic and hazardous substances, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1000-
.1047 (1985).
108. In the United States, technology and indefinite legal concepts appear in post-acci-
dent compensation lawsuits, where non-experts (often laypersons on juries) apply broad legal
concepts, ostensibly taking technical standards into account. Uncertainty exists here, too, until
dissipated in the concrete case by what often appears to be an arbitrary judgment by a jury of
laymen, unequally bestowing benefits on "lucky" individuals. Whether the potential liability of
manufacturers and suppliers results in de facto compliance with voluntary standards is un-
known. However, given the lack of a state-of-the-art defense in most jurisdictions for products
liability litigation in the United States, the incentives to comply are not strong. In addition,
litigation in occupational health is concentrated on only a few substances, such as asbestos.
Technical rules and indefinite legal concepts in the vast majority of substantive areas of regu-
lation are never reviewed by a court.
109. See, e.g., National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d
882, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("so long as his action is rational in the context of the statute, and
is taken in good faith, the Secretary [of Labor] has authority to delay development of a stan-
dard at any stage as priorities demand") (footnote omitted).
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few issues can be regulated at one time. Therefore, the danger that
improvements in technology will outdate the regulations before they
are implemented is tolerated as inevitable in the United States.'"
b. West Germany.-In West Germany, technology - through
technical standards"' and indefinite legal concepts"' - is incorpo-
rated in regulation. The law keeps up with technological changes be-
cause it defers to the experts for standard-setting and application of
the standards." 3 In effect, the employer has great flexibility in ap-
plying safety and health standards, although this flexibility is accom-
panied by uncertainty. However, the uncertainty is settled by general
agreement among technical experts, and as a result, has not caused
legal controversy in practice. The trend in new legislation is towards
directly mandating technical standards or scientific judgments as le-
gally enforceable norms, thereby relying less on indefinite legal
concepts.
The traditional view in the German literature staunchly opposes
the incorporation of technical standards into mandatory legal stan-
dards.' 4 The fears expressed are illustrated by the American experi-
ence with inflexibility, inability to keep up with technical develop-
ments, lack of experts in the bureaucracy, and conflicts between the
government bureaucracy and private standard-setting groups that in-
hibit the private development of technical standards." 5
The German system, which incorporates technology in the stan-
dard-setting process, is definitely superior to the limited government-
developed standards in the United States. German regulation is
broader and yet more detailed. The reluctance to incorporate volun-
tary technical standards into law in the United States is attributable
to the lesser range of participation and greater diffusion of standard-
110. One example: the 1971 National Electrical Code was incorporated as an OSHA
consensus standard in 1971. In 1984, there had been four revisions of the code, and the latest
edition was issued in 1984. Yet OSHA still required use of the 1971 code, 29 C.F.R. 932, 936
(1985); Regulatory Program of the United States Government 1985, at 320 (Office of Man-
agement & Budget, Executive Office of the President, 1986).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 198-203.
112. Id. at notes 204-17.
113. P. MARBURGER, supra note 18, at 145-47, 286-91.
114. Building codes are an exception.
115. See, e.g., W. ERNST, RECHTSGUTACHTEN ZUR GESTALTUNG DES VERHAELTNISSES
DER UEBERBETRIEBLICHEN TECHNISCHEN NORM ZUR RECHTSVERORDNUNG 29-30 (Deutscher
Normenausschuss (1973). The new Dangerous Substances Regulation strikes new ground in
incorporating technical rules as legal obligations. Here again, however, the Germans have
shown considerable flexibility in adopting technical standards into mandatory obligations. For
example, the obligation to undercut technical reference concentrations (TRKs) is not backed
up by a fine, it is phrased as aspirational rather than absolute (dafuer sorgen); employment
restrictions are seen as the remedy for a violation rather than fines (leaving room for doubt as
to whether they actually will be enforced); and the employer is obliged to adopt new techno-
logical developments improving on TRKs, again without the mechanism of a fine as enforce-
ment. See infra text accompanying notes 260-83.
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setting bodies in comparison with their counterparts in West Ger-
many. The advantages of greater coverage by including voluntary
standards and technical expertise in the legal process are so great
that methods should be found to remedy the weaknesses of voluntary
standard-setting organizations in the United States. The danger ex-
ists that incorporating technical rules and judgments as mandatory
standards in the United States, in the absence of institutional partic-
ipation by all affected groups, would lead to industry capture of gov-
ernment. A concern about delegating public power to private groups
is unwarranted at least for public health and safety problems, be-
cause without broad delegation, health and safety in the workplace
will be ineffective in a preventive sense.
Some standard's, however, have been codified in the United
States. In public health and safety matters,11 voluntary technical
standards have long been incorporated directly in state and munici-
pal codes, with many codes referring to the latest edition of profes-
sional voluntary standards as the legal standard, without any prior
review. Moreover, the Code of Federal Regulations'1 7 expressly in-
corporates safety standards of the American National Standards In-
stitute (ANSI), American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and
other standard-setting organizations.
Technical expertise has been tapped in the United States for
technical safety, but is not yet utilized in determining health
hazards. This may be a result of the fact that the field of safety is
more scientifically certain whereas the health field is subject to con-
troversy and speculation. In this way, the German public has a ten-
dency to put too much trust in its technical experts and avoids the
benefits of explanations and justifications." 8
2. Economics.
a. United States.-In applying economic guidelines to stan-
dard-setting, Americans are generalists, in that identical guidelines
are used to evaluate regulations without regard to their subject or
116. E.g., fire prevention, tank boiler and elevator safety, and codes for electricity, hous-
ing conditions, and construction.
117. 29 C.F.R. 931-38 (1985).
118. This view is shared by some Germans, too: scientists on expert committees charged
with the classification of substances as cancer-causing are urged to document (1) why certain
facts were deemed decisive and others not important, (2) the assumptions of the committee,
and (3) the justifications for using the assumptions made. Woelcke, Zur Einstufung von Stof-
fen als krebserzeugend, 3 Amtliche Mitteilungen der Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeitsschutz 3, 6
(1985). Perhaps it is a reaction to this lack of questioning that explains why the Green Party
enjoys substantial support among the young for its positions rejecting technology and reliance
on technical experts. No comparable policital movement has accompanied the rise in environ-
mental awareness in the United States.
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content. The procedure for enacting federal occupational safety and
health regulations is modeled on statutory procedures in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act u1 9 modified by an executive order120 requir-
ing consideration of economic factors. Occupational safety and
health regulations are subjected to a cost benefit analysis, and are
not to be issued unless their potential benefits to society outweigh
their potential costs to society.121 This has resulted in the President's
economists 122 returning several safety and health regulations pro-
posed by the Department of Labor,12 3 and influencing many
others.1 24 In effect, the United States has instituted centralized eco-
nomic planning for government regulations, using free market guide-
lines as the decision-making criteria.12 5 Thereby, OSHA regulations
in the United States are shaped by a tug of war between industrial
hygienists and safety engineers on the one side and economists on
119. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553, 706 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
120. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). This executive order applies
to all federal agencies in the executive department but excludes independent regulatory agen-
cies listed in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1982). See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 1(d). The Supreme
Court subsequently ruled that OSHA see supra note 7, does not itself require the balancing of
the benefits and costs of health standards. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490 (1980).
121. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b).
122. The Office of Management and Budget [hereinafter OMB] was established in the
Executive Office of the President in 1970. 5 C.F.R. § 1303.2(a) (1986). It is staffed largely by
economists. Exec. Order No. 12,291 empowers the Director of OMB to, inter alia, "(r)equire
an agency to obtain and evaluate, in connection with a regulation, any additional relevant data
from any appropriate source." Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 6(a)(3).
123. E.g., OMB returned the following proposed regulations to the Department of Labor
for reconsideration in 1984: (1) occupational exposure to toxic substances in laboratories, and
(2) concrete and masonry construction. See OMB, Executive Office of the President, Regula-
tory Program of the United States Government 578 (1985) (Exhibit 8 - Regulations Re-
turned to Agencies for Reconsideration in 1984).
124. See House Comm. on Gov't Operations, OMB Interference With OSHA Rulemak-
ing, H.R. Rep. No. 98-583, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). On October 27, 1987, OMB in-
structed OSHA to reconsider parts of the revised hazard communication standard. OMB
based its decision not under Exec. Order No. 12,291 but under the Paperwork Reduction Act,
44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (1982). This statute enables the Director of OMB to, inter alia,
review and approve information collection requests proposed by agencies, and determine
whether the collection of information by an agency will have practical utility for the agency.
44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(1), (2). See 'Unusual' Budget Office Paperwork Decision Directs OSHA
to Additional Hazard Rulemaking, 16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 907 (Nov. 4, 1987 (text at
916-21, reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 46,075 (1987). In February 1988, OMB instructed OSHA
that its standard on formaldehyde would not go into effect as planned because of OMB's con-
cerns about excessive information collection under the standard. This directive, too, was based
on the Paperwork Reduction Act. See 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) at 1374 (Feb. 3, 1988).
125. Such control has been criticized as using microeconomic rules to govern regulations
intended to operate on a macro-economic level. Economists tend to look at a standard isolated
from the context in which it appears. Existing social costs such as litigation awards, litigation
costs, medical costs and unmet medical treatment needs are not considered and cannot be
logically considered by each separate standard. In support of economic review of individual
standards in occupational safety and health, it is argued that without them there will be exces-
sive costs imposed on enterprises that will harm the competitiveness of American industry in
the world.
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the other.
b. West Germany.-In West Germany, economic costs and
benefits of proposed occupational safety and health regulations are
considered informally on an ad hoc basis. Several factors within
West Germany contribute to the tendency to neglect economic anal-
ysis of the costs of regulations.
First, indefinite legal concepts pervade the legal obligations
leaving the precise limits of these obligations defined by technical
rules and privately issued standards. Estimation of compliance costs
within scientific judgments or technical rules are made difficult given
the varied interpretations of legal obligations.
Second, the political environment in West Germany prevents ec-
onomics from playing a large role in occupational safety and health
standard-setting. The minority "liberal" party126 espouses a free, un-
regulated market yet garners only five percent of the vote. The major
"conservative" party 127 is rooted in religious and populist values and
rejects the pursuit of political policy solely on economic grounds of
efficiency or rationalization. Therefore, the five "wise ones ' 28 give
their expert opinions on the general economic situation in a yearly
report, and national economic stability is a goal imposed on govern-
ment by statute. 12 9 Yet, no central government apparatus exists to
carry out these mandates as a matter of regulatory planning. The
system of social insurance initiated by Bismarck in 188413° has
marked German "conservative" politics clearly at the social welfare
end of the economic spectrum.
Moreover, there are complaints in West Germany about the so-
cial welfare burdens: the increasing costs of governmental social ben-
efits, the wisdom of government control of the employment market,
indefinite employment contracts that make it difficult to terminate
employees and thus inhibit creation of new jobs, and rising insurance
and medical care costs. 81 This debate has not extended, however, to
technical labor protection. The contrast with the United States in
126. The Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP is pivotal and has been a coalition partner
in all governments since 1966.
127. Christlich Demokratische Union or CDU; in Bavaria, the Christlich Soziale Union
(CSU) is slightly more conservative but shares similar values.
128. This is the popular label given to the five economics professors who evaluate na-
tional economic developments in an annual report to the federal government. See Gesetz ueber
die Bildung eines Sachverstaendigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung, BGBI.I 685 (1963), as amended, BGBI.I 633 (1966).
129. Gesetz zur Foerderung der Stabilitaet und des Wachstulms der Wirtschaft (Law
for the Promotion of the Stability and Growth of the Economy), 1967 BGBI.I 582. See infra
text accompanying notes 449-50.
130. See supra text accompanying note 29.
131. From the employers' viewpoint, Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeit-
geberverbaende, Jahresbericht 1987 50-51 (1987), and id., Gesamtueberblick aus dem
Jahresbericht 1987, at 6, 8-10.
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the economic dimension could not be greater. Economically speak-
ing, Americans not Germans, are the centralists." 2
An equivalently centralized system in West Germany, 13  similar
to that occupied by the Office of Management and Budget in the
United States, would not be consistent with the politics of the two
major political parties in West Germany. It would be rejected by
public opinion as unsocial. Nevertheless, the inclusion of economic
costs and benefits as a formal part of deliberations in setting regula-
tions and technical standards would help concretize the discussions
and resulting norms. A public economic review of occupational
safety and health standard-setting in West Germany is perhaps in-
tentionally avoided in order to keep technological and scientific judg-
ments immune from political compromise. The risk of this omission
is manifestly inapposite of the laudable goals set by the incorpora-
tion of technological advances in the law: the non-recognition of
safety and health dangers due to the absence of economic pressure
on enterprises to discover or solve technical problems.
3. Judicial Review.
a. United States.-The threat of judicial review often eliminates
controversial parts of regulations in the United States. This in turn
effects a delay of several years before regulations become effective.""
Through the process of judicial review, courts examine the adminis-
trative record of regulatory bodies in search of a reasoned justifica-
tion for the conclusions and rules reached. The courts have required
a showing of significant need 36 for regulations concerned with occu-
pational health. This requirement impedes the agency from taking
preventive action where the hazard is not completely recognized. 36
It is questionable, however, whether the courts are qualified to
132. The term centralists refers to a group of policymakers who approve or reject gov-
ernmental regulations using identical criteria.
133. E.g., creating a federal Office of Management and Budget in the Chancellor's
office.
134. In the past ten years, OSHA regulatory processes and their written justification
have become steadily more comprehensive. Public records of proceedings frequently run more
than 10,000 pages. Moreover, although federal OSHA is not required to hold hearings on
proposed rules or standards, major regulations are accompanied by extensive hearings, which
also delay the, process.
135. E.g., deaths, injuries or illness. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (benzene standard held invalid for lack of a showing that the
standard was "reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material
health impairment. 448 U.S. at 639.)
136. E.g., OSHA stayed the publication of lists of potential occupational carcinogens in
the wake of the Industrial Union Dep't. decision, supra note 135. See 48 Fed. Reg. 243
(1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 187 (1982). 29 C.F.R. § 1990.121 note (1986). The projected list is part
of OSHA's Carcinogen Policy, which sets forth procedures for identifying, classifying, and
regulating potential occupational carcinogens. 29 C.F.R. § 1990.101 (1986). The Carcinogen
Policy does not impose any requirements on employers. Regulatory Program of the United
States Government. supra note 110, at 274.
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make a judgment concerning the amount of uncertainty in determin-
ing an occupational safety and health standard.137 The emphasis on
party-appointed experts rather than court-appointed experts does not
aid judges in reaching scientific judgments. Frequently, the adminis-
trative record is simply too vast for rational review. Although Ameri-
can courts regularly review expert opinions in worker compensation
cases, they reject this in administrative law cases and instead defer
to an agency whose limited budget and expertise are well known. 38
b. West Germany.-The German system of incorporation suf-
fers from excessive reliance on technical experts. West German
courts have no statutory authority to invalidate occupational safety
and health regulations or most federal law other than on constitu-
tional grounds. In addition, proceedings of standard-setting are se-
cret and haphazard. 39 Technical standards published by the Labor
Ministry'" and the expert committees of the insurance bodies"' as
well as deliberations in governmental bodies such as the
Bundesrat,"2 should be more accessible to public review. Similarly,
judicial review of the validity of occupational safety and health regu-
lations issued by the state or insurance bodies should be available.
Such measures would insure that the incorporation of technology in
law is taken seriously.
This criticism further extends to the courts. The resolution of
appealed orders and fines, and appeals of criminal convictions are
difficult to determine. Appeals and judgments are not automatically
available to the public and the court panel has the discretion
whether or not to release a copy of the judgment to a non-party upon
request.t4 .3 Only the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht) and the Federal Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal
Law (Bundesgerichtshof) publish all of their decisions. Furthermore,
officially published decisions are not always printed in full.
The authorization, in American law, for a court to order admin-
istrative rulemaking is unknown in German law."' German regula-
137. It is also questionable whether administrative agencies, which are continually short
of technical expertise, staff, and funds, are qualified to make these judgments.
138. This is partially due to the individualist ethic, which distrusts scientific objectivity
and pretends that the administrative state will be a neutral arbiter.
139. Greater openness, it is feared, would discourage compromise and prevent consensus.
140. See infra text accompanying note 207.
141. See infra notes 435-36.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 445-46.
143. The names of the parties are deleted from published decisions. This may be traced
to the belief that decisions bind only the immediate parties and do not set precedent, and to a
desire for privacy.
144. See Wuertenberger, Die Normenerlassklage als funktionsgerechte Fortbildung
verwaltungsprozessualen Rechtsschutzes, 105 Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts 370, 374 nn.21-
22 (1980) (noting that such orders are generally rejected by the courts and commentators).
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tions are divided into levels of increasing complexity - statutes, reg-
ulations, general administrative regulations, technical standards, and
scientific judgments.'45 Despite this complex hierarchy of regula-
tions, German courts need to consider in cases presenting imminent
occupational risks, whether an order to an administrative agency or
a public insurance body to consider or take specific action on a par-
ticular issue or substance makes sense, regardless of the existence of
technical standards. 146
Judicial review of the private standard-setting bodies to force
rulemaking would not fall under administrative law in either the
United States or West Germany, since these organizations are pri-
vate bodies. The sole basis on which judicial review of private bodies
would be warranted is on procedural and participatory ground
rules." 7 Abuses in setting private standards are reviewable ade-
quately in the United States under antitrust law and in West Ger-
many under unfair competition and delictual law.148
4. Preemption in Standard-Setting
a. United States.-The American states rather than the fed-
145. See infra text accompanying notes 189-97.
146. This is especially so in the field of dangerous substances where there exists a trend
towards the concretization of occupational safety and health duties into legal norms. However,
the use of indefinite legal concepts that incorporate technical standards makes such promulga-
tion of legal norms unnecessary in theory, since the obligation to act already exists. See infra
text accompanying note 484.
147. See Furth, Evaluation of a Rescinded Regulation, in Standards and the Law 1,2
(American Nat'l Standards Inst. 1984) (description of a federal "circular" that required each
private standard-setting organization to give public notice of its meetings and other standard-
setting activities through media designed to reach persons reasonably expected to have an in-
terest in the subject, issued in 1980, withdrawn in 1982) (United States); Normenvertrag §§ 1,
2, 4 (Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and DIN), 54 DIN-Mitteilungen
359-67 (1975) (DIN agrees to consider the public interest in its standard-setting, to give rep-
resentatives of the federal government a place in its standards committees upon request, to
involve government agencies in its standards-setting activity, to give priority to requests from
the federal government for standard-setting, and to withdraw or adopt a DIN standard if the
federal government issues a contradictory rule. The federal government agrees not to issue
rules pending DIN's consideration of priority requests from the government, so long as the
public interest, laws or enforcement do not otherwise require action) (West Germany).
148. See, e.g., American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556 (1982). In this case, Hydrolevel, a manufacturer of boilers, claimed that the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, a private standard-setting group, issued a false interpretation
of its code upon the urging of a competitor of Hydrolevel. The Supreme Court held that the
standards group and Hydrolevel's competitor could be held liable for treble damages if this
was done with the intent to materially damage Hydrolevel's marketing of its boilers. In Indian
Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.) cert. granted, 56
U.S.L.W. 3242 (Oct. 6, 1987), efforts by manufacturers of steel conduit to stack the vote at a
meeting of the National Fire Protection Association against a proposal by manufacturers of
PVC conduit were held to be unprotected anticompetitive acts, which subjected them to treble
damages on a $3.8 million verdict. If the standards effort, however, is connected with the
adoption by legislative bodies of the private standards, and the legislative adoption rather than
the private standards caused the competitive injury, the actions will be exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. Sessions Tank Lines, Inc. v. Joar Mfg., Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 2393 (C.D. Calif. Jan. 21,
1986) (United States); see infra text accompanying notes 477-83 for German cases.
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eral government have traditionally taken the chief legislative and ad-
ministrative role in setting public health laws.'49 Nevertheless, fed-
eral OSHA standards are frequently written to preempt states from
maintaining or setting inconsistent rules. The opportunity of testify-
ing at hearings or submitting written comments does not afford ade-
quate participation by the states and by private groups in federal
standard-setting. The states' expertise and resources cannot be effec-
tively utilized by offering views to an understaffed and inexpert fed-
eral agency. "The science of government is 'the science of experi-
mentation,' "15 yet the use of preemption often cripples state
experimentation and prevents developments of a preventive system
that adopts current technology.
b. West Germany.-In West Germany, the Laender may pro-
mulgate laws in occupational safety and health matters provided
that the federal government has not occupied the field. 15 Duplicative
standard-setting occurs more frequently between federal regulations
and the accident prevention regulations of the vocational insurance
associations. No formal preemption rules exist in this area. Since the
membership on the technical committees of the Federal Labor Min-
istry (Bundesarbeitsministerium) and the technical committees of
the vocational insurance associations (Berufsgenossenschaften) nor-
mally overlap, there is little danger of conflict. In practice, profes-
sionals at the plant level often use technical standards published by
private bodies15 rather than the more unwieldy compilations of ap-
proved technical standards issued by the Federal Labor Ministry.
The vocational insurance associations have not been active in setting
exposure levels for chemicals in the workplace. 53 However, where
overlap does exist between accident prevention regulations and fed-
eral regulations, the former have a narrower coverage 54 unless ex-
tended by statute.
Conflicts have been mentioned in the literature'55 but have sel-
149. In upholding a state statute that required insurance carriers to include minimum
mental health care benefits in health insurance policies offered to state residents, the Supreme
Court stated: "The States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to
legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons . . .
laws affecting occupational health and safety . . . are. . . examples." Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985).
150. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821).
151. Art. 74(12) Grundgesetz, supra note 8. For example, the 1986 Dangerous Sub-
stance Regulation expressly preempts numerous Laender laws.
152. E.g., DIN. See infra note 193.
153. They have left this to the German Research Society's Panel for MAK-Values and
to the Technical Committee for Dangerous Substances of the Federal Labor Ministry.
154. The coverage extends only to members of the Vocational Insurance Association.
155. See, e.g., Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung, 3Arbeits-
schutzsystem - Untersuchung in der Bundersrepublik Deutschland 1088-89 (Forschungsber-
icht [Research Rep.] No. 232, 1980).
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dom come before the courts for review. The continuation of the
double track system is favored by the historical role of the vocational
insurance associations in linking medical treatment and workplace
safety with accident insurance and disability pensions. Multiplicity
of regulators is seen by workers as providing a double security for
workplace protection. 15e Political and institutional forces in German
society probably will prevent the elimination of the standard-setting
authority of the vocational insurance -associations.
5. Methods of Administrative Enforcement
a. United States.-In the United States, there is a distinction
between inspection for consultation and inspections that can lead to
citations and fines."" A violation is immediately cited with a fine.
However, remedial orders must be issued by a court and are ex-
tremely rare. Few inspections are made despite the enforcement sys-
tem's emphasis on compliance subject to the imposition of sanc-
tions.158 Advocates of stricter state enforcement of occupational
safety and health standards in the United States tend to focus on the
amount of fines and number of violations rather than on how compli-
ance could better be achieved. 5
b. West Germany.-The occupational inspectorates
(Gewerbeaufsicht) in West Germany maintain no distinction in staff
or inspections regarding consultation and inspections. Remedial or-
ders are issued in great quantities, but fines are imposed only excep-
tionally. The emphasis is on consultation. No exemptions from in-
spections are given.
156. Id. at 1083.
157. A federally funded, state operated consultation program offers small business con-
sultations with different personnel rather than those used for regular inspections. No citations
are issued during the consultation and no regular inspection is scheduled for one year. See
House Comm. on Education and Labor, Subcomm. on Health and Safety, Oversight on
OSHA: State of the Agency, Serial No. 99-12, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985) (testimony of
Robert Rowland, Asst. Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health); All About
OSHA supra note 7, at 35-36.
158. In absolute terms, the number of inspections by the occupational inspectorates and
vocational insurance associations in West Germany is ten times the number of state and fed-
eral inspections by occupational safety and health agencies in the United States. In Germany,
the number of inspections of workplaces totalled 1,719,691 in 1984 (about evenly divided be-
tween the two institutions). Unfallverhuetungsbericht, supra note 95, at 47, 51. In the United
States, federal and state OSHA inspections totalled 179,000 in fiscal year 1984 (71,000 were
federal inspections and 108,000 were by the states). Of this number 9,000 federal inspections
covered only a review of employer records without a view of the workplace itself. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 72d Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1984, at 1, 2, 34; U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Inspec-
tion Reports. This comparison is somewhat overdrawn in that many American states use other
agencies for inspections of certain equipment or machinery. Nevertheless, when the relative
number of employees and establishments in the two countries are taken into account, the gap
remains staggering and provocative. Fines by federal OSHA totalled $7.7 million. Id.
159. E.g., Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace, supra note 24, at 23.
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Curiously, there is little concern among unions for more sanc-
tions.160 Similarly, the Social Democratic Party proposes a Chemi-
cals Policy16' advocating more governmental authority to prohibit
use of dangerous substances but omits reference to the use of
sanctions.
The Laender, which are charged with enforcement of safety and
health laws through the occupational inspectorates, complain that
they lack the authority to issue fines in certain cases. For example, in
approving the new Dangerous Substances Regulation, the Bundesrat
requested the federal government to make noncompliance with or-
ders (Anordnungen), under the Chemicals Statute, punishable by a
fine. The proposed revision would declare non-compliance with an
order to be a breach of order (Ordnungswidrigkeit), enabling the
occupational inspectorate to issue a fine and seek its collection
through the criminal branch of the ordinary courts. 6 '
The relevant question is not how many fines are levied or viola-
tions found but how compliance can best be achieved in each society.
The West Germans have opted for frequent inspections, plentiful or-
ders, but few external sanctions.' 63 The Americans would do well to
examine this as a possible course of action in place of few inspections
accompanied by coercive fines.'"
6. Participation
a. United States.-American labor unions are hesitant to under-
take enforcement responsibilities in safety and health matters, fear-
ing liability in suits by their members or joinder by employers and
insurance companies in product liability suits. 6 ' "Right to know"
regulations 66 and regulations regarding the right to refuse danger-
ous work 717 are aimed at the individual or union as actors, but not at
160. The staff of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, in making suggestions for improved
enforcement by the accident insurance associations, suggests not levying more fines, but hiring
more technically qualified personnel - engineers, doctors, chemists, physicists, psychologists,
and sociologists. Kaiser & Konstanty, supra note 103 at 167.
161. Antrag der SPD Angeordneten, Konzept fuer eine umwelt- und gesundheitsver-
traegliche Chemiepolitik (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 10/518, Mar. 13, 1986).
162. Beschluss des Bundesrates (Decision of the Federal Council), 128, at 102 (Deut-
scher Bundesrat, Drucksache 211/86, May 16, 1986).
163. E.g.. infra note 529.
164. Infra note 158.
165. Union lawyers, for example, urge the union to (1) caution their safety committee
members against personally undertaking efforts to abate or eliminate hazardous conditions,
and (2) make it plain in the collective bargaining agreement that the employer retains exclu-
sive responsibility to provide a safe and healthful workplace. Cohen, Union Liability Under
State Tort Law For Workplace Injuries or Illnesses, 3 The Labor Law Exchange 28, 32
(1985).
166. E.g., the federal Hazard Communication Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
(1985).
167. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (1985).
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the workplace community as a whole. The concept that the majority-
elected union has a duty to represent the entire workforce' 68 also
requires the union to consider safety in the workplace as a whole.
However, the "duty of fair representation" is a judicial construction
and vague in content. 6 ' More important, unions represent less than
20% of the workforce.' Workplace involvement in occupational
safety and health regulation in the United States exists only where
safety committees have been established by company policy or col-
lective bargaining agreements.'
b. West Germany.-The West German participatory system is
oriented towards the interests of the work community or team
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft) which includes workers as well as supervisors
and employers. Mandatory requirements for safety and medical ser-
vices at the workplace, for plant safety and health committees, and
for safety stewards as well displace the role of the labor union as an
institution for enforcing occupational safety and health rules. 7 ' It is
difficult for individual workers to call attention to problems that the
work council does not acknowledge. Workplace medical services are
not always used by workers for fear of losing jobs. 73 The emphasis
on medical testing results in neglect of measures for plant engineer-
ing and exposure controls, and the lack of central data collection of
medical statistics inhibits effective prevention or recognition of many
occupational disease cases.' 7
7. Litigation
a. United States.-Product liability"' and toxic tort litigation16
concerned with occupational disease and accidents are an indirect
method of private occupational safety and health enforcement in the
168. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
169. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976).
170. In 1987, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 17 percent of the wage
and salary work force over the age of 16 were members of unions. Daily Labor Rep. (BNA),
Jan. 25, 1988, at 1.
171. The 1982 National Agreement between the Clothing Manufacturers Association
USA and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, for example, provides for a
joint safety and health study committee to be composed of representatives of the association
and the union. Workplace safety committees are established either by agreement or through de
facto creation by unions.
172. See infra notes 367-74.
173. Infra note 400.
174. Infra notes 367-74.
175. According to one insurance industry report, forty-two percent of awards in product
liability cases concern work accidents. Insurance Service Office, 1976 Product Liability Closed
Claims Survey, Rep. 18 - Theory of Liability (1976).
176. Toxic torts refer to the effects on health of substances in the environment or work-
place. Litigation about toxic torts relies on product liability for theories of recovery. Its use has
increased dramatically in the past ten years.
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United States. Litigation, however, is a largely inadequate and inef-
fective tool. Such litigation occurs over a limited number of acci-
dents and diseases, and only after injury or the probability of future
injury has been caused. Moreover, it is brought by individuals who
alone reap remedial benefits. Thus, as a compensation system, such
litigation is unfair and unpredictable. Those who do not sue receive
nothing, whereas a few litigants receive millions of dollars.1"7 Litiga-
tion raises insurance costs without affecting insurance benefits and
insurance companies search for ways to avoid exposure. Insurance
companies would rather withdraw from fields with high litigation re-
coveries than institute prevention programs. There is little evidence
that litigation inspires prevention programs. " 8
b. West Germany.-Product liability claims against manufac-
turers and suppliers are infrequent due to the procedural barriers to
litigation in West Germany.1 9 The lack of strict liability in this
area, the generous social insurance system, and the reluctance of ac-
cident insurance bodies to sue other insurance companies further dis-
courage product liability claims.180 The individual lacks financial in-
centive to sue in West Germany on claims stemming from
occupational causes. Toxic tort litigation claiming occupational links
is virtually unknown in West Germany, although complaints by com-
munity residents against neighboring factories and schools contain-
ing PCBs have occurred in large cities.
Questions of causation 8 ' that plague American product liability
litigation arise in West Germany primarily with occupational pen-
sion determinations. Only some 13% of these claims are granted in
West Germany. 82 Medical affidavits from different doctors often
conflict with one another, leaving the decision to the pension com-
mittee. The decision is not appealable. Thus, increased coverage for
social insurance in the United States can be expected not to elimi-
nate the difficulties of determining causation. Moreover, it is likely
to transfer the arena of dispute from the courts to an administrative
body and from tort law to insurance law.
Product liability claims in West Germany are rare and are
brought by and paid in annuity payments to the vocational insurance
177. In 1985 and 1986, one study located only 488 jury verdicts in the United States of
over $1 million, eighty-three of which were product liability cases. Phila. Legal Intelligencer,
Jan. 5, 1987, at 3.
178. Plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers contend the opposite, but not persuasively.
179. Infra text accompanying notes 596-98.
180. Infra notes 582-88, 598-605.
181. For example, is shortness of breath due to being overweight or to asbestosis?
182. Unfallverhuetungsbericht, supra note 95 at 35.
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associations where a worksite accident or injury is involved. 8 The
individual is placed in no better position after a successful lawsuit.
The costs of accident and health insurance in Germany are often
ignored when Germans voice their outrage about the costs of liability
insurance in the United States.184
8. Preemption in Enforcement
a. United States.-In the United States, state and federal en-
forcement of occupational safety and health regulation are treated as
exclusive of one another. Federal supervision of states with state ap-
proved OSHA plans is inadequate. Some state and local agencies
perform duties that cover safety concerns, however, many laws they
enforce are not federally governed.185 In specific employment fields,
such as mining, nuclear power plants, and agricultural employment,
special enforcement bodies exist at either the federal or state level. 86
While the exclusive enforcement jurisdiction of these agencies fosters
simplicity of inspection and avoids conflicting orders, the additional
safety margin that duplicate checks may provide is lost.
b. West Germany.-There is no preemption of vocational insur-
ance associations' enforcement responsibilities by the occupational
inspectorate. The unions, which favor increased enforcement, are the
only institutional group favoring the consolidation of enforcement re-
sponsibilities in one agency."'
The judicial appellate process further illustrates the concurrent
sources of occupational safety and health enforcement authority in
West Germany: social courts review the accident insurance associa-
tions' remedial orders, administrative courts review the remedial or-
ders of the Laender, and criminal court panels of the ordinary civil
courts review fines levied by both authorities. 88 The administrative
183. This may change after the new European community directive on product liability
is implemented in German law. O.J. EuRo. COMM. (No. L 210) 31 (Aug. 7, 1985).
184. While accident insurance payments and health care costs are difficult to compare,
payments of accident insurance in West Germany in 1984 totalled 11.5 billion German marks,
or over seven billion dollars at current exchange rates. This figure is more than one-half of the
total worker compensation payments in the United States in 1978. Also interesting to note are
other, higher social payments: fifteen billion German marks as payments for children
(Kindergeld); twenty-five billion German marks for wage replacement for illness
(Lohnfortzahlung), and 109 billion marks for health insurance payments (Krankenver-
sicherung). Hauck & Schenke, Voraussetzungen geschaffen, Bundesarbeitsblatt 5, 7 (1985)
(chart).
185. E.g., licensing inspection requirements for boilers, elevators and other mechanical
equipment.
186. E.g., The U.S. (Department of Labor maintains a separate agency for overseeing
mine safety. Many states have agencies for migrant farm workers.
187. See, e.g., Gewerkschaften zum Arbeitsschutz, Die (Formerly Die Berufsgenossen-
schaft 396 (1984).
188. § 51(4) Sozialgerichtsgesetz, 1975 BGBI.l 2535 (social courts); § 40(1) Verwal-
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enforcement system is part of the entire legal judicial system; it is
not built on a single specialized agency, as in the United States.
IV. German Technical Standards
A. Nomenclature
German statutes concerned with occupational safety contain
mostly general clauses and leave their concretization to administra-
tive regulation. State regulations (Verordnungen) bind all persons;
accident prevention regulations (Unfallverhuetungsvorschriften), by
themselves, bind only the employer members and insured persons of
the vocational insurance association that issues the regulation.
Where statutes or state regulations (Verordnungen) adopt the acci-
dent prevention regulation as legal standards, they then bind all
persons.'89
General administrative regulation (allgemeine Verwaltungsvor-
schriften) cannot be used by administrative authorities to require be-
havior by private persons, but the administrative authorities must ac-
cept behavior that complies with such regulations. 190  Since
individuals cannot be required to obey general administrative regula-
tions directly, such regulations lack the status of legal norms
(Rechtsnormen).191
Non-binding guidelines (Richtlinien), circulars (Merkblaetter)
and enforcement advice (Durchfuehrungsanweisungen) do not bind
the issuing authorities either internally or externally. They indicate
recommended policy only, and so cannot be the basis for a fine.' 92
Similarly, technical standards occupy an important role but are not
legally binding by themselves. Private organizations 93 and expert
tungsgerichtsordnung, 1960 BGBI.I 17 (administrative courts) - after administrative review,
id. § 68); §46 Ordnungswidrigkeitsgesetz, 1987 BGBI.I 602, § I Strafprozessordnung, 1987
BGBL.1 1074, § 24 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 1975 BGBI.I 1077, as amended by 1984
BGBI.I 1654 (civil courts).
189. E.g., Equipment Safety Law § 3(1) (Geraetesicherheitsgesetz).
190. See P. Marburger, supra note 18, at 414-26; H. Mauer, Allgemeine Verwaltung-
srecht 489-91 (4th ed. 1985).
191. Judgment of Feb. 6, 1978, Bundesverwaltungsgericht, (BVERwG) (highest Admin-
istrative Court), 24 Gewerbe Archiv: Zeitschrift fuer Verwaltungs- und Gewerberecht 232, 238
(1978). Nevertheless, such regulations can give legally binding status to technical standards.
General administrative regulations issued under the Equipment Safety Law, for example, cre-
ate a presumption that privately-set technical standards and non-binding guidelines of the vo-
cational insurance associations are generally recognized technical rules upon their publication
in the Federal Labor Gazette (Bundesarbeitsblat).
192. Judgment of Apr. 27, 1978, Oberlandesgericht, Karlsruhe [OLGI (Court of Ap-
peals, Karlsruhe), Die Berufsgenossenschaft 600 (1983). Nevertheless, the hortatory duties
imposed by statute or binding regulation are defined in detail in this type of regulation.
193. The largest private standard-setting organizations are the DIN German Institute
for Standardization, issuer of DIN-Standards; the Association of German Electrical Techni-
cians (Verein Deutscher Elektrotechniker), issuer of VDE-Rules, and the Association of Ger-
man Engineers (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure), promoter of VDI-Guidelines. The standards
issued by these organizations tend to pertain to safety rather than health issues.
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advisory committees" 4 of the Federal Labor Ministry prepare these
technical standards.
There are three types of technical standards: technical rules (die
Regeln der Technik), technical norms (technische Normen), and sci-
entific findings (wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse). In the field of ex-
posure to dangerous substances, technical standards are called scien-
tific findings. These scientific findings establish maximum worksite
concentrations (maximale Arbeitsplatzkonzentrationen or MAK-
Values) 195 as determined by a panel of the German Research Society
(deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft).
The panel sets no maximum concentrations for carcinogenic
substances (krebserzeugende Arbeitsstoffe) or mutagenic substances
(erbgutveraendernde Arbeitsstoffe). Instead, the Advisory Commit-
tee for Dangerous Substances (Ausschuss fuer Gefahrstoffe)1 96 de-
termines "toleration" values (Toleranzwerte) or technical reference
concentrations (technische Richtkonzentrationen (TRKs) of such
substances. The panel of the German Research Society advises em-
ployers to seek concentrations below this toleration value to the
greatest possible extent." 7 Thus, occupational safety and health
standards rely on technical experts to define their content.
B. Incorporation
The nearly unanimous view among German commentators and
government authorities is that regulation (Vorschriften or Rechtsver-
ordnungen) should not contain technical standards:
It lies in the nature of the subject and is proven through
practice that regulations can never contain ready technical solu-
tions. These are constantly in flux. A literal fulfillment (Erfuel-
lung) of legal requirements for technical equipment in general is
not possible; it always depends on the appropriate compliance
(Durchfuehrung). The decisive point is that the requirements for
the goal of protection are achieved. "8
194. The Labor Minister appoints a committee for each type of installation that requires
supervision under the Trade Law, see infra note 228, as well as for dangerous substances, infra
notes 196, 424-32.
195. (maximale Arbeitsplatzkonzentrationen or MAK-Values). MAK-Values are mea-
surements based on an exposure of eight hours a day to certain substances in the air at the
workplace in the form of gas, dust or steam. They are based principally on human experience.
Where human results do not exist, however, the panel uses animal experimental data and
reduces the results three to thirty times. The panel also sets biological tolerance values (bio-
logische Arbeitsstofftoleranzwerte (BAT-Values) for concentrations of substances in blood and
urine; fourteen have been issued so far.
196. The committee is appointed by the Labor Minister. See Gefahrstoffverordnung §
44.
197. Maximum Concentrations at the Workplace and Biological Tolerance Values for
Working Materials 1985, supra note 195, at 59.
198. Volkman, Die Zentralstelle fuer Unfallverhuetung des Hauptverbandes der gewer-
blichen Berufsgenossenschaften, in Festschrift fuer Dr. Herbert Lauterbach zum 60.
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Technical standards, unlike regulations, provide no independent
legal basis for enforcement measures by public authorities. 99 These
standards, 200 however, become mandatory whenever statutes, binding
regulations, the administrative authorities, or the reviewing courts
determine that the specific technical rule, guideline, or regulation is
a "generally recognized rule of technology" (eine allgemein
anerkannte Regel der Technik).'0'
The German system makes up for the lack of mandatory rules
by instituting broad, legally binding regulations containing indefinite
legal concepts (unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe)102 whose scope can en-
compass technical standards. Statutes and regulations, incorporating
general formulae such as "the generally recognized rules of technol-
ogy"2 ' and "the state of technology" (Stand der Technik), link
technical standards to the regulatory structure and hence to a legal
standard.
1. General Recognition Rules.-The majority view still defines
"generally recognized" as the technical rule adhered to by a major-
ity of experts active in a particular field. 04 In addition, the rule must
have been applied in practice and have shown itself to be practica-
ble.0 3 The minority view, which finds no support in judicial deci-
sions, dispenses with the practice requirement and requires only that
Geburtstag, Grundsatzfragen der sozialen Unfallversicherung 227 (1961) (emphasis in
original).
199. Judgment of Aug. 29, 1961, Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVERwG], Neue Juris-
tisehe Woche [NJW] 506 (1962).
200. This includes technical rules as well as nonbinding technical standards set forth in
guidelines and general administrative regulations.
201. This term appears in numerous statutes.
202. Indefinite legal concepts must be distinguished from general clauses (General-
klauseln). General clauses give courts open-ended discretion to define legal norms. An example
would be the duty of good faith imposed on parties in performing contracts by section 242 of
the Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch) (BGB). The determination of an indefinite legal
concept by the courts or agencies, on the other hand, involves establishing factual elements.
203. The origins of this term lies in building standards referred to by medieval guilds as
the "rules of building art" (die Regeln der Baukunst). The guilds had their own inspectors,
and continued functioning until well into the nineteenth century. The "rules of building art"
became part of police law rules governing construction of buildings. P. MARBURGER, supra
note 18, at 149-50.
The expression "generally recognized rules of technology" found its first entry into statu-
tory law as a standard of negligence for what is now the crime of serious endangerment of the
environment, as found in the Criminal Code. (Strafgesetzbuch) Section 330(l)[3] makes pun-
ishable with three months to five years imprisonment for a person, inter alia, "to operate
pipeline equipment for transporting water-endangering substances or work equipment for stor-
ing, unloading or transferring water-endangering substances . . . in a manner that is a gross
violation of the generally recognized rules of technology."
The original version of section 330 referred to the generally recognized rules of building
art, which were defined by the Reichsgericht in 1891 as rules "thoroughly recognized and
accepted as correct in the circles of concerned technicians." Judgment of June 26, 1891,
(Reichsgericht in Strafsachen) [RGSt]. See also Judgment of Oct. I1, 1910, 44 RGSt 76
(1910).
204. P. MARBURGER, supra note 18, at 145.
205. Id.
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they be experimentally tested and scientifically controllable."' The
determination of a "generally recognized rule of technology" is aided
by the presumption that technical rules published in the
Bundesarbeitsblatt are "generally recognized. 2 07 Many commenta-
tors would go even further and accord to technical standards the sta-
tus of "generally recognized" even without their publication in the
Bundesarbeitsblatt.208
2. State of Technology Rules.-The "state of technology"
formula appears primarily in environmental laws.2"9 Recent regula-
tions also use this formula. 210 "State of technology" has a higher
threshold than "generally recognized rules of technology."' 1 ' State
of technology need not represent the prevailing theory or practice
while the "generally recognized rules" must do so. 212 The modern
trend in German safety and health regulation is towards using "state
of technology" rather than "generally recognized rules of technol-
ogy" as a regulatory basis.113
3. Indefinite Concepts in General.-Although the use of indef-
inite legal concepts in statutes and regulations is common, the courts
have determined that the legislature itself could have constitutionally
set the permissible types of risks and risk factors, as well as the pro-
206. Id. 146-47. An example of a guideline that received recognition as "a generally
recognized rule of technology" and subsequently became a mandatory rule is a guideline about
wiremesh and other aspects of children's playpens. It was prepared by public officials in federal
and state labor departments. In an action brought to prohibit the import of a certain brand of
playpens, the administrative court recognized the guideline as binding and as a generally rec-
ognized rule of technology. The court stated that the officials who were charged with enforcing
the law on machine safety, as well as importers and manufacturers of playpens, recognized the
guideline's soundness in view of accidents many small children had suffered after being placed
in playpens. Judgment of May 6, 1974, No. W2V74 Verwaltungsgericht Wuerzburg
[VERwG], (Administrative Court Wuerzbure) (copy in author's possession).
207. E.g., General Administrative Regulations for the Equipment Safety Law § II (re-
printed in Nipperdey 11, Technical Labor Protection [ArbeitssicherheitJ).
208. E.g., W. ERNST, supra note 115, at 12-13.
209. E.g., Federal Emissions Protection Law § 3(vi) (Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz);
Technical Directives for Air and Noise (Technische Anleitungen Luft und Laerm).
210. E.g., GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 19(1), see infra note 244.
211. Advanced processes, equipment or plant methods that have been tested experimen-
tally may be used to define the "state of technology." P. MARBURGER, supra note 18, at 162-
63.
212. Budde, Die Begriffe Anerkannte Regel der Technik, Stand der Technik und Stand
von Wissenschaft und Technik und ihre Bedeutuing, 59 DIN MITTEILUNGEN 738 (1980);
Pinter; Rechisnatur und Rechtsverbindlichkeit von berufsgenossenschaftlichen Richilinien
und Sicherheitsregeln, 29 Moderne Unfallvehuetung 13 (1985).
213. Two additional indefinite legal concepts appear in specific areas of safety and
health. First, the Law Concerning Regulation of Atomic Power uses the term "state of tech-
nology and science." (emphasis added) (Stand der Technik und Wissenschaft). This concept
requires application of the newest scientific developments that are technically feasible
(machbar). Budde, supra note 212, at 738. Second, the term "reliable ergonomic findings"
(die gesicherten arbeitswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse) is used in connection with work coun-
cils and ergonomic considerations generally.
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cedure to determine them or tolerance limits. 14 However, the courts
have recognized that the executive branch is much better suited to
make continuing adjustments of risk evaluation based on the newest
technological knowledge:
The statutory fixing of a particular safety standard through
the adoption of inflexible rules would, even were it to come
about, hold back rather than promote further technological de-
velopment. It would be a step backwards at the cost of safety.21
Basically, then, the use of indefinite legal concepts as non-spe-
cific safety and health standards in German administrative law still
prevails and remains an exception to the principle that every admin-
istrative invasion of the private sphere must be justified by explicit
statutory authorization (Gesetzesvorbehalt). The majority of com-
mentators favor the use of indefinite legal concepts. 6 Those who
oppose the introduction of concepts such as "generally recognized
rules of technology" into new areas of environmental law do so on
the grounds that the expression gives agencies and courts too broad a
delegation of power. 17
214. Judgment of Aug. 8, 1978, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 49 BVERFGE 89 (1978)
[hereinafter Kalkar]. The Kalkar decision concerned the Atomic Power Law but the court did
not limit its statements to the field of nuclear power. At the same time as the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht was discouraging more precise legislative standards, the administrative courts
were upholding their power to define the "state of technology." Czajka, Der Stand von Wis-
senschaft und Technik als Gegenstand richterlicher Sachaufklaerung, 35 DIE OEFFENTLICHE
VERWALTUNG 99, 106 (1982).
The highest administrative court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) (BVERwG) recently took a
step towards reducing its power to define indefinite legal concepts, at least in nuclear power
cases. In the Why] case, the court, while noting that the executive must seek the advice of
science in evaluating risks of nuclear power, emphasized that judicial control cannot replace
the executive's evaluation of scientifically disputed matter through its own evaluation. To allow
the administrative court to make an independent evaluation would ignore the executive's tech-
nical superiority over the legislative and judiciary in the fields of repelling danger
(Gefahrenabwehr) and risk prevention (Risikovorsorge), and offend the principle of separation
of power (Gewaltenteilung). BVERwG, Dec. 19, 1985, 39 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG
431 (1986).
215. Kalkar, supra note 214, at 362.
216. Despite the preference for using indefinite legal concepts as a link between techni-
cal rules and law, an increasing trend in West Germany is for the law to contain a reference to
a "static" or "dynamic" technical rule. Static refers to a specific edition of a particular rule,
while dynamic includes subsequent revisions.
Static references are contained in the lists of technical rules regularly published by the
Bundesarbeitsblatt. They are also contained in the adoption of technical standards (mainly
DIN standards) by the building supervisory authorities as uniform technical construction regu-
lations (einheitliche technische Baubestimmungen) (ETB) under section three of each Land's
building regulations. Static references are binding only on administrative authorities, not on
the courts. Budde, supra note 212, at 739.
In technical safety law, the static reference is not very prominent in German law because
it is seen as too inflexible. On the other hand, some German commentators see the dynamic
reference as equally infirm as it unconstitutionally transfers law-setting functions to private
associations. Nevertheless, the Dangerous Substances Regulation now adopts the dynamic ref-
erence in dealing with chemical exposures.
217. E.g., Schroeder, Lenkungsabgaben im Umweltschutzrecht am Beispiel der Abwas-
serabgabe, 36 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 667, 673 (1983).
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V. The German Regulatory Framework
In addition to administrative regulation in occupational safety
and health, two other contexts of regulation exist: organizations and
technical services for the workplace, and the vocational insurance as-
sociations (Berufsgenossenschaften). Workplace organizations have
the authority to partially determine the content of labor protection
standards. The vocational insurance associations issue and enforce
accident prevention regulations for their employer members. Thus,
throughout all three levels of regulation - administrative, work-
place, and accident insurance - the incorporation of privately-set
rules of technology is pervasive.
A. Administrative
There is no single legal field called occupational safety and
health. Rather, the substantive rules are scattered throughout six ar-
eas of legislation identified as technical labor protection (technischer
Arbeitsschutz). These are (1) industrial hygiene, (2) installations re-
quiring supervision, (3) equipment safety, (4) dangerous substances,
(5) testing new substances, and (6) working hours.
1. Industrial Hygiene.-In 1891, the Trade Law (Gewerbe-
ordnung)218 was amended to introduce basic requirements applicable
to industrial and service enterprises (Gewerbe) in the field of work-
place facilities and industrial hygiene.219 These requirements, how-
ever, were framed in very general terms.2 0 The Commercial Code
(Handelsgesetzbuch)2 1in 1897 imposed similar duties on employers
of commercial workers and apprentices."'
A more recent federal regulation concerning industrial hygiene
(Arbeitsstaettenverordnung) was promulgated in 1975. Although
this regulation on workplace facilities is more detailed and applies to
more workers than the Trade Law, it also contains broadly-defined
goals. Specifically, it requires "adequate, healthful, and acceptable
ventilation" in workplaces during working time, with consideration
of the nature of the work and the needs of the employees.22 This
regulation also requires the vacuuming and removal from the work-
place facilities of unhealthy amounts or concentrations of gas, steam,
218. [GEWO] (1869) RGBL. 245.
219. Employers became obligated "to erect and maintain work rooms, plant facilities,
machines and tools in such a manner that employees are protected against danger to life and
health as far as the nature of the workplace permits." GEWO § 120 a(l).
220. Id. § 120a(2).
221. [HGB] 1897 RGBL. 219.
222. HGB § 62.
223. Arbeitsstaettenverordnung [ARBSTAETTVO] (Workplace Facilities Regulation) §
5, 1975 BGBL.I 729.
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mist or dust at the point of emission, insofar as their accumulation
cannot be prevented. 24 Workplaces must utilize an independent
alarm system to signal otherwise undetectable breakdowns in the
vacuuming equipment. Furthermore, employers must take additional
measures to protect employees against danger to their health in the
event of such breakdowns.22 A general clause of the regulation obli-
gates employers to comply with the generally recognized rules of
technical safety, occupational health, and industrial hygiene as well
as reliable ergonomic findings and any applicable regulations.22
The regulation on workplace facilities is accompanied by de-
tailed guidelines (Arbeitsstaetten-Richtlinien) defining generally rec-
ognized rules and reliable ergonomic findings. The guidelines refer
frequently to technical standards set by private organizations and
provide the occupational inspectorate, the administrative courts, and
the public with nonbinding advice as to the content of these general
clauses.
2. Installations Requiring Supervision (ueberwachungsbedu-
erftige Anlagen).-Laws in the 1840s requiring police approval of
steam boilers were the earliest regulations in the field of technical
labor protection.22 7 Since 1953, their inspection, along with inspec-
tion of a wide range of other technical installations, has been man-
dated by the Trade Law.22 Federal safety regulations2 9 have been
issued for types of equipment listed in the Trade Law. They fre-
quently require building permits for construction or installation of
designated equipment.2 30 The regulations require regular testing 231
and adherence to "the generally recognized rules of technology. '2 32
General administrative regulations provide that adherence to rules
set by the advisory committee for the specific type of equipment sat-
isfies "the generally recognized rules of technology. ' 2a3
224. Id. § 14.
225. Id.
226. Id. § 3(1)[1].
227. See A. MERTENS, supra note 28, at 24.
228. Included in this list are elevators, beverage dispensing equipment, technical medical
machines, electrical machinery, tanks storing acetylene or calcium carbide, equipment storage
or transport of flammable liquids, pressurized connections for flammable, acidic or poisonous
gases, steam or liquids, and equipment for transferring pressurized, liquified or solidified gases.
See GEWO § 24.
229. E.g., Steamboiler Regulations (Dampfkesselverordnung), Elevator Regulations
(Aufzugsverordnung), Regulations for Flammable Liquids (Verordnung ueber brennbare
Fluessigkeiten). These regulations are reprinted in Nipperdey I1, Technical Labor Protection
(Arbeitssicherheit).
230. E.g., Dampfkesselverordnung § 10.
231. Id. § 17.
232. Id. § 6(1).
233. E.g., Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zur Dampfkesselverordnung, 1980
BGBL.I 173, § 1.
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3. Equipment Safety.-The Federal Equipment Safety Law2 "
functions as preventive consumer protection in addition to occupa-
tional protection. Passed in 1968, the Equipment Safety Law obli-
gates manufacturers and importers bringing equipment into com-
merce to conform with the "generally recognized rules of
technology" and the regulations for labor protection and accident
prevention. Conformity means that the user or third party who
utilizes the equipment properly is protected against all types of dan-
gers to life or health so far as the proper use permits.23 Deviations
from the rules are permitted provided that the same safety is guar-
anteed by other means.236 Approved equipment is permitted to be
marked by a seal signifying "tested for safety." '37 Under the general
administrative regulations2 38 for this statute, technical standards of
specific private organizations23 9 are presumed to be "generally recog-
nized technical rules" upon their publication by the Federal Minister
of Labor and Social Order in the Bundesarbeitsblatt.2 40
Allowing the sale or importation of unsafe products into com-
merce can also be prohibited by the Laender under the Equipment
Safety Law.24 1 The list of such prohibitions is published regularly in
the Bundesarbeitsblatt. Violation of a prohibition order (Unter-
sagungsverfuegung)242 subjects only the manufacturer or importer in
the state where the order is issued to penalties. Thus, the order is not
valid in other Laender against the same person or a different person.
However, the occupational inspectorates usually give precedential
weight to prohibition orders from different Laender, so that another
Land's occupational inspectorate would issue a new prohibition order
promptly. 243
234. Gesetz ueber technische Arbeitsmittel (Geraetesicherheitsgesetz), 1968 BGBI 717.
235. Geraetesicherheitsgesetz § 3(1). Regulations under this statute have been issued
for electrical tools, decoration lights and paraphernalia, and technical medical machines.
236. Id.
237. Id. § 3(4). The label is "GS," which stands for "tested for safety" (gepruefte
Sicherheit).
238. General Administrative Regulations, Equipment Safety Law (Allgemeine Verwal-
tungsvorschrift zum Gesetz ueber technische Arbeitsmittel printed in Nipperdey II, supra
note 207).
239. I.e., Deutscher Normenausschuss e. V. (DIN), Verband Deutscher Elektrotechniker
e. V. (VDE), and Deutscher Verein von Gas und Wasserfachmaennern e. V., id. at § 3(1). Sec-
tion 3(2) permits the same recognition to be given to foreign and international standard-setting
organizations.
240. Id. § 4(1)[1], [2]. The same recognition applies to accident prevention regulations
and guidelines of the vocational insurance associations when they are published in the
Bundesarbeitsblatt. Id. § 4. Appendices to the general administrative regulation list the techni-
cal standards that have been published according to organization, title of technical rule, and
date of issuance. See, e.g., Bundesarbeitsblatt 22-55 (Jan. 1986) for a list of then-approved
technical standards.
241. Geraetesicherheitsgesetz § 6.
242. Prohibition orders usually involve consumer products, for example, barbecue grills,
Bundesarbeitsblatt 110 (1985), or children's playpens, VERwG Wuerzburg, supra note 206.
243. Interview with A. Mertens, BUNDESARBEITSMINISTERIUM, in Bonn, May 28, 1986.
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4. Dangerous Substances.-The most recent and evolving
branch of German technical labor protection law is the area of dan-
gerous substances.24 Similar to the previous regulations, the current
Dangerous Substances Regulation 2" regulates these substances both
upon their entry into commerce (Inverkehrbringen) and through
their use or handling (Umgang).
a. Entry into Commerce.-The Dangerous Substances Regula-
tion contains uniform labeling rules24 for some 1,100 substances.4 7
Moreover, a categorization and labeling guide (Leitfaden) is pro-
vided for substances not specifically included in the list. In addition
to the duty of labeling, these rules require certain kinds of packag-
ing," and permits249 or ban outright the entry of certain substances
into commerce. 251 In order to enter commerce, cancer-producing
substances must have warnings in the form of labels identifying their
contents.251
The requirements for packaging are general: packaging of dan-
gerous substances and preparations is to be designed so that the con-
tents do not "unintentionally" leak outside the container.252 Packag-
ing that conforms with transportation regulations meets this
requirement.253 When appropriate use of solid dangerous substances
or preparations does not result in danger for life or health of
humans, or danger for the environment, special packaging is not re-
quired. Misleading or confusing packaging or labeling is
prohibited.254
Specific products containing asbestos are banned from being
brought into commerce. 255 Formaldehyde containing wood and parti-
244. The first regulation on dangerous work substances (gefaehrliche Arbeitsstoffe) was
issued in 1971, the same year that the Occupational Safety and Health Act in the United
States came into effect. A revision was issued in 1982. The current Regulation on Dangerous
Substances (Gefahrstoffverordnung) [hereinafter GEFAHRSTOFFVO] (Dangerous Substances
Regulation) became effective October 1, 1986, replacing the Regulation on Dangerous Work
Substances of 1971. 1986 BGB1. 1 1470.
245. GEFAHRSTOFFVO is printed in Nipperdey 11, supra note 207.
246. They are printed in appendix six of the Regulation.
247. This is 300 more substances than the 1982 Regulation included. See supra note
244.
248. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 3.
249. Id. § 11.
250. Id. § 9.
251. New substances are to be added to the cancer-producing list as determined by the
MAK panel of the German Research Society (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) on the basis
of new and reliable scientific knowledge, or when the manufacturer or importer acquires such
knowledge. Preparations containing more than one percent of substances newly found to be
cancer-producing must also be labeled. Id. § 5.
252. Id. § 3(1).
253. Id.
254. I.e., packaging must not be subject to confusion with foods. Labels such as "not
poisonous," "not subject to labeling," "not health-damaging," "not damaging when properly
used," "not dangerous" or similar assertions are not permitted. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 3(l)-(4).
255. Id. § 9. An exception may be made by the authorities for undercoating on cars
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cle board are prohibited from commerce in certain concentrations.
Eight other compounds are banned as well.2 56 Persons bringing into
commerce substances categorized as poisonous or very poisonous
must have permits.257 To obtain the permit, the applicant must em-
ploy a person with the required expert knowledge. This is determined
by an examination conducted by the authorities or waived if the ap-
plicant employs a pharmacist or pharmacist's assistant.2 58 Changes
in personnel of such persons must be communicated to the authori-
ties without delay.2 "
b. Handling and Use.-The regulations on handling and use
of dangerous substances comprise the largest part of the regulation
and contain the most fundamental changes compared with earlier
versions."' Major sections deal with testing, supervision of testing,
labeling of substances when they are being handled, prohibitions on
employment, and medical examinations.261 Coverage extends beyond
manufacturing to service and retail industries as well as other
activities.2"2
The definition of dangerous substances for purposes of handling
includes the substances required to be labeled for entry into com-
merce. 263 The regulation provides for additional substances to be
treated as dangerous by introducing several broad definitions. 26'
Chemical concentration and toleration values have been introduced
directly into a legal regulation for the first time." 5 The regulation
when an appropriate substitute is not available. § 9(2).
256. The method of testing the concentration of formaldehyde is to be determined by a
procedure that must conform with "the state of technology and science." Id. § 9(a). A grand-
father clause permits substances containing these banned substances to be brought into com-
merce until June 1989, if they were produced before the effective date of the Regulation. Id. §
45(2), (3), (5).
257. Id. § 11. Exceptions are made for pharmacies, public facilities such as laboratories
and universities as long as they have expert knowledge, wholesales, and gas stations.
258. Id. 2 13.
259. Id. 2 11(7).
260. Supra note 244.
261. GEFAHRSTOFFVO §§ 16, 18, 23, 26, 28-35.
262. Newly covered persons include civil servants, soldiers, students (from kindergarten
to university), and persons employed at home. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 15(3).
263. Supra note 244.
264. A substance or preparation is dangerous if it is poisonous, irritating, combustible,
flammable, cancer-producing, teretogenic (fertility-damaging), mutagenic (gene-changing), or
possesses other chronic damaging qualities. It is also dangerous if it changes any part of the
natural non-human habitat such that significant dangers or disadvantages for the public
(Allgemeinheit) ensue. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 15(I)[1]; Chemicals Law (Chemikaliengesetz)
[hereinafter CHEMG] § 3(3). The definition includes products that set free dangerous sub-
stances, and substances known to carry disease or sickness (Krankheitserreger). GEFAHR-
STOFFVO § 15(l)[4].
265. The Regulation declares that MAK and BAT values are concentrations of sub-
stances in the air (MAK) or body (BAT) within which generally, the health of employees will
not be damaged. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 15(4), (5). TRKs, on the other hand, are defined as
concentrations of substances in the air "which can be attained by the current state of technol-
ogy." Id. § 15(6). No assurance as to the level of safety provided by TRKs is given.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
also introduces a new technical concept: the threshold value (Aus-
loeseschwelle), defined as "the concentration of a substance in the
air at the workplace or in the body, an excess of which requires addi-
tional measures for the protection of health." 66
Under these regulations for handling and use, an employer has
a duty to determine whether a substance, preparation or product he
uses involves a dangerous substance.267 Where uncertainties remain
in the use of dangerous substances, the manufacturer or importer is
obligated to inform the employer, upon request, of the dangers posed
by the substance and the measures the employer should take to pro-
tect his employees.26 8 The regulation also establishes a general
duty26 9 on the employer to protect human life and health as well as
the environment. The general duty is measured by the contents of
the regulation and the applicable labor protection and accident pre-
vention regulations.2 70 It also includes "generally recognized" techni-
cal safety (sicherheitstechnischen), health (arbeitsmedizinischen)
and hygienic (hygienischen) rules as well as reliable ergonomic find-
ings (die sonstigen gesicherten arbeitswissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnisse).
The employer remains responsible for testing to determine
whether chemical concentration and toleration values are acceptable
or exceed the threshold value. Consequently, the entire effect of the
various dangerous substances in the air at the workplace is to be
evaluated.21' The results of tests are to be preserved for at least 30
years.272 The authorities can order that the employer test chemical
concentration and toleration values.273
A priority list of protective measures is established in the regu-
lation.27 Within this, the first priority is to avoid, as far as is possi-
266. Id. § 15(7). Skin contact automatically exceeds the threshold value. Id.
267. An examination should be made to determine whether products, substances or
preparations consisting of a less health-damaging risk can be used and whether that substitute
should be used exclusively if its use is reasonable (zumutbar). The result of this test is to be
presented to the competent authorities on demand. Id. § 16(1)-(2).
268. Id. § 16(3).
269. Id. § 17. However, the Regulation permits variance from the general duty. Upon
written application the authorities can grant exceptions where an equally effective measure is
used or when a disproportional difficulty (unverhaeltnismaessige Haerte) would result and the
deviation is consistent with protection of the employees. Id. § 36.
270. Id. § 17(1).
271. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 18(1). The Regulation requires that whoever performs these
tests must have the necessary expert knowledge and equipment. Id. The employer may assume
that tests carried out by persons not part of his enterprise possess the necessary qualifications
only if they belong to the network attached to the Advisory Committee for Dangerous Sub-
stances and are on the testers' list published by the Minister of Labor and Social Order in the
Bundesarbeitsblatt. Id. § 18(2). Thus, a network of environmental workplace testing services
and laboratories is being created.
272. Id. § 18(3). When a plant closes, the test results must be given to the accident
insurance carrier. Id.
273. Id. § 18(4).
274. Id. § 19.
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ble according to the state of technology, the release of gases, vapors
or floating substances dangerous for man and environment." 5 If re-
lease of dangerous gases, vapors or floating substances is unavoida-
ble, the next priority is to completely capture them at their place of
effect or creation and to remove them without danger to man and
the environment as far as possible according the state of technol-
ogy. 76 Thirdly, ventilation measures corresponding to the state of
technology are to be taken."'
No fine is provided for in case of violation of these priorities. If
the appropriate concentrations278 are not obtained in spite of the first
three steps, the employer must provide effective and appropriate per-
sonal protective equipment and maintain it in usable, hygienic condi-
tion. 79 The employer must also take care that the workers are only
employed when the work process makes it absolutely necessary and
when their health can be protected.2 80 The employer is required to
post, in understandable form and language, the dangers, protecting
measures, behavior rules, and disposal methods concerning the use of
dangerous substances. 81 Instruction of employees using dangerous
substances is required before employment and at least once annually
thereafter. The content and time of the instruction is to be kept in
written form and signed by the affected employees.282 Women capa-
ble of bearing children are to be further instructed about the possible
dangers to pregnant women and employment restrictions pertaining
to them. 83
Medical examinations for employees exposed to eighteen speci-
fied dangerous substances and all listed cancer-producing and flam-
mable dangerous substances are to be conducted and repeated at
stated intervals at the employer's expense. 84 Upon demand, the em-
ployer must provide to an authorized doctor necessary information
about workplace circumstances and facilitate an inspection of the
275. Id. § 19(1). Skin contact of employees with dangerous solids or liquids is to be
avoided as far as permitted by the state of technology. Id.
276. Id. § 19(2).
277. Id. § 19(3).
278. See generally supra note 265.
279. The prevailing practice in 1984, according to the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund,
was to use personal protective gear much more frequently than technical preventive measures.
STELLUNGNAHME ZUM ENTWURF EINER VERORDNUNG UEBER GEFAEHRLICHER STOFFE (State-
ment Regarding the Draft of a Regulation on Dangerous Substances) [hereinafter STEL-
LUNGNAHME] 11 (Feb. 28, 1984) (copy in possession of author).
280. If allergic reactions are to be expected, personal protective equipment should be
provided. However, the wearing of breathing masks and entire protective suits may not become
a permanent measure. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 19(4). If MAK or BAT concentrations are not ob-
tained, personal protective equipment is to be used. Id. § 19(4).
281. Id. § 20(1).
282. Id. § 20(2).
283. Id.
284. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 28 and app. 5.
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workplace. 85
The employer must further keep a medical file for each em-
ployee undergoing medical examinations.2 86 On leaving employment,
the employee receives the original medical record and the employer
keeps a copy.287 Statements in the medical record may not be com-
municated to "unauthorized third parties." '288 Where it is determined
that an employee's health may be damaged by his further employ-
ment, the authorities can order that an employee may only continue
employment after he is examined by a doctor.289 Where the doctor
has "medical reservations" (gesundheitliche Bedenken) he must ad-
vise the employee in writing. The doctor must recommend in writing
to the employer a review of the workplace when the examined em-
ployee appears to be endangered as a result of his workplace condi-
tions.290 The work council must also be informed of "medical reser-
vations" that the employer has received;291  in the case of
employment prohibition, the proper authorities must also be
notified. 92
Further employment at the same worksite of an employee who
receives "medical reservations" is permissible only after the em-
ployer reviews the effectiveness of the preventive measures and es-
tablishes that no further medical reservations exist for the employee.
Furthermore, other employees can only be employed when they can
be sufficiently protected through preventive measures. 3
Additional requirements exist for handling dangerous sub-
stances294 that are cancer-producing, poisonous or flammable. Each
of the fifty-four substances listed as cancer-producing is categorized
according to the strength of its concentrations: (1) very highly en-
dangering, (2) highly endangering, and (3) endangering.295
285. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 28(1), (4).
286. Id. § 34(2). The information is to include, inter alia, the date and result of the
examination, a description of past and current employment that has a potential for endanger-
ment, the date of the next examination, and the name of the person maintaining the file. Id.
Unions' efforts to establish medical examinations of persons after they have stopped working in
an endangered workplace (e.g., retirees) were not adopted in the Regulation. See STEL-
LUNGNAHME, supra note 279, at 8.
287. GEFAHRSTOFFVO, supra note 244, § 34(3).
288. Id. § 34(4). The Regulation does not define this term.
289. Id. § 35(1).
290. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 31(3). Either the employer or the examined employee can ap-
peal the doctor's finding to the competent authorities. Id. § 32. If a medical affidavit is ob-
tained by the authorities before the decision, the employer bears the cost. Id.
291. Id. § 31(4).
292. Id.
293. Id. § 33. The preventive measures are listed in section 19.
294. These are set forth in separate appendices.
295. Dangerous Substances Regulation, app. 2 - Special Regulations for Handling
Cancer-Producing, Teretogenic and Mutagenic Dangerous Substances (Besondere Vor-
schriften fuer den Umgang mit krebeserzeugenden, fruchtschaedigenden und erbugtver-
aenderden Gefahrstoffen), (printed in Nipperdey I1, supra note 207). For example, Benzidin is
classified as very highly endangering at concentrations of more than one percent, highly endan-
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Authorities and employees are to be notified of the manufacture
of any cancer-producing substance within the first two categories.29
However, if the threshold value2 97 in a second category substance is
not exceeded, notification is not required.2 98 Authorities can prohibit
the handling of a cancer-producing substance by the employer where
the substance falls within the first category when its handling is not
necessary.2 99 Handling a substance in the second category may be
prohibited when its use is not necessary and no disproportional diffi-
culty would arise from a ban.300 Duties of reporting, continued test-
ing, and medical examinations are waived for substances within cate-
gories two and three where the threshold value is not exceeded.30'
With minor exceptions, the labeling obligations for the handling
and use of dangerous substances are the same as the requirements
for entry into commerce. Substances formed in the production pro-
cess that change form into non-dangerous substances need not be
labeled as long as the employees involved are alerted to these sub-
stance changes.02
Employment restrictions for handling designated types of dan-
gerous substances exist for pregnant women,303 nursing women, s30
women capable of bearing children,3 05 and youths under certain
ages.3 0
6
5. Testing New Substances.-In accordance with a directive
of the European Community, 07 the 1980 Chemicals Act308 requires
gering at concentrations from .01% to one percent, and endangering at concentrations from
.001% to .01%. Id. app. 2 1 1(1).
For carcinogenic substances the employer must ensure (dafuer sorgen) that the tolerance
values (TRKs) are undercut, and he must adopt, within a reasonable period, technical safety
developments that have been shown to improve safety. Id. T 1.2.2(l)-(3), (5).
Special handling requirements exist for several cancer-producing substances (including
asbestos, arsenic, benzene, and vinyl chloride), for specified poisonous substances (including
lead, anti-fouling colors used to coat the undersides of ships, formaldehyde, and
pentachlorophenol), for ammonium nitrate, and for flammable substances in general. Id. §
1.3.1-1.3.7.2; appendices three and four.
296. Id. app. 2 1.2.2(1).
297. See supra text accompanying note 266.
298. Id. app. 2 1 1.2.2(5).
299. GEFAHSTOFFVO, supra note 244, app. 2, 1 1.2.2(3)[1].
300. Id. 1.2.2(3)[2].
301. Id. 1.2.2(5).
302. Registered pesticides in pesticide equipment need not be labeled. In addition, pipes
do not need labels either. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 23(1), (4).
303. Id. § 26(5), (6).
304. Id. § 26(5).
305. Id. § 26(7). Women capable of bearing children are prohibited from employment in
handling lead or mercury unless the threshold value has not been reached.
306. Id. §§ 25(4); 26(2), (3), (4).
307. (Council Directive of 27 Nov. 1980) 80/1107/EEC. Directive for the protection of
workers from harmful exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work. 23 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 327/9) 327 (1980).
308. CHEMG, 1980 BGBI.I.
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new chemical substances to undergo tests by manufacturers and im-
porters and to be registered with a national registration authority of
the European Community forty-five days before bringing the sub-
stance into commerce.309 The registration authority in West Ger-
many is the Federal Institute for Labor Protection and Accident Re-
search.3 10 The manufacturer is permitted to choose the state in
which to register; the Chemicals Act exempts from registration sub-
stances registered in another member state in an equivalent proce-
dure.311 The Chemicals Act permits the competent Laender authori-
ties to ban the manufacture or bringing into commerce of new
dangerous substances, preparations, or products for a period of only
three months where factual indications exist that they pose a signifi-
cant danger for life, human health, or the environment.312
The Chemicals Act provides the statutory authorization for is-
suing regulations on labeling and authorizes the promulgation of reg-
ulations requiring testing of existing substances,313 but no regulations
on testing of existing substances have as yet been issued.
6. Working Hours.-The field of regulation of working time
properly belongs to social labor protection along with protection
against dismissal, rather than to the technical labor protection area.
Nevertheless, certain provisions are considered part of technical la-
bor protection.
Statutory restrictions on working hours maintain an important
place in German employment law. The 1938 Regulation On Work-
ing Time' is still in force. This regulation prohibits regular working
hours over ten hours a day unless the use of other workers is impossi-
ble.3"5 The Regulation on Working Time assumes a regular six day
work week of eight hours a day.3" It has long since been outdated in
this respect by collective agreements that usually provide for a regu-
lar forty-hour or thirty-nine-hour work week. The Trade Act prohib-
its most work on Sundays and holidays. 1 Unless otherwise provided
by a collective agreement, the requirement of extra compensation for
overtime 18 over forty-nine hours 1 9 still controls, even though the
309. Id. § 4(1).
310. Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung.
311. CHEMG § 4(1).
312. CHEMG § 23(2).
313. Id. § 17(1).
314. Arbeitszeitverordnung [AZO], 1938 RGBI. 1 447.
315. Id. § 5(3).
316. Id. § 3.
317. GEwO §§ 105a, 105b, 1978 BGB.I 97 Hospitals, utilities, police, hotels and restau-
rants are excepted.
318. 125% of regular pay.
319. AZO § 15.
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regular work week is no more than forty hours. 2 Additional restric-
tions apply for particular occupations and groups."' 1
Most significantly in terms of occupational health and safety,
the Mother Protection Law22 prohibits women from working during
the six weeks preceding and eight weeks following birth. 23 In the
absence of a doctor's statement that the health or life of the mother
and child would be endangered, this prohibition is lifted upon re-
quest of the woman.324 In either case, the employer must pay full
wages during these pre and post natal periods. Moreover, pregnant
women are not permitted to work between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. or on
Sundays or holidays, and may not work overtime. 325 They are not
permitted to be paid by piecework, to regularly lift objects weighing
more than five kilograms, to perform heavy manual work, or to work
where they are exposed to health-endangering substances, heat, cold,
wetness,, noise or radiation. 26
Similarly, the Youth Protection Act 2 7 prohibits the employ-
ment of children.328  Moreover, older youths are prohibited from
320. Judgment of July 28, 1982, Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] Federal Labor Supreme
Court, No. ABR 90/79.
321. Retail stores must close during the hours between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. during
the work week. On Saturday they must close at 2:00 p.m., except on the first Saturday of the
month when the hours are extended to 6:00 p.m. Shop Closing Laws of the Laender
(Ladenschlussgesetze, § 3(1)] 1956 [BGBL.1875 Gas stations, newspaper stands and one phar-
macy per community are excepted to varying degrees. Id. §§ 4-6. Sunday and holiday work in
the production branches is prohibited; exceptions exist for bakeries (two hours on Sunday),
restaurants, theaters and the like. Trade Law §§ 105, 105(b)[1]. Branchwide exceptions may
be made by regulation. See G. SCHAUB, ARBEITSRECHTSHANDBUCH 926 (5th ed. 1983) [herein-
after G. SCHAUB]. Attempts to make shop hours more flexible have been generally
unsuccessful.
322. Mutterschutzgesetz [MuScHG] 1968 BGB.1315.
323. Id. §§ 3, 6. This law prohibits dismissals of pregnant employees except in extraordi-
nary circumstances. Id. 88.
324. Id. § 6.
325. Id. § 8. The Regulation on Working Time prohibits all women from employment
between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. In shiftwork the hours can be extended to 12 a.m. AZO, supra note
314, § 19(1), (2). On days before Sundays and holidays their employment must end by 5 p.m.
Id. § 19(1).
326. Id. § 4. Some female protective legislation has been challenged; the 1982 draft of a
Unified Labor Protection Code by the former social democratic-liberal governing coalition
would have eliminated weight lifting prohibitions for women. Draft of a Labor Protection Law:
The Most Important Provisions (Entwurf des Arbeitsschutzgesetzes - die wichtigsten Bestim-
mungen), Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Order, § 6. The Freizeitanordnung [FRE-
IZEITAO] (Free Time Regulation) (RAB.III 325), issued during World War II in 1943, is in
effect in states that have not passed their own home workday statutes. The Free Time Regula-
tion and its state counterparts grant women a day off for housework. However, since a similar
state law was held unconstitutional by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (highest constitutional
court), the regulation is no longer applied. The court held it violates the constitutional princi-
ple of equality of man and woman in Article three of the Basic Law. G. SCHAUB, supra note
321 at 962-63.
327. Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz [JARBScHG] (Youth Protection Act), 1976 BGB.I 965.
328. Defined as under fourteen years of age. Id. § 2. Among the exceptions are that
thirteen year olds are permitted to do agricultural work up to three hours daily and to deliver
newspapers for up to two hours daily. Id. § 5(3)[1], [2]. Fourteen year olds may work as an
apprentice seven hours daily and thirty-five hours a week in light and "appropriate" activity.
Id. § 7(2). Youths between the age of fifteen and eighteen may work eight hours a day and
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piecework, and from work exposing them to damaging effects from
noise, vibrations, radiation and substances that are poisonous, acidic
or irritating. 329 Medical examinations, paid for by the state govern-
ment, are required for youths when entering employment and one
year after the start of their employment.33
B. Enterprise and Workplace
1. Collective Bargaining.-Little attention has been focused
on occupational safety and health in collective bargaining.331 Unlike
in the United States, unions in West Germany are industrially and
regionally organized, with only one principal confederation332 and
seventeen constituent federations. 3 Bargaining occurs at the indus-
trial level with regional and often national coordination. Union mem-
bership is individual and voluntary; no exclusive bargaining unit con-
cept is needed since union competition hardly exists and most
employers apply collective agreement provisions voluntarily or by ad-
ministrative extension to all their employees, regardless of whether
they are union members.33 Although about 40% of German employ-
ees are union members, 33 5 informal application of collective agree-
ments by employers and their extension by administrative order
doubles the coverage for collective agreements to approximately
80%.336
Unions have no statutory responsibility in the occupational
safety and health field; their autonomy to bargain (Tarifautonomie)
and freedom to enter coalitions (Koalitionsfreiheit) would make
statutory duties problematic if applied to them. Collective bargain-
ing agreements (Tarifvertraege) rarely include clauses relating to
forty hours a week, but not between the hours of 8 p.m. and 7 a.m., Sundays, holidays, or for
the most part, Saturdays. Id. 58.
329. Id. § 22.
330. Id. §§ 32-34.
331. An exception has been labor's demand for thirty-five hour work week at forty hours
a week wages. This was the sole demand of a five week strike by the Industrial Metalworkers
Union (Industriegewerkschaft Metall) in 1984. After mediation, the metalworking industry
agreed to a 37.5 hour work week with plant level implementation after consultation between
work councils and plant management. In 1987, the same union sought a 32.5 hour work week
for night shift workers.
332. The German Labor Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund).
333. The three largest federations are the metalworkers (Industriegewerkschaft-Metall)
with 2.6 million members in 1981, the public service workers (Gewerkschaft Oeffentliche Dien-
ste, Transport und Verkehr) with 1.1 million members, and the chamical, paper, and ceramic
workers (Industriegewerkschaft-Chemic, Papier, Keramic) with 650,000 members. W.
Zoellner, Arbeitsrecht 98 n.8 (3d ed. 1983).
334. See generally, Arbeitsring der Arbeitgeberverbaende der Deutschen Chemischen
Industrie e.V., Wie Tarifvertraege zustande kommen 1-3 (Jun. 1973); Boedler & Kaeser, 30
Jahre Tarifregister, Bundesarbeitsblatt 22 (Sept. 1979).
335. Id.
336. Id. A mark of unions' political strength is that over 60% of representation in the
Bundestag, supra note 456, are union members. W. Zoellner, supra note 333, at 98.
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occupational safety and health. Thus, the one principal confedera-
tion, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), employs two persons
for occupational safety and health matters. None of its constituent
federations employed full time staff in the area of occupational
safety and health in 1986.111
2. Work Councils.-The 1972 Workplace Constitution Law338
permits the election of work councils (Betriebsraete) in establish-
ments (Betriebe) with at least five employees. 39 Work councils are
composed solely of elected employees.
Work councils have several tasks regarding occupational safety
and health. These tasks are assigned to them by the Workplace Con-
stitution Law. In the absence of rules set by collective bargaining
agreement or statute, this law gives the work council a right of
codetermination 4 ° concerning two aspects of regular working time:
(1) the disposition of working hours;341 and (2) the temporary short-
ening or lengthening of usual working hours.342 Significantly, work
councils have a right of codetermination concerning the prevention
of work accidents and occupational diseases, and the protection of
health.343 This codetermination right is self-initiating; the plant
council need not wait for the employer to act before raising issues.344
However, this right extends only to action within the scope of admin-
istrative or accident prevention regulations where no statutory or col-
lective agreement rule exists.3 5
A similar right of codetermination applies to the introduction
and use of technical equipment designed to supervise the behavior or
work performance of employees.3 4 Work councils also have a right
337. The union's primary focus for occupational safety and health issues is the work-
place. The DGB's proposal concerning occupational safety and health and codetermination, for
example, is to employ full time union-selected representatives in the enforcement offices of the
state and accident insurance associations. The function of these labor protection representa-
tives (Arbeitsschutzbeauftragte) would be to support enforcement of labor protection rights by
plant councils and unions and to promote their cooperation with the administrative and insur-
ance offices. Another DGB proposal is to require employer members of vocational insurance
associations to allow union representatives access to workplaces. Kaiser & Konstanty, Aspekte
betrieblicher und ueberbetrieblicher Mitbestimming der Arbeitnehmer im Kampf fuer Ge-
sundheit in der Arbeitswelt, 34 Soziale Sicherheit: Zeitschrift fuer Sozialpolitik 72, 75
(1985).
338. BETRVG, 1972 BGB.I 13, printed in Nipperdey I, Arbeitsrecht.
339. Three of the five persons must be qualified to serve as work councillors. BETRVG §
1.
340. See infra text accompanying note 349.
341. BETRVG § 87(l)[2].
342. Id. § 87(l)[3].
343. Id. § 87(l)[7].
344. Judgment of Nov. 14, 1974, Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG), 30 Betreibsberater (BB)
420 (1975).
345. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz § 87(l)[7].
346. BETRVG § 87(l)[6]. An example would be the introduction of computers that en-
able the employer to review the performance of its sales employees. In ordering codetermina-
tion in this area, courts analogize to the protection of privacy anchored in Article two of the
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to codetermine changes in jobs or work surroundings which obviously
contradict or burden in a special way the humane organization of
work. a4
7
The workplace implementation of occupational safety and
health measures in its broadest sense is thus usually a matter of
codetermination between the work council - if one exists - and the
employer. In public enterprises and government, employees elect
staff councils (Personalraete) rather than work councils; a separate
statute governs the operation of these staff councils
(Personalvertretungsgesetz).348
Work councils and employers may conclude workplace agree-
ments (Betreibsvereinbarungen)s4 9 which may set guidelines for
safety and health conduct at the establishment. Striking to obtain a
plant agreement is prohibited. If the work council and employer are
unable to agree on a subject that is within the scope of codetermina-
tion, a conciliation committee (Einigungsstelle) decides the dis-
pute.350 The work council has no power to compel agreement on a
matter not subject to a right of codetermination.35 1 In order to re-
quire the employer to comply with obligations under the Workplace
Constitution Law, the work council or a union having members who
work in the plant may petition the labor court for an injunction. 52
The work council has obligations to promote and review en-
forcement at the workplace of the regulations concerning labor pro-
Basic Law, which guarantees each individual the free development of personality. Judgment of
Sept. 14, 1984, Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG), 42 BAGE 367 (1985).
347. The reliable ergonomic findings define the meaning of humane organization of
work. BETRVG § 91.
348. Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz, 1974 BGBI.I 693 (as amended).
349. At the Ford plant near Cologne, for example, workplace agreements exist in the
field of safety and health that set higher qualifications than are required by regulations in the
following areas: qualification of workplace doctors, safety engineers, and safety technicians;
establishment of guidelines for how workplace health and safety professionals are to cooperate
with each other; and implementation of safety rules for testing new cars. Interview with Pro-
fessor M. Seeger, Chief Safety Engineer, Ford factory near Cologne (April 23, 1986).
350. This office may be formed by work agreement or convened ad hoc. It is composed
of an equal number of persons selected by the work council and employer, and a neutral
chairperson whom both sides select jointly. In the absence of agreement, the local labor court
selects the chairperson. The decision (Spruch) of the Einigungsstelle can be reviewed only for
abuse of discretion by the labor court. BETRVG § 76.
351. The work council has no power to compel agreement on a matter not subject to a
right of codetermination (Mitbestimmungsrecht). However, the Workplace Constitution Law
does contain three other types of participatory rights besides codetermination for work coun-
cils: (1) a right to veto particular personnel decisions for reasons prescribed in the statute
[hiring of individual employees - § 99(2) - and dismissals of individual employees - §
102(3)]; (2) a right to be consulted regarding particular decisions; and (3) a right to receive
information promptly about particular decisions after they are made. An example of the latter
two participatory rights would be the statutory obligation of the employer to inform the work
council of the planning for plant construction, technical equipment, the work process, and jobs,
and to consult with the work council regarding the effects of these changes on work and the
demands on employees. BETRVG § 90.
352. There must be a gross violation for such an order to be issued. BETRVG § 23(3).
An individual cannot obtain this relief.
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tection and accident prevention and to support the local authorities
and vocational insurance associations through suggestions, consulta-
tion, and information.535 Conversely, these agencies and the em-
ployer are required to seek participation of the plant council or its
members in connection with inspections, accident investigations, and
other questions concerning labor protection and accident
prevention .15
3. Individual Employee Rights.-The German Civil Code"5
prescribes the duty of an employer to operate workplaces, machines,
tools and services in such a way that the individual is protected
against danger to life and health so far as the nature of the work
permits. 356 This provision cannot be displaced by contrary collective
bargaining agreements. 5 1
In practice, individual relief is difficult to obtain under the Civil
Code,358 collective labor law, or the Workplace Constitution Law,
because individual rights are generally subordinated to the institu-
tions of participation. However, the employer must inform, hear and
discuss with the individual employee matters that affect the em-
ployee personally.360 The employee may see his personal file and may
complain (beschweren) to the appropriate office in the plant when he
feels disadvantaged, unjustly treated or otherwise injured.361
Generally, individual remedies are slowly entering German oc-
cupational safety and health law. The new Dangerous Substances
Regulation (Gefahrstoffverordnung) is the first to include par-
ticipatory and individual employee rights in enforcing occupational
health law. Under this regulation, affected employees and the work
council have the right to be heard by the employer on the results of
353. Id. §§ 80(1)[1], 89(1).
354. Id. § 89(2). The employer must give copies of all labor protection and accident
prevention orders and accident reports to the plant council. Furthermore, the employer must
timely inform the plant council in sufficient detail to enable the plant council to fulfill its
responsibilities. Id. §§ 89(4), 89(5), 80(2).
355. Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [hereinafter BGB], 1986 RBBI.195 (as amended),
printed in H. SCHOENFELDER, DEUTSCHE GESETZE (German Laws).
356. Id. § 618(1). Section 618 equates with accident prevention regulations and labor
protection regulations. For example, in several cases the Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) has held
that the provision of safety shoes at company expense is required by section 618 of the Civil
Code where accident prevention regulations require employees to wear safety shoes. Judgment
of Aug. 21, 1985, BAG No. 7 AZR 199/183; Judgment of Aug. 18, 1982, 40 BAGE 52
(1984); Judgment of Mar. 10, 1976, BAG 5 AZR 34/75 (copies on file with author).
357. Section 619 voids agreements that limit or remove the employer's obligations under
Section 618 in advance. Individual agreements that employees must pay for safety shoes have
been voided under BGB § 619. Id.
358. BGB § 618(1).
359. The few sections of the Workplace Constitution Law [BETRVG] that recognize
rights of individual employees are weak and do not refer expressly to labor protection or acci-
dent prevention.
360. BETRVG §§ 81-82.
361. BETRVG §§ 83-84.
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chemical measurements in the plant and the conditions of personal
protective equipment when it is necessary to use such equipment." 2
The regulation also gives individual employees protection when com-
plaining to the authorities and provides them with an express right to
refuse dangerous work. 63
Although individual legal remedies are evolving, many provi-
sions may be ineffective in reality. The comments of the Bundesrat
on the draft regulation 64 state candidly that employees, particularly
in small enterprises where the source of complaint is easily discov-
ered, have experienced disadvantages and even termination for re-
porting conditions to the administrative authorities.365 Furthermore,
"even when a plant council exists, it cannot be excluded that it may
represent the interests of the employees only halfheartedly
(bedingt)."36
4. Safety and Medical Services.-The Law concerning Occu-
pational Doctors Safety Engineers and Other Professionals engaged
in Workplace Safety (Gesetz ueber Betriebsaerzte, Sicherheit-
singenieure und andere Fachkraefte fuer Arbeitssicherheit) was
passed by the Bundestag in 1973. This law, also called the Work
Safety Law,3 67 requires employers to have doctors and professionals
concerned with workplace safety available to employees.368 The con-
sent of the work council is needed for the hiring or dismissal of occu-
362. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 21(1), see supra note 244. For example, any excess of the
MAK, TRK or threshold value, together with a statement of reasons, is to be communicated
without delay to the affected employees and the work council. Id. § 21(1). Copies of the chem-
ical measurements are to be available to the work council and to be given to them on request.
Id. § 21(3). The regulation contains a right of the work council to suggest to the employer
protective measures to remove health damage in addition to those in the regulation. Id. §
21(4).
363. This section, similar to the new right of suggestion discussed above, was added by
the Bundesrat. Where the chemical concentrations (MAKs or BATs) or tolerance values
(TRKs) are not met and the employee attempts, without success, to seek relief promptly
within the establishment through complaints (Beschwerde) the individual employee may turn
directly to the competent supervisory authorities. Where a direct danger to life or health exists
by reason of the above deficiencies, the individual has the right to refuse work. No disadvan-
tage may result to the employee for exercising either of these rights. GefahrstoffVO § 21(6).
364. GEFAHRSTAFFVO. See supra note 244.
365. Beschluss des Bundesrats, (Decision of the Federal Council), at 30 (Drucksache
211/86, May 16, 1986).
366. Id.
367. Arbeitssicherbeitsgesetz (ARBEITSSICHERHEITsG), printed in Nipperdey II, supra
note 207.
368. In addition to doctors, the Work Safety Law requires three types of safety profes-
sionals: engineers, technicians (Techniker), and safety experts (Sicherheitsmeister). Id. § 5.
The employer may use a contracting service. Id. § 19. The Work Safety Law states that doc-
tors and safety professionals at the plant level are not subject to the instructions of the em-
ployer. They may submit their suggestions over the head of the plant management directly to
the employer or competent member of the legal entity of the employer. Rejection of such a
suggestion must be in writing and with reasons given, with a copy sent to the work council.
ARBEITSSICHERHEITSG § 8.
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pational doctors and safety professionals. 69 When the work council
and employer are unable to agree on the hiring or dismissal of an
occupational doctor or safety expert"' final determination will rest
with the Conciliation Committee (Einigungsstelle). When it comes
to contracting with or dismissing non-plant medical or safety ser-
vices, the work council must be heard.3 71
Conversely, occupational doctors and safety professionals are re-
quired to cooperate with the work council, to inform it of important
matters regarding labor protection and accident prevention, and to
advise it on request. 72 Where doctors or safety technicians are em-
ployed directly by the plant, a safety and health committee
(Arbeitsschutzausschuss) must be established. Such committees in-
clude the employer or a representative, two work council members
selected by the work council, the doctors, safety professionals, and
safety stewards (Sicherheitsbeauftragte). Meetings of the commit-
tee must be held at least quarterly."7
C. Vocational Insurance Associations
1. In General.-The vocational insurance associations in Ger-
many (Berufsgenossenschaften) are organized regionally and indus-
trially, as are the labor unions. Unlike the employees' voluntary
membership, however, employers are required to join and fund the
appropriate vocational insurance association. The vocational insur-
ance associations provide money to the injured employee and family
after an occupational accident and they provide rehabilitation assis-
369. Note that this is a broader authority than the work council's right to refuse consent
to hiring and dismissal of other persons for reasons specified by statute. Id. § 9(3); Cf.
BETRVG § 99(2).
370. Judgment of Apr. 10, 1979, BAG, 34 Der Betriebsberater [BB] 1713 (1979); D.
GAUL, DIE BETRIEBLICHE EINIGUNGSSTELLE 80 (2d ed. 1980).
371. ARBEITSSICHERHEITSG § 9(3).
372. Id. § 9(2).
373. RVO § 719, see supra note 44, requires one or more safety stewards in plants with
20 or more employees. The work council participates in their selection. Safety stewards are
obligated to support the employer in the enforcement of accident prevention, in particular by
testing continually the existence and regular use of required safety measures. They may not be
disadvantaged for performing their duties. RVO § 719(1)-(3). Where three or more safety
stewards are appointed, they form a safety committee, unless a safety and health committee
already exists. The employer or his representative are required to hold monthly meetings with
the safety stewards, safety and health committee (if one exists), and the work council. Id. §
719(4). The number of safety stewards is set by the vocational insurance associations. Id. §
719(5). In addition to safety stewards, there are stewards to be appointed for radiation protec-
tion, water protection, sanitation, air emission protection, data protection, and handicapped
workers. See Radiation Protection Regulation §§ 29-31 (Strahlenschutzverordnung), Ver-
ordnung ueber den Schutz var Schaeden durch ionisierende Strahlen, 1976 BGBI.1 2905,
amended 1977 BGBI.I 184, 269; Water Resources Law §§ 4,21a (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz)
[WHG] 1976 BGBL.I 3017; Waste Disposal Law (Abfallbeseitigungsgesetz) [ABFG] 1977
BGBL.I 41, ber. 288 § 1 Ia; Federal Emissions Law §§ 53,55 (Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz)
[BlmSchG] 1974 BGB.I 721, ber. 1193 §§ 53, 55; Disabled Persons Law § 25
(Schwerbehindertengesetz) [ScHwBG] 1986 BGB.I 1421, ber. 1550.
374. ArbeitssicherheitsG § 11, see also RVO § 719(4).
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tance to the injured employee. 7 The decisions on pension claims
due to occupational illness are determined by a committee with
equal representatives of employers and employees. These associations
are also entrusted with preventing occupational accidents and insur-
ing first aid by all appropriate means."7 6 The Insurance Code3 77 au-
thorizes vocational insurance associations to issue regulations on
these matters. 8
Accident prevention regulations are issued by each insurance as-
sociation. Absent statute, direct administrative regulation, or adop-
tion by all of the ninety-odd accident insurance carriers, the regula-
tion is mandatory only for the employer members of the association
or associations that issued it." 9 The vocational insurance associations
also train persons who enforce labor protection and accident preven-
tion in the enterprises and place member employers and insured em-
ployees in training programs."'
General regulations have been adopted by all vocational insur-
ance associations acting in concord. Generally, these regulations im-
pose obligations on the employer to make arrangements, issue orders,
and undertake measures for the prevention of occupational accidents.
All measures must correspond to the generally recognized technical
safety and occupational medical rules.3 8' Adherence to the general
regulations and other applicable accident prevention regulations is
also required.382
The employer may deviate from the generally recognized rules
only insofar as the same degree of safety is achieved. 83 A vari-
ance3 84 permits an employer to deviate from particular accident pre-
375. RVO § 537.
376. Id. § 546(1).
377. RVO. See supra note 44.
378. Specifically, vocational insurance associations are authorized to issue regulations
under the Insurance Code in four areas:
(1) measures to be taken by employers to prevent occupational accidents,
including delegation of the employer's duties to other persons;
(2) behavior that insured persons are to observe to prevent occupational
accidents;
(3) medical examinations to be given to insured persons before employment
that is connected with unusual dangers of accident or health for them or third
persons;
(4) measures that the owner is obligated to take under the Work Safety
Law.
RVO § 708(1).
379. See supra text accompanying note 189.
380. Transportation, lodging and direct training costs are underwritten by the vocational
insurance association for training programs; the employee retains his pay for work time lost
because of participation. Id. § 720(l)-(3).
381. General Regulations I, § 2(1) (Allegemeine Vorschriften) [VBG 1], printed in
Nipperdey 11, supra note 207.
382. Id.
383. Id. § 3(2). Instructions of the employer that are contrary to safety (sicherheits-
widrig) are not to be followed. Id. § 14.
384. The employer must apply to the vocation insurance association for a variance (Aus-
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vention regulations, as long as the opinion of the plant representative
institutions85 is submitted by the employer. A variance is granted
either when the employer takes an equally effective measure, or
when enforcement of the regulation would be disproportionately dif-
ficult to observe and the deviation is reconcilable with protection of
the insured.386
Consistent with many other accident prevention regulations, the
general regulations are accompanied by enforcement advice
(Durchfuehrungsanweisungen). The enforcement advice states that
occupational diseases (Berufskrankheiten) are to be included under
work accidents (Arbeitsunfaellen). In many instances, enforcement
advice specifically refers to technical rules developed by private stan-
dard-setting organizations.387 The enforcement advice also contains
references to other accident prevention regulations, to circulars
(Merkblaetter) issued by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs and to administrative regulations such as the Workplace Fa-
cilities Regulation (Arbeitsstaettenverordnung)388 and the Danger-
ous Substances Regulation (Gefahrstoffverordnung).389
Each vocational insurance association has set forth the mini-
mum number of safety stewards (Sicherheitsbeauftragte), organized
according to the number of plant employees.390 Safety stewards have
the right to request and obtain results of plant inspections and acci-
dent investigations.3 91 The enforcement advice states that managers
and plant officials are not to be appointed as safety stewards.
Neither may safety technicians or those who have employer responsi-
bilities delegated to them be appointed as safety stewards. 92 The
employer is thus obligated to facilitate participation in training pro-
grams by the persons responsible for accident prevention enforce-
ment in the establishment.393
2. Health.-The Regulation on Occupational Medical Care39"
was adopted by nearly all vocational insurance associations in 1984,
under the authority of the Work Safety Law (Arbeitssicherheit-
sgesetz). It occupied the central role of defining the obligations of all
nahme). Id. § 3(l).
385. Usually this is the work council.
386. Id. § 3(1).
387. E.g., Deutsches Institut fuer Normung (DIN) and the Verein Deutscher Elek-
trotechniker (VDE).
388. See supra note 314.
389. See supra note 245.
390. VBG 1 Appendix.
391. Enforcement Advice (Durchfuehrungsanweisungen) VBG I § 9(2).
392. Id. § 9(1).
393. RVO § 720.
394. Arbeitsmedizinische Vorsorge [VBG 100], printed in Nipperdey I1, supra note
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employers and employees in the occupational medical field until the
advent of the new Dangerous Substances Regulation in 1986
(Gefahrstoffverordnung). The administrative Dangerous Substances
Regulation, by requiring tougher standards, in many instances su-
persedes this regulation of the vocational insurance associations.
Under the Regulation on Occupational Medical Care, medical ex-
aminations of employees 96 before and during employment are re-
quired where a specified effect (Einwirkung) or activity is to be ex-
pected. The employer bears the cost of the examination. 96
The occupational medical care regulation defines the effects of
medical examinations on future employment of the examined
worker.397 Upon demand, the examining doctor must instruct the
employee of the results of the examination. 98 Where doubts about
the employee's health exist due to endangering workplace conditions,
the doctor must make a written recommendation to the employer
requesting an investigation of the workplace. 99 When the danger
can be addressed by medical measures, the employee is to be advised
in writing of the appropriate measures to undertake. 00
The examining doctor may withhold issuance of a health doubts
395. The frequency of medical examinations is prescribed in the appendix to VBG 100.
396. VBG 100 § 2(2). Where the employee has followed instructions of the employer,
the Enforcement Advice indicates that travel and salary for lost time are to be included in the
costs of the examination. Enforcement Advice VBG 100 § 2(2). However, the Bundesarbeit-
sgericht declined to require an employer to pay an employee his salary for the period of a
required medical hearing test conducted in the employee's free time, although the test was at
the direction of the employer. The court regarded the examination as serving primarily the
employee's own interest and not as constituting performance of work for the employer. BAG,
April 20, 1983, No. 5 AZR 624/80 (copy on file with author).
397. VBG 100 § 10.
398. VBG 100 § 7(l)[1].
399. Id. § 7(1)[2][a].
400. Id. The doctor's finding of health doubts has great significance for the individual
employee and the employer. Where the doctor expresses health doubts and recommends a
workplace investigation, no employee may remain at the workplace until the investigation has
been completed and the employees can be "protected sufficiently" through measures that ac-
cord with VBG 1. Id. § 10(1). Where the doctor expresses health doubts and recommends
medical treatment for the examined employee, the employee may not work at the endangered
job until the doctor confirms that the danger has been remedied by medical measures. Id. §
10(2). Where medical measures cannot remove the health danger, the employee may no longer
work further at the endangered job. Id. § 10(3).
Some accident prevention regulations take even stricter approaches to employment in the
absence of medical examinations. The accident prevention regulation on noise of the Machin-
ery Construction and Small Foundry Vocational Insurance Association, for example, prohibits
further employment of the employee at his workplace if the employee refuses to be medically
examined for the effects of occupational noise. However, the Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) has
held that the employer's welfare duty (Fuersorgepflicht) requires the employer to examine
whether employment is possible at another workplace where the medical examination is not
required. Judgment of Apr. 20, 1983, BAG, No. 5 AZR 624/80 (copy on file with author).
The regulation prohibits further employment where an employee in a covered workplace has
not been tested for three years for the effects of noise. Unfallverhutungsvorschrift "larm" der
Maschinenbau-und Kleineisenindustrie-Berufsgenussenschaft. (Accident Prevention Regula-
tion on Noise, Machinery, Construction and Small Foundry Vocational Insurance Associa-
tion), Dec. I, 1974, id.
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(gesundheitliche Bedenken) finding when, in a particular case, the
intervals between medical examinations are shortened, the appropri-
ate measures of technical labor protection are undertaken, or the
proper personal protective equipment is used."0 1 When a report ex-
pressing health doubts has been issued - and even when one has
been withheld under the circumstances described above - notice
must be given to the work council."0 2
Upon request of the employee or employer, the vocational insur-
ance association decides whether to review the examining doctor's
results. If a review is recommended, the costs of the second doctor's
review are borne by the employer if the association does not cover
them. The decision of the association then replaces the examining
doctor's initial report. 0 3
Additionally, special medical record retention rules exist under
the Regulation on Occupational Medical Care' 04 for carcinogenic
work substances. Basically, the vocational insurance association must
be informed of the type of exposure, the start and end of exposure of
the individual employee, and the occupational medical care provided
when an employee is exposed to cancer-producing substances for six
months or more.'0 5
VI. Procedures for Setting Standards
A. Establishing Standards
1. Technical Standards Set by Private Groups.-The largest
standard-setting private group in West Germany is the German In-
stitute for Standardization (DIN). It conducts activities through ex-
pert committees with representatives of manufacturers, users, aca-
demic experts, and inspectors from the vocational insurance
association and public authorities. 06 Occasionally, union representa-
tives will participate. In contrast to the American National Safety
Institute (ANSI), there is no requirement that a member of an ex-
pert committee be affiliated with a DIN member.0 7
DIN's expert committees are required to follow certain proce-
401. Enforcement Advice § 7(l)[2] (Durchfuehrungsanweisungen) VBG 100.
402. VBG 100 § 10(4); Enforcement Advice VBG 100 § 7(l)[2].
403. However, if the medical examination was required by an administrative regulation,
the state authorities decide whether the examining doctor's report was correct. VBG 100 § 8.
404. VBG 100 § II(1).
405. Id. A copy of the medical record is to be furnished to the employee. Id. § 11(2).
The examining doctor is required to retain the employee's health file concerning exposure to
cancer-producing substances until the employee is seventy-five years old or would have been
seventy-five years old. Where the doctor cannot store the files, he must give them to the voca-
tional insurance association for storage. Id. § 12(2).
406. Bylaws (Satzung), DIN (Deutsches Institut fuer Normung) 1(2).
407. DIN Normungsarbeit 820 (1986).
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dural standards. 40 8 The setting of standards by DIN may not lead to
a special economic advantage for an individual.40 9 Items protected
under a trademark or otherwise subject to potential objection based
on unfair competition concerns may be adopted as a standard only
via exception with cause.410 In setting standards, DIN's committees
are directed to consider not only the perpetually developing fields of
science and technology as well as international and European harmo-
nization, but also the economic feasibility of the proposed technical
rules.""'
Anyone may request that DIN develop a standard. Acceptance
or rejection of a request is published in the DIN-Anzeiger maga-
zine.41 2 Publication of a draft standard, however, may be bypassed
by an accelerated procedure (Kurzverfahren)."l3 The accelerated
procedure is generally used only to revise existing standards. Publi-
cized requests receive comments. Committees review comments on
proposed standards within three months after the comment period
ends, and commenters are invited to attend the session. If they do
not attend, they are sent the committee's evaluation of their
comment.
Any person can request conciliation (Schlichtung) from the
head of the committee within one month of rejection of their com-
ment or proposed standard. Further appeal for conciliation may be
made within two months thereafter to the management of DIN
(Geschaeftsleitung). The Praesidium of DIN, composed of thirty to
forty-five persons elected by the membership, can be requested to
establish an arbitration committee4 14 if no agreement is reached by
the management within two months. The decision is usually ren-
dered by the arbitration committee within three months. 1 5
Draft Standards may not remain in draft form for longer than
two years. 4 6 Regular standards are to be reviewed every five years
408. See DIN Norm 820.
409. DIN Norm 820, Teil 1 1 2.
410. Id. 1 5.10.
411. Id. %11 5.2, 5.7.
412. Proposals accepted by a DIN committee as draft standards are published in the
DIN-Anzeiger for a four month comment period. Announcement of the draft standard is also
made at professional meetings. The comment period may be reduced to two months if the
standard is the product of a regional or international standards organization.
413. DIN's rules require publication of intent to so proceed for two months in the DIN-
Anzeiger and in the general newsletter, DIN-Mitteilungen. All interested constituencies
(Kreise) are to participate in the initiating committee.
414. The arbitration committee consists of a chairman appointed by the DIN
Praesidium, two members selected by the complainant, and two members appointed by the
affected committee. No members of either the committee or the complainant may serve as
arbitrators. DIN Norm 820, Teil 4, T 2.4.7.
415. DIN Standard 820, Part 1 15.3; Part 4 1 2.13, 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.7, 3.2 (Jan. 1986).
416. Id. Part 4, 7 2.4.9. Instead of issuing a draft standard, DIN may issue a pre-stan-
dard (Vornorm). A pre-standard is used where reservations on content exist or a nonconform-
ing procedure is used. It is to be reviewed every three years. Id. 11 3.1.
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for conformance with the state of technology. 17 Standards must be
retracted when their continued existence is not justified by science,
technology, or practicality. The intent to retract along with the rea-
soning must be published for comment for two months in the DIN-
Anzeiger."18
Although DIN is a private organization, it obligated itself, by
an agreement with the federal government (Normenvertrag), to con-
sider the public interest in its standards work 19 and in particular to
develop standards that can be used as a description of technical re-
quirements for legislation, administration and business.420 The agree-
ment provides that public officials may participate in DIN."2 1 In ad-
dition, DIN agrees to give priority to the federal government's
requests for standards and to refrain from issuing standards that
conflict with a rule issued by the federal government.422
2. Technical Standards Set by Public Committees.-Many
statutes and regulations provide that publicly-appointed committees
may decide that technical standards are to be treated as generally
accepted rules of technology."" These committees consist of repre-
sentatives from technical as well as social fields. There are commit-
tees for dangerous substances and for each of the six regulations con-
cerning technical installations. The Committee on Dangerous
Substances, 42 4 for example, has thirty-six members, appointed by the
Minister of Labor and Social Order with the consent of the Minister
of Youth, Family and Health. Members are to represent science,42 5
labor unions,2 6 employers,2 7 the competent authorities of the
Laender,'12 8 accident insurance carriers, and consumers. In the
cases of science, employers, and consumers, particular organizations
are frequently named which then select their representatives. The
417. Id. 1 3.4.5.
418. Id.
419. DIN Standard 820 binds DIN organs as a result of a resolution of the Praesidium;
the Normenvertrag nevertheless reiterates that Standard 820 and the guidelines for expert
committees bind the organization.
420. The Normenvertrag was prompted by a study in 1973 that suggested more public
legitimation of technical standards would be attainable through cooperation with the govern-
ment in standards development. W. ERNST, supra note 115. DIN's executives viewed this as a
way to reduce the fear that special interests control standardization. Federal funds provide
about 15% of DIN's budget. 54 DIN-Mitteilungen 361-67 (1975).
421. Normenvertrag 11(2).
422. Id. i 3, 2(2).
423. See infra notes 228-40.
424. It is appointed by the Minister of Labor and Social Order with consent of the
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committee elects a chairperson who must be approved by the two
federal ministers.
The sessions of the committee are not open to the public and
their deliberations are not published. Because the members serve in
a representative capacity, they have a duty to communicate with
their individual organizations. Therefore, the work of the committee
is usually known to experts in the relevant fields as well as organized
lobby groups. Moreover, the federal ministers and competent highest
authorities of the Laender can send representatives who are entitled
to speak at the sessions.431
In some instances, committees will issue technical standards re-
garding matters not addressed by technical standards issued by pri-
vate organizations. This occurs most frequently in the field of dan-
gerous substances, where tolerance values for carcinogens
(technische Richtkonzentration or TRKs) are set by the Committee
on Dangerous Substances. 3 Other public committees often adopt
privately-set technical standards without change.
3. Guidelines and General Administrative Regula-
tions.-Guidelines (Merkblaetter) and general administrative regu-
lations (allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschriften) issued by the Ministry
of Labor and Social Order are usually prepared by a technical stan-
dards committee. The vocational insurance associations also issue
guidelines prepared by an expert committee (Fachausschuss). Ex-
pert committees have representatives from member employers, un-
ions, public inspectors, practicing professionals, and the relevant vo-
cational insurance associations. 33 Guidelines need not be approved
by individual insurance associations. 34
4. Accident Prevention Regulations.-Each vocational insur-
ance association issues its own accident prevention regulations (Un-
fallverhuetungsvorschriften or UVV). In reality, these regulations
are centrally drafted by one of the expert committees, in cooperation
with the Central Office for Accident Prevention of the vocational in-
431. GEFAHRSTOFFVO § 44, supra note 244.
432. The German Labor Confederation, a participant on the Committee, emphasizes
that these tolerance values represent "political values which in no way protect against cancer."
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Stellungnahme zum Entwurf einer Verordnung ueber gafaeh-
rliche Stoffe 6 (Feb. 28, 1984) (copy on file with author). In 1985, there were 21 substances
with TRK values; 10 others on the category I cancer list were to be handled so that employees
are not exposed to them. Schuetz, MAK- Werte und TRK-Werte gefaehrlicher Arbeitsstaffe
und ihre Bedeutung fuer die Arbeitssicherheit, 38 Sichere Arbit 10, 12 (1985).
433. Complaints are made by some Laender that their interests are not sufficiently rep-
resented in the insurance associations' expert committees. Union or employee participation is
also infrequent.
434. Aufgabe und Stellung der berufsgenossenschaftlichen Fachausschuesse, Die Beruf-
sgenossenschaft 415 (Nov. 1971).
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surance associations. The assembly of each insurance association,
composed of an equal number of employer and employee representa-
tives, approves the accident prevention regulations, usually verba-
tim.""5 The Ministry of Labor and Social Order approves each acci-
dent prevention regulation after consultation with the Laender.136
5. Federal Regulations.-The Basic Law 437 requires that fed-
eral regulations (Rechtsverordnungen) which the Laender enforce on
behalf of itself or the federal government have the consent of the
Federal Council, the Bundesrat"38 The Bundesrat has a veto right
over such federal regulations; in essence, the states also possess this
veto right by virtue of their direct representation in the Bundesrat.
Nevertheless, the Bundesrat has never declined its consent to a fed-
eral regulation in the technical labor protection field.439 The proce-
dure for approval of a regulation is neither lengthy nor complicated.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Order usually drafts the proposed
regulation with the assistance of the relevant advisory committees. 4 0
For major regulations such as the Dangerous Substances Regulation,
brief meetings may be held by the Ministry to which concerned
435. Bearbeitung von Unfallverhuetungsvorschriften, Die Berufsgenossenschaft 415,
416 (Nov. 1971). For example, of 1,500 accident prevention regulations, only ten percent are
substantially different. Id.
436. RVO § 709. According to several labor ministry staff members, such consent has
never been refused. Interviews with A. Mertens and Mr. Streffer , in Bonn (Apr. 24, 1986).
437. Grundgesetz art. 80(2), see supra note 8.
438. The Bundesrat is comparable to the old United States Senate, composed of repre-
sentatives selected by the states. In West Germany, representatives are chosen by the executive
branch of state government, not by the state legislature as under the original United States
Constitution. Thus, the influence of the states - and through them the dominant political
party in the state - is much greater than it would be if the representatives to the Bundesrat
were directly elected. Further, it is dissimilar to our Senate in that voting is based upon popu-
lation; each state has from two to five votes.
439. Although very few regulations have failed to receive the consent of the Bundesrat,
many, including the Dangerous Substances Regulations, have been changed in the Bundesrat.
440. The debate within the Bundesrat committees is not public and is not later pub-
lished. However, an inkling of the discussions can be gleaned from the published recommenda-
tions of the committees together with brief justifications. Individual Laender see supra note 8,
may also present motions (Antraege) to alter the government's draft. In the case of the Dan-
gerous Substances Regulation, for example, Hessen, one of the Laender, proposed to make
tests obligatory under section 16(2) to find substitutes for dangerous substances so long as no
disproportional difficulty existed. Hessen also sought to permit authorities to prohibit the use
of dangerous substances when a less dangerous substitute was available. Antrag des Landes
Hessen zur Verordnung ueber gefaehrliche Stoffe, Bundesrat, Drucksache, 211/6/86 (May
14, 1986). This proposal was not adopted. The Bundesrat emphasized that the use of substi-
tutes for dangerous substances is "the most effective protection measure" against endangering
health effects, and organizational circumstances faced by the employer. To make sure that the
employer fulfills this obligation, the Bundesrat added to the government's draft the require-
ment that the tests be made available to the competent authorities upon demand. Beschluss
des Bundesrates zur Verordnung ueber gefaehrliche Stoffe, Bundesrat, Drucksache, 211/86,
at 19, Begruendung zu § 16(2) (May 16, 1986). Within nine days of the published recommen-
dations of the committees, the Bundesrat as a whole voted on them and concluded its delibera-
tions by approving a revised draft. The resolution (Beschluss) contains the revised text to-
gether with the justification for changes given by the committee or land whose proposals were
successful.
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groups are invited.441
When the proposed regulation receives the consent of the Fed-
eral Chancellor, it is forwarded to the Bundesrat."4 The draft sub-
mitted to the Bundesrat is published as a document (Drucksache)
and made available to the public for sale. The draft is assigned to
one or more committees of the Bundesrat.4" The Bundesrat may
make alterations in the draft, with the Federal Chancellor either ac-
cepting these alterations or submitting a new draft. The schedule set
by the Bundesrat is generally adhered to."" Throughout the process,
there is no requirement that the general public be heard. In reality,
however, letters from members of the public are considered, and
pressure for desired changes is usually applied to the Laender"8 or
the Ministry of Labor and Social Order by the affected organized
constituencies." 8
There is no separate review in the regulatory procedure for the
economic utility of regulations." 7 Such control would probably be
441. The meetings are not open to the public and the results are not published.
442. In addition, since 1983, proposed regulations in the field of technical labor protec-
tion must be provided to the European Commission and member countries of the European
Community one year in advance of their effective date in order to avoid potential trade barri-
ers. European Community member states and the Commission have no veto right; they may,
however, send comments to the federal government. EEC Council Directive No. 83/189 (Mar.
28, 1983).
443. In the case of the Dangerous Substances Regulation, six committees received the
draft: labor & social policy, government, internal affairs, culture, law, and economics. The
Dangerous Substances Regulation draft is one of the most complicated technical labor protec-
tion regulations to be considered by the Bundesrat, yet its deliberations were concluded in just
four and a half months.
444. The most successful argument that the federal government made to avoid changes
in the draft was to point out that a new notification to the European Commission would be
required, and would set back the process three to twelve months. E.g., Bundesrat, Drucksache
211/86, at 97 Begruendungzu § 123 (May 16, 1986).
In the case of the Dangerous Substance Regulation, instead of delaying the regulation by
seeking stricter standards, the Bundesrat made numerous requests to the federal government
for changes in the next modification of the regulation or Chemicals Statute. Id. 111-27 at
89-102. The Bundesrat also indicated where forthcoming technical rules would tighten the
regulation. For example, it stated in its comments that a technical rule for dangerous sub-
stances would be issued to provide the evaluation procedure and lists of substances which can
synergetically interact with one other. It noted that dangerous substances in the air at the
workplace can result without employing dangerous substances, such as gaseous aminos,
(Aminen) and from storage of tires. Bundesrat, Drucksache 211/86, at 21, Begruendung zu §
18(1) (May 16, 1986).
445. Laender, see supra note 8, often take their case to the press, particularly when they
are politically outnumbered. E.g., Hessische Kritik an Arzneimittelgesetz, Frankfurter
Aligemeine Zeitung, Jan. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
446. In the case of the 1986 Dangerous Substances Regulation, the Bundesrat's changes
and proposals for future changes uniformly tightened the regulations, indicating the influence
that the opposition Social Democratic Party had at the time in the Bundesrat through their
control of five of eleven Laender, including two large Laender (Nordrhein-Westfalen and Hes-
sen) with five votes each.
447. The published recommendations with their brief justifications indicate that the eco-
nomic committee frequently raised objections to provisions of the draft regulation on danger-
ous substances, but that most of its recommendations were rejected. E.g., Bundesrat,
Empfehlungen der Ausschuesse zur Verordnung ueber gefaehrliche Stoffe (Recommendations
of the Committees Concerning the Regulation of Dangerous Substances) Drucksache 211/86,
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regarded with disfavor on the basis of past exploitation of centralized
governmental authority. The general absence of concrete limitations
in safety and health administrative regulations makes economic pro-
jections difficult.
The Basic Law,448 however, requires that the federal govern-
ment and Laender consider the national economic balance
(gesamtwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht) in their budget policies. This
goal concerns only public expenditures (Finanzwirtschaft), but it is
often implied that the entire economic policy (Wirtschaftspolitik)
has to direct itself towards this goal. The Stability Law,44 ' concretiz-
ing this goal, sets forth four goals to be simultaneously achieved:
stability of prices, high employment levels, foreign trade balance,
and constant, yet appropriate, economic growth. 5 ' The relationship
of these goals to noneconomic goals of regulation is not usually ad-
dressed, thus, leaving it up to the legislator or administrator to deter-
mine on an individual basis.
There is also an annual report"' to evaluate the general
macroeconomic development in the country in the past year. Recom-
mendations for particular economic and social measures are prohib-
ited by law,4 52 although criticisms of existing programs are often
made in the reports. The reports have no binding effect.
6. Statutes and Regulations of the Laender.-The Laender
are permitted to pass statutes and regulations in the area of labor
protection only where the federal government has not acted."53 In
practice, the Laender do not assume a large role in occupational
safety and health standard-setting.""'
7. Federal Statutes.-Periodic efforts are made to consolidate
the various labor protection statutes into one code."" Such efforts
1 16, 18, 20, 28, 36, 37, 41, 43 (May 5, 1986).
448. Grundgesetz art. 109(2), see supra note 8.
449. Law to Promote Economic Stability and Growth (Gesetz zur Foerderung der
Stabilitaet und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft) (Stabilitaetsgesetz), 1967 BGBI.I 582, as
amended, printed in Sartorius I, Constitutional and Administrative Laws of the Federal Re-
public (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgesetze der Bundesrepublic).
450. Id. § 1.
451. This report (Jahresgutachten) is issued by an independent commission of five
economists.
452. Law for the Formation of an Expert Council to Evaluate the National Economic
Development (Gesetz ueber die Bildung eines Sachverstaendigenrates zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlicher Entwicklung), 1963, BGBI.1 685, amended by 1966 BGB.I 633.
453. Grundgesetz art. 74.
454. An exception exists in the field of social labor protection, especially regarding limi-
tations on working time and shop closing hours, where varying rules exist depending on the
type of enterprise and the Land. Technical labor protection is generally considered by the
Laender enforcement authorities and Laender ministries of labor to require action at the fed-
eral level or at least on the industrial level by the vocational insurance associations.
455. E.g., in 1929 and in 1982.
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have not succeeded, and the range of related laws continues to be
extremely broad despite the lack of a law concerned specifically with
occupational health protection.
Legislation can be initiated by the federal government, by any
Bundestag representative, 45 6 or by the Bundesrat itself. 57 Since the
Bundestag elects the federal chancellor, the chancellor always com-
mands a majority of the Bundestag, and thus is always able to pass a
bill in the Bundestag 58 Laws on labor protection, however, also re-
quire the consent of the Bundesrat 59 If a majority of the votes in
the Bundesrat are controlled by the opposition party, it is possible to
block a proposed law, although the same party that controls the
Bundestag usually controls the Bundesrat as well.
8. Labor Agreements.-Collective agreements are negotiated
over specific subjects on industrial and regional levels. 60 They some-
times include clauses on working time limits but rarely include other
subjects of labor protection. Agreements may not reduce statutory
protections. As a formal matter, individual labor contracts are al-
ways permitted to set a more favorable standard (das Guenstigkeit-
456. The Bundestag comprises 518 elected representatives. One half (259) are elected
by geographical districts directly, one half are selected by parties. Thus, each voter has two
votes: one for a district representative and one statewide vote for a party, which selects its
candidates in ranking order. The party list must be published at least thirty-four days before
the election and the ballot must contain the names of the first five party candidates. 30
Bundeswahlgesetz (Federal Election Law) §§ 1, 4, 28(3), 1975 BGB.I 2325, amended by 1985
BGB.I 521.
457. Grundgesetz art. 76(1). Most of the labor protection statutes have been planned by
the federal government for a long period or were party platforms prior to proposal. Bills are
often subjected to extended debate in the media and at party meetings before approval by the
cabinet and consideration by the Bundestag.
458. Provided that the coalition partner, if any, consents. The chancellor usually can
rely on his party colleagues because party loyalty or discipline is much stronger in West Ger-
many than in the United States.
459. Most legislation is approved solely by the Bundestag, with the Bundesrat having a
limited veto power (Einspruchsgesetz). Where the Bundesrat vetoes a bill with a majority
vote, the Bundestag can also override the veto with a majority vote, too. Grundgesetz art.
77(4). A two-thirds veto by the Bundesrat can be overriden only by a two-thirds majority in
the Bundesrat. Id.
Legislation for which the Basic Law expressly requires consent of the Bundesrat is treated
differently. In these cases, the Bundesrat must give its consent (Zustimmungsgesetze).
Grundgesetz art. 78. Consent is defined as an absolute majority of votes. Geschaeftsordnung
des Bundesrates § 30, 1966 BGBI.I 437, printed in Sartorius 1, supra note 449. The Basic
Law states that federal laws which the Laender enforce as their own affair are subject to
consent of the Bundesrat. Grundgesetz art. 84(1). The general rule is that the Laender enforce
federal laws as their own affair, Grundgesetz art. 83, and labor protection is no exception.
More than fifty percent of federal laws now require consent of the Bundesrat. H. ERICHSEN,
STAATSRECHT UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 63 n.9 (Juristischer Studienkurs 2d ed.
1979).
460. E.g., The IG Metall (Industrial Metalworkers' Union) recently concluded a wage
and salary framework agreement (Lohn- und Gehaltsrahmentarifvertrag) with the metal in-
dustry association of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Other collective agreements cover vacations
(Urlaubsabkommen), and overall framework agreements (Manteltarifvertraege). Regelungen
fuer Qualifizierung der Arbeitnehmer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 13, 1988, at I1,
col. 3.
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sprinzip). A few large companies sign company-wide agreements
along with or in place of the more common employer association col-
lective agreements.""'
B. Challenging the Validity of Standards
1. Administrative Review.-Once a technical rule is approved
by a private standard-setting organization, it may be informally re-
considered by the same organization."4° There is no procedure to
challenge the legal validity of the rule before administrative authori-
ties, however, since the rule has no legal effect. Similarly, guidelines
and regulations of the Ministry of Labor and Social Order and the
vocational insurance associations, as well as technical rules approved
by public advisory committees, may be changed upon renewed con-
sideration, but there is no procedure for challenging them
administratively.
2. Judicial Review.-German law separates a direct indepen-
dent challenge to the Law (abstrakte Normenkontrolle)"'3 from the
raising of a defense of validity in an enforcement action (konkrete
Normenkontrolle).4 "6 Direct review of regulations is extremely
limited.
a. Direct.-The Administrative Court Code"65 permits only mu-
nicipal ordinances (Satzungen) and regulations (Rechtsver-
ordnungen) under the Federal Building Laws (Bundesbaugesetz)
and Laender regulations as determined by Laender laws to be the
subject of direct judicial review. The administrative court of appeals
(Oberverwaltungsgericht) hears these cases in the first instance.
When the matter has fundamental importance, or the court intends
to deviate from the decision of another administrative court of ap-
peals, the court must send the legal question to the highest adminis-
trative court for decision.466
In order to obtain direct review, the plaintiff must have suffered
a disadvantage or expect one in the foreseeable future.467 The de-
461. Supra note 334.
462. Interview with E. Budde, Legal Department DIN, in Berlin, (April 15, 1986).
463. This means direct review of the validity of a regulation without waiting for an
enforcement proceeding. Thus, it is akin to a declaratory judgment proceeding.
464. This review arises in the context of appeal in an enforcement proceeding in which
the overall validity of the regulation is raised.
465. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] § 47(l), 1960 BGB.I 17, as amended,
printed in Satorius I, supra note 449.
466. Id. § 47(5), (6). However, the parties cannot appeal judgments of the administra-
tive court of appeals concerning the validity of regulations. E. EYERMANN & L. FROEHLER,
VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG KOMMENTAR 422 (8th ed. 1980); H. Wolff & 0. Bachof,
Verwaltungsrecht 1I 464 (4th ed. 1978).
467. Public officials are not subject to this limitation.
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fendant is the state or public body issuing the regulation. Labor pro-
tection regulations are not included and are thus not subject to chal-
lenge in an independent proceeding. 68
Direct judicial review does not fit comfortably into a system of
nonbinding case jurisprudence because civil law courts are not sup-
posed to make law. Nevertheless, the invalidation of the regulation
has general binding effect, as does the holding that a certain inter-
pretation is impermissible." 69 The upholding of a norm is not in and
of itself generally binding, although it has a strong de facto effect,
especially on administrative authorities. Technical standards that are
published by public authorities as "generally accepted rules of tech-
nology" are not within the direct review permitted for building regu-
lations because they do not constitute legal standards.""
Direct or abstract constitutional challenges to governmental reg-
468. Some commentators urge section 47 as a model for other courts such as the social
and financial courts, and urge its application to all federal law. Bavaria is the only state
(Land) that subjects all of its legal norms to abstract norm control. Five other Laender have
provided for abstract review of more limited scope.
469. E. EYERMANN & L. FROEHLER, supra note 466 at 422.
470. A rare example of a decision involving direct review of an accident prevention regu-
lation occurred when a bank filed a complaint before a social court (Sozialgericht) to declare
illegal a regulation requiring bulletproof cashier windows in banks. The court stated that ad-
ministrative review of accident prevention regulations was limited to determining whether the
regulation fulfills the statutory purpose of prevention of work accidents and to make sure such
regulations do not conflict with administrative labor protection regulations. The court stated
that judicial review was limited to examining whether the procedural requirements had been
complied with and whether they were in harmony with administrative and constitutional law.
The content and appropriateness of accident prevention regulations were not reviewed by the
court because of the principle of self-administration (Selbstverwaltung) of the vocational in-
surance associations. Judgment of Jan. 14, 1970, Landessozialgericht Darmstadt, docket No.
L3/U-685/69 (copy on file with author).
In 1985, judicial intervention occurred for the first time with regard to publication in the
Federal Labor Gazette of the annual list of chemical concentration values: an administrative
appeals court enjoined the Minister of Labor and Social Order from publishing the chemical
concentration values for two substances (dust from oak and beech trees) on the 1985 list of
cancer-producing substances. (Other wood dust was listed as having an established suspicion of
potential to cause cancer.) Technische Regein fuer gefaehrliche Arbeitsstoffe (TRGA 980)
Bundesarbeitsblatt 84, 88 (Dec. 1985).
Advocates of abstract judicial review of technical standards refer to the courts' treatment
of product testing by the Product Testing Foundation (Stiftung Warentest), a well-known con-
sumer organization. Misleading tests and consciously false tests, courts have held, interfere
with the business of the manufacturer under Section 823(1) of the Civil Code. Judgment of
Dec. -, 1985, Oberlandesgericht Muenchen, 21 U5546/85 and 21 U5690/85, reported in
Gericht wirft 'Warentest' Irrefuehrung vor, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 24, 1985,
at 13, col. 6. Section 823(1) provides, "whoever illegally and intentionally or negligently in-
jures the life, body, health, freedom, property or other particular right of another, is obligated
to that person for replacement of the damage that results." As early as 1975, the civil chamber
of the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction (Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Zivilkammer) re-
viewed the organization's tests to ensure they were "neutral, objective and expert." The court
defined objectivity not by the test results but by the organization's efforts to ensure correctness
of the results. Judgment of Dec. 9, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], 65 BGHZ 325, 328;
Neue Juristische Woche [NJW] 620 (1976).
Commentators who urge more direct review suggest higher court filing fees and reduced
controls on attorney fees for such complaints to discourage spurious litigation. (Court costs in
the social, administrative and finance courts are slight in comparison with the percentage tax
levied on the amount claimed in cases in the ordinary civil courts.
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ulations and statutes are possible through a constitutional complaint
(Verfassungsbeschwerde). Any person may file such a complaint
before the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsger-
icht),71 alleging that he has been injured by public authority (die
oeffentliche Gewalt) in a fundamental right (Grundrecht)7 1 or other
specified constitutional right. 473 Review occurs only after official en-
forcement action and other legal recourse has been exhausted. Fur-
thermore, the challenged statute must currently and directly inter-
fere with the legal position of the plaintiff.47 4
A second means of direct constitutional review permits the fed-
eral government, a state government, or one-third of the Bundestag
to bring disputes concerning the federal constitutionality of a pro-
posed law or compliance of state law with federal law to the Federal
Constitutional Court.47  Thus, an opposition party in power in a state
or an opposition party that has at least one-third of the Bundestag
seats can test the constitutionality of a proposed statute.47 6
b. Indirect.-The validity of a technical standard issued by a
private organization may not be directly contested; however, applica-
tion of the rule may result in liability of the standards issuer or user.
A standards issuer may be liable when a carelessly prepared and
defective standard results in an injury because of the standard's de-
fects. The remedy is a delictual claim under the Civil Code 477 for
which proof of fault is required.478 Some commentators, advocate a
negligence standard of review for such claims: the standard's issuer
must have had knowledge of the inappropriateness or danger of the
rule and, even with that knowledge, must have failed to warn or
comment.479
A standards user may arguably be liable if he misuses a valid
rule to injure competitors.4 80 In Germany, personal or comparative
471. If the complaint concerns state (Land) law, it is brought before a state constitu-
tional court if one exists.
472. As set forth in the Grundegesetz. arts. 1-19, supra note 8.
473. Id. art. 93(l)[4a].
474. In Bavaria, any person can challenge the constitutionality of a state law without
the need to show direct injury.
475. Grundgesetz art. 93(1)[2].
476. This provision has not been used for laws concerning labor protection.
477. See CIVIL CODE § 823(l), supra note 470. A user may also be held liable under
Section 823(l) for an unsatisfactory rule whose defect could have been discovered with ordi-
nary care.
478. Id.
479. Tilmann, Zum Rechtsschutz gegenueber Veroeffentlichungen der MAK-Werte-
Kommission, 19 DER BETRIEBSBERATER, [BB] 521 (1981). A possible defense would be section
676 of the Civil Code, which exempts the giver of advice or recommendations from liability in
the absence of a contractual relation or delictual act. Organizations in the form of an associa-
tion (Verein) carry a greater liability under section 31 of the Civil Code because experts who
are their agents are held to a special duty of care.
480. 54 BGHZ 188, 190 (general public is protected from excess [Auswuechsenl of
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advertising, even if true, can result in liability.48 This rule extends
logically to technical standards, too. Such action might violate the
general clause of the Law Against Unfair Competition4 82 or consti-
tute a boycott under the Law against Limits on Competition.483 The
remedy under both is a prohibitory injunction and damages.
As previously noted, technical rules by public committees,
guidelines from administrative and insurance authorities, and gen-
eral administrative regulations rely on "the generally accepted rules
of technology" (die allgemeinen anerkannten Regeln der Technik).
This makes uniform treatment of challenges to their legal validity
impossible. The formula of "generally accepted rules of technology"
obligates the authorities and courts to interpret its meaning in each
case, giving to the technical standards contained in the rule the
weight deemed appropriate.
The concept of "generally recognized rules of technology" rep-
resents, in a broad sense, a statutory delegation of self-control to in-
dustry. Since the employer can always deviate from the generally
accepted rule if he provides the same protection through other
means, there is less incentive to challenge the validity of the recom-
mended rules.48'
Thus, the key question is not the validity of the recommended
rule, but whether the authorities or the courts will apply it. Regula-
tory enforcement actions occur before practically every type of court
- administrative, social, labor, and both the criminal and civil
branches of the ordinary courts. Within each court, permanent
panels hear the same type of cases, thereby acquiring specialization
in their field. Nevertheless, criticism that judges usurp the experts'
opinions and lack sufficient training in technical matters is fre-
quently heard.
The presumption that technical standards constitute generally
accepted rules of technology may be refuted by the age of the stan-
dard, subsequent change in technical development, or the priority of
an economic or legally binding regulation. 85 However, a decision de-
clining to apply a technical standard is extremely unusual.486
competition); P. Marburger, Die Regeln der Technick 574-75 (1979).
481. 49 BGHZ 325, 328.
482. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb § 1, 1909 RGBI. 499, as amended.
483. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen, § 26(1), (2), 1980 BGBI. 1 1761, as
amended.
484. Furthermore, until recently, the regulations have usually omitted specific limits in
the case of chemical exposure.
485. Lukens, Die Bedeutung der sogenannten Regein der Technik fuer die Schadenser-
satzpflicht von Versorgsunternehmen, 23/24 Veroeffentlichengen des Instituts fuer Energie-
recht an der Universitaet Koeln 22, 31, 32 cited in W. ERNST, supra note 115, at 12, n.5.
486. In one civil case for damages resulting from the faulty construction of a house, the
Cologne Court of Appeals refused to apply a DIN Standard on soundproofing (Schallschutz),
which was 18 years old and out-of-date with current technology. Judgment of Sept. 23, 1980,
[Vol. 6:2
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The decision to seek expert affidavits and the court's determina-
tion of the weight to be given to it conclude whether or not the rec-
ommended technical rule will be applied. The Administrative Court
Code (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung), supplemented by the Civil Pro-
cedure Rules (Zivilprozessordnung), determines the parameters for
the taking of evidence (Beweisaufnahme). The principles that the
judge - not the parties - has the investigative duty and that the
judge evaluates the evidence according to free discretion are over-
shadowed by the practice of relying on the expert's affidavit.
The court usually appoints the expert to advise the court di-
rectly. Case law indicates that a judge must request an expert if
difficult technical questions are presented. s7 While the court has dis-
cretion to require the appearance of an expert to explain the affida-
vit,' 8 8 when the parties orally request to question the expert, the
court must summon him."89 The decision to seek further expert affi-
davits is left to the investigating judge."9" According to judicial prac-
tice, further affidavits are required only where the first affidavit has
obvious deficiencies, unsolvable contradictions, uses incorrect factual
assumptions, or there is cause to doubt the qualifications or neutral-
ity of the expert. Experts, like judges, may be rejected on grounds of
prejudice. After reasonable evaluation of all the circumstances, there
must be objective grounds to doubt the neutrality or impartiality of
the expert. Prior testimony by the same expert in another adminis-
trative proceeding involving the same issues is generally not suffi-
cient, unless the expert prepared the affidavit for one of the parties,
rather than for the decisionmaker. The highest administrative court
stresses that the court must evaluate the expert's affidavit using its
own expert knowledge of the subject and general experience. Courts
may not rely on legal conclusions of experts. "91 Nevertheless, a lower
Oberlandesgericht Koeln, docket No. 15 U262/79 (copy on file with author). The homebuyer
complained about noise he heard from the neighboring house's steps, and the builder asserted
compliance with the DIN standard as proof of lack of a defect. The court said that DIN
standards are not automatically synonymous with the recognized rules of technology. It is
interesting to note that the court followed the affidavit of the expert it had appointed in mak-
ing this ruling. The legal advisor at DIN noted that he was aware of only one other DIN
standard that courts had refused to recognize as evidencing the current state of technology or
generally accepted rules of technology. Interview with E. Budde, in Berlin (Apr. 15, 1986).
487. An oral request by a party for an expert affidavit can be refused by the court only
with reasons stated in writing.
488. Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) § 411(3).
489. Id. §§ 397, 402.
490. The second affidavit is often referred to as the superior ranking affidavit(Obergutachten) although it has no greater authority than the first affidavit.
491. For example, a court's reliance on an expert's decision as to the percentage of work
disability of a postman was reversed. Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVERwG) 2 Apr. 1969,
Buchholz 232 No. 9 of § 139 BBG, cited in Skouris, Grundfragen der Sachver-
staendigenbeweises im Verwaltungsverfahren und im Verwaltungsprozess, 107 Archiv des oef-
fentlichen Rechts 215, 247 (1982). In another case, the court reversed a determination based
on the grounds that the experts unanimously concluded that an individual was unsuitable to
Winter 1988]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
court's deviation from an expert's affidavit must be convincingly
supported.'92
Technical standards issued by public committees, administrative
guidelines, and general administrative regulations are treated as "an-
ticipatory" expert affidavits (antizipiertes Sachverstaendigenurteil)
by administrative courts where the group issuing the standard is ex-
pert, representative, and independent. 9 3 In addition, in order to be
treated as "anticipatory," there must have been procedural openness
in the development of the rule, and the rule must be sufficiently con-
crete and recent so as to be a basis for the particular case. The court
also may seek an expert affidavit concerning the applicability of the
technical standard to the case.'94
Technical rules, guidelines, and general administrative regula-
tions are applied in the first instance by the enforcement authorities.
The enforcement authorities must respect compliance with general
administrative regulations but can permit deviations. Thus, the advo-
cates of a stricter standard will not be able to challenge the legal
validity of technical rules, guidelines, or general administrative regu-
lations. The advocates of a weaker standard will be subject to en-
forcement actions yet may claim that the generally accepted rule of
technology diverges from the written regulation. If a court upholds
this latter view, it will not strike the written standard down as inva-
lid, but rather will define the generally accepted rule differently from
the technical standard.
Accident prevention regulations and their interpretation by the
vocational insurance associations may be tested in the Social Court
(Sozialgericht) for compliance with relevant statutes. This is
predominantly relevant to the Work Safety Law (Arbeitssicherheit-
sgesetz), under which the vocational insurance associations set the
required numbers of doctors, safety engineers, and other safety ex-
perts in the establishment.495 Most other accident prevention regula-
tions derive their authority from the very broad delegation in the
Social Insurance Code,496 which authorizes the associations to pass
regulations to prevent accidents.
The highest social court (Bundesozialgericht or BSG) requires
hold a truckdriver's license. The court held that the experts should not have answered the legal
question in the case. Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVERwG) Buchholz 310 No. 72 of § 86(l)
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, cited in id. at 248.
492. Id.
493. Breuer, Direkte und indirekte Rezeption technischer Regeln durch die Rechts-
ordnung, 101 Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts 46, 84 (1976).
494. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1978, Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Neue Juristiche Woche
(NJW) 1450 (1978); Breuer, supra note 493, at 46, 84.
495. R. Skiba, Taschenbuch Arbeitssicherhert 346 (5th ed. 1985).
Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz.
496. RVO § 708.
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accident prevention regulations to comply with statute and higher
ranking law.49 7 Furthermore, it requires that the insurance associa-
tion not abuse its discretionary authority."" This court has held that
separating enterprises into two groups for purposes of calculating the
required number of hours that occupational doctors must be availa-
ble is a proper exercise of the insurance association's discretion."99
The insurance association's interpretation of an accident prevention
regulation, which required an insured employer to obtain the highest
possible rebate over the last three years for safe workplaces before
being eligible for reduced number of hours of service of occupational
doctors, was found to be unjustified.500 Another accident prevention
regulation that based the required number of safety engineers and
safety experts on total enterprise employment was struck down by
the highest social court as inconsistent with the Work Safety Law's
emphasis on workplace rather than enterprise. 501 Challenges to other
accident prevention regulations are rare; as for technical standards,
their case-by-case application makes general challenges difficult.
The highest administrative court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht)
gives administrative authorities a broad range of discretion in the
setting of technical standards. In an environmental case challenging
general administrative regulations that set specific air emission limits
under the Federal Emissions Protection Law,10 2 the court noted that
the current state of medical and biological knowledge did not permit
a precise conclusion as to the amount of emission or pollution of the
air that results in the onset of a damaging environmental effect.50 '
Nevertheless, the regulation was upheld.
497. E.g., the Grundgesetz, supra note 8.
498. Judgment of Oct. 24, 1985, Bundessozialgericht. (BSG) docket No. 2 RU 31/84,
at 8 (copy on file with author). Judicial review of accident prevention regulations does not
involve determinations of the reasonableness or appropriateness of regulations. Id.
499. Id. at 11.
500. Such an interpretation included all establishments of the employer in calculating
the extent of a rebate, and an individual establishment of the employer might otherwise have
been eligible if considered separately. Id.
501. Judgment of May 8, 1980 Bundessozialgericht. (BSG), No. 8a RV 44/79 (copy on
file with author). The appendix to the regulation. provided that where the minimum number of
employees in an establishment for appointment of such experts (240 employees) was not
reached, distant and unrelated establishment "parts" would be included. The court ruled that
the Work Safety Law focuses on establishment, not enterprise, that labor protection by its
nature is related to the worksite, not to the economic or organizational form of an enterprise,
and that the rule was inconsistent (sachwidrig) since enterprises with less than 240 employees
in one plant but more in another plant would be required to hire safety engineers and experts
regardless of the lack of connection of the two plants to one another. An oral interpretation by
another vocational insurance association similar to the invalid regulation was likewise held
invalid: the establishments were organizationally independent and geographically distant from
one another and were not to be counted together for determining the number of hours of
service required by a doctor in the workplace. Judgment of June 26, 1980, Bundessozialgericht
(BSG), No. 8a RV 106/79 (copy on file with author).
502. Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz [BIMScHG].
503. Judgment of Feb. 2, 1978, Bundesverwaltungsgericht. (BvERwG), 1/C/102.76,
Gewerbe Archiv 232-35 (1978).
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Regulations, statutes, and their interpretation can be challenged
in enforcement proceedings on constitutional grounds. 504 The court
usually favors the broadest interpretation that would uphold the con-
stitutionality of the regulation. When the matter concerns a violation
of federal constitutional law, any court that considers unconstitu-
tional a statute passed after the date of the Basic Law (1949) -
where the decision depends on such determination - must stay the
proceeding and seek [he determination of the Bundesverfassungsger-
icht. If the matter concerns violations of a state constitution, the
state supreme court, if one exists, has jurisdiction (Verfassung-
sbeschwerde).50 5 Where the court considers that the claim lacks
merit, the aggrieved party may raise the question at the end of the
proceedings by way of a constitutional complaint. 506 Challenges to
the constitutionality of statutes and the statutory and constitutional-
ity conformity of regulations in the field of technical labor protec-
tions, however, are rare. Another type of judicial review of job safety
and health provisions occurs in the labor courts, which review the
substantive contents of workplace agreements (Betriebsver-
einbarungen) for equitable fairness (Billigkeitskontrolle).507
504. Grundgesetz, art. 100(1). See supra note 8.
505. Id. art. 93(l)[4a].
506. For example, the Bundesverfassungsgericht reviewed a constitutional complaint
challenging RVO § 551(2). This section of the code permits accident insurance carriers, on the
basis of new knowledge, to compensate persons suffering from an occupational disease that is
not included in the Occupational Disease regulation as a recognized occupational disease. The
case concerned a woman who ran a metal welding shop for ten years and then had to stop
because of repeated operations for Scheidensenkung, a disease not listed in the appendix to the
Occupational Disease Regulation. Her insurance association refused to give her a disability
pension. The social court (Sozialgericht) denied her complaint, stating that the disease was not
on the compensation list. The appellate social court (Landessozialgericht) obtained a medical
affidavit stating that there was a probable connection between her illness and occupational
activity, and that this medical knowledge existed prior to revision of the compensable list of
occupational diseases in 1976. The Ministry of Labor and Social Order answered the court's
request in the negative as to whether the disease had been considered in the preparation of the
compensable list. The appellate social court decided that the knowledge was not new because it
could have been considered in preparation of the list. The highest social court denied certiorari
for lack of a legal question of basic importance.
The plaintiff's constitutional complaint alleged that her fundamental rights of equality
(Grundgesetz, art. 3(a) see supra note 8], free development of her personality [id. art. 2(1)],
and guarantee of a social state [id. art. 20] were violated because the Insurance Code ignored
a disease when knowledge existed at the time of adoption of the official list, yet was excluded
from consideration. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, interpreted Section 551(2) to
avoid violation of the principle of equality: the difference that one occupational disease was
scientifically known at the time of promulgation of the last edition of the compensable list and
that another was unknown, did not justify a difference in the protection of statutory accident
insurance. The Bundesverfassungsgericht cited cases of the highest social court ruling that so
long as the occupational disease regulation did not consciously reject putting an illness on the
list, the "new knowledge" provision of section 551(2) could apply. Thus, the court granted
plaintiff the relief she sought by interpreting the statute and avoiding the constitutional
questions.
507. This review appears most frequently in reviewing compensation agreements for
plant employment reductions (Sozialplaene). A few decisions have concerned occupational
safety and health. For example, the highest labor court invalidated part of a workplace agree-
ment that required employees who remained for less than one year to reimburse the company
Winter 1988] GERMAN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
3. Preemption.-Preemption rules concerning state and fed-
eral legislation are stated in the Basic Law."0 8 Where there is con-
current legislative jurisdiction,0 9 the Laender may legislate so long
and so far as the federal government has not done so.510 There has
been little initiative by the Laender to add to the predominantly fed-
eral legislation and regulations. Rather, the trend is for federal regu-
lation to expand to areas once regulated by the Laender.6 " In con-
trast, there is no general rule of preemption concerning regulation by
the state and the vocational insurance associations. Both entities fre-
quently issue overlapping regulations and guidelines, often when re-
ferring to the same technical rules. 512 Labor law contains at least
three preemption rules. First, a workplace agreement (Betriebsver-
einbarung)56" is preempted if a collective agreement (Tarifvertrag)
already exists or commonly exists on the subject. 1 Second, an em-
ployer is always permitted to provide greater protection than that
required by statute, regulation, or collective agreement. 516 Third, a
collective agreement may not change the terms of a statute or regu-
for safety shoes at the rate of one-twelfth of the cost for each month of employment. Judgment
of Aug. 18, 1982, Bundesarbeitsgericht. (BAG), No. 5 ARZ 493/80, at 4, 6 (copy on file with
author). The court stated that the prohibition of individual waiver of rights in section 619 of
the Civil Code applied to workplace agreements as well as individual contracts and that the
expense of safety shoes was part of the employer's general cost of business. The court recog-
nized that employees could voluntarily keep the shoes for private use and legally agree to pay
in part for them.
508. See Grundgesetz arts. 70(1) (residuary jurisdiction rests with Laender); 71, 73
(rules and subjects of exclusive federal jurisdiction); 72, 74, 74a (rules and subjects of concur-
rent jurisdiction).
509. Labor protection (Arbeitsschutz) is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction. See
Grundgesetz, art. 74(12) (concurrent jurisdiction extends to "labor law, including workplace
governance (Betriebsverfassung), labor protection and job placement as well as social insur-
ance and unemployment insurance").
510. Id. art. 72(1).
511. For example, the new Gefahrstoffverordnung (Dangerous Substances Regulation)
replaces some twenty-one police law regulations of the Laender in the fields of poisons, pest
control and fertilizers, but leaves them standing insofar as they set rules for expert knowledge,
notification, and permits regarding bringing permissible pesticides into commerce. GEFAHR-
STOFFVO, § 47(6), (12), (14).
512. E.g., overlapping rules for medical surveillance in accident prevention regulation
VBG100 and the Dangerous Substances Regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 395-
405. The Work Safety Law is an exception. It grants to the vocational insurance association
the first opportunity to pass implementing regulations while prohibiting the Federal Ministry
of Labor from acting on a subject in which an accident prevention regulation already exists.
ArbeitssicherheitsG § 14(1).
513. The Workplace Constitution Law authorizes agreements in the field of labor pro-
tection that elaborate, inter alia, on administrative and accident prevention regulations.
BetrVG § 87(l)[7]; supra note 349.
514. BETRVG § 76(3). However, the workplace agreement will not be preempted if the
collective agreement expressly authorizes workplace agreements. Id.
515. Guenstigkeitsprinzip. This rule is a judicial construction. See supra text accompa-
nying note 461. It stands in contrast to the American doctrines of duty of fair representation
and exclusive bargaining, which expressly prohibit employers from reaching preferential indi-
vidual employment contracts and uphold collective agreements that displace terms of individ-
ual employment contracts.
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lation516 that disallows deviations.
4. Requiring Issuance.-As the constitutional complaint is
only a recent procedure,511 it is not surprising that an injunction re-
quiring issuance of administrative regulations is generally rejected
by the courts and treated gingerly by commentators. Courts have not
compelled administrators to define more precisely the indefinite legal
concepts frequently used in occupational safety and health norms.
According to a growing minority of commentators, however, the
state must be able to define legal obligations and should not leave
the entire decision to the experts.""' One supporter of a new cause of
action to require regulatory action writes:
In the social state under law (sozialer Rechtsstaat) of the
present, the citizen is no longer an object of state decisionmak-
ing, but a partner in a dialogue before the final decisionmaking,
in which the arguments for and against the decisional alterna-
tives are to be weighed.51'
As with direct judicial review, the danger exists that the courts
would thereby create law, which is contrary to the nature of a code-
based legal system.5 0 In practice, political pressure to issue regula-
tions is asserted through the federal government and not through in-
direct channels like the courts."'
516. This is a general proposition that is also valid in the field of labor protection.
517. It was introduced in 1969.
518. See, e.g., Kopp, Welche Anforderungen soil eine einheitliche Verwaltungsordnung
genuegen um im Rahmen einer funktionsfaehigen Rechtspflege effektiven Rechtsschutz zu
gewaehrleisten? Verhandlungen des 54. deutschen Juristentages B 71-73 (1982).
519. Wuertenberger, Die Normenerlassklage als funktionsgerechte Fortbildung verwal-
tungsprozessualen Rechtsschutzes, 105 Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts 370, 376 (1980).
520. Such action nevertheless is warranted in some writers' views because of the require-
ment to conform interpretation of the laws with the Constitution, the necessary adherence by
the executive (Verwaltung) to the Constitution, and by the democratically legitimated law or
regulation itself. Id.
521. The labor courts, however, are continually asked to define the scope of various
codetermination and information rights of the plant council regarding labor protection issues.
Where the court finds a right of codetermination, this has the effect of forcing the agreement
or issuance of some rule because of the provision for the plant conciliation committee
(Einigungsstelle).
A case brought by the enterprise-wide work council (Gesamtbetriebsrat) of Pan American
Airlines provides an example of how labor courts handle preemption and affirmative injunc-
tions. The work council sought a workplace agreement concerning the introduction of video
display terminals in the workplaces of Pan Am offices in West Germany. The highest labor
court held that no codetermination right to propose a clause prohibiting pregnant women from
working at video display terminals existed under Section 81(1)17] of Workplace Constitution
Law because the field was already covered by the Mother Protection Law, which authorizes
the Federal Minister of Labor to issue regulations to avoid health dangers for pregnant and
nursing women. The absence of such a regulation did not allow the work council a right of
determination in this case, as the statute left action in this field to the labor minister to be
active. Conversely, the court found that the absence of laws or regulations on the general
subject of video display terminals in workplaces did not imply a right of codetermination under
the Workplace Constitution Law to fill out existing laws or regulations. See generally H.
Ehmann, Arbeitsschutz und Mitbestimmung bei neven Technologien (1981).
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VII. Enforcement of Standards
A. Public
1. Laender.-For historical reasons, the Federal Republic of
Germany shuns federal enforcement authority as much as possible.
As in other areas, the Laender enforce federal occupational safety
and health law through their own agencies; there is no direct federal
enforcement apparatus for occupational safety and health matters.
In most Laender, the occupational inspectorate (Gewerbeaufsicht)
undertakes this function. 22 Part of the inspectors' time is spent en-
forcing environmental and social labor protection laws. The inspec-
tors are divided according to the size of the enterprise they inspect.
The most senior inspectors are responsible for large enterprises, the
middle level for middle-sized enterprises, and the lowest level for
small enterprises."3
Since Bismarck's time, the occupational inspectorate has fo-
cused on consultation, rather than coercive measures such as orders,
fines and criminal penalties to enforce standards. 524 Thus, enforce-
ment measures are viewed as a last resort to be used after consulta-
tion fails. This is true because the occupational inspectors are re-
sponsible for enforcing many different laws and regulations and are
often not technically qualified in every area for which they are
responsible.525
The information and consultation right of the work council regarding the form and organ-
ization of work in section 90 of the Workplace Constitution Law did not provide the enterprise
work council with a right of codetermination, according to the court. The employer and work
council must give consideration to reliable ergonomic findings (gesicherte arbeitswissenschaft-
liche Erkenninisse), but such principles, which have not yet become legal norms, are not sub-
ject to a mandatory codetermination right. Id.
The Workplace Constitution Law further provides a right of codetermination if the work
obviously contradicts reliable ergonomic findings, and employees are thereby burdened in par-
ticular ways. BetrVG § 90. The court recognized that individual employees were burdened by
the way in which they worked with video terminals, but refused to convert this partial burden
into a right to enforce rules concerning the work of all employees at such terminals. Rather,
the court limited the right of codetermination to the affected individual workplaces.
522. The occupational inspectorates are usually under the supervisory authority of the
State Department of Labor. They had 3,042 inspectors in 1984, nearly half of them (1,257) in
the most populous state, Nordrhein-Westfalen. Accident Prevention Report (Unfallverhuetung-
sbericht) 1985 (Report of the Federal Government of the State of Accident Prevention and
Accident Events in the Federal Republic of Germany), Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache, 10/
4601, at 44 (Dec. 19, 1985).
523. There is no separation into health inspectors and safety inspectors, although a sepa-
rate and very small staff of ninety-four public occupational doctors exist. Id. at 45. The signa-
ture of one of these public occupational doctors (Gewerbeaerzte) is necessary for compensation
in an occupational disease claim. The public occupational doctor prepares an affidavit based
upon examination by himself or other doctors on the question of the occupational illness.
524. Consistent with German regulations and laws, criminal penalties and fines - pun-
ishment for "violations of order" - (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) are separated from other parts of
each regulation. Obligations punishable by criminal punishment or by fines are itemized spe-
cifically and always require negligent or willful behavior. See, e.g., GEFSTOFFVO §§ 37-43.
525. Moreover, the budget for occupational inspectors varies by Land. Support staff is
frequently lacking, and as of 1983 only a few Laender had begun to computerize their occupa-
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In 1984, the occupational inspectorates made 838,995 inspec-
tions of establishments, construction sites, and technical equipment
in some 376,898 enterprises.52 ' The high number of inspections of
workplaces may give a false impression of workplace security;
problems may be covered up at the establishment since most inspec-
tors give notice before they arrive.527
Although there are regional occupational inspectorate offices,
there is little exchange of staff within each office. The result is that
inspectors are personally acquainted with conditions and staff at
most of the enterprises in the size category for which they are re-
sponsible in their area. Relations with many plant managers are
close enough that the inspectors orally indicate corrections to be
made and leave it to plant management to prepare the written report
of the inspection and the list of items to be corrected.528
For the foregoing reasons, the number of coercive measures is
miniscule in comparison to the number of inspections and viola-
tions.529 Orders to undertake certain action may be issued by the
inspectorates only after the period for repairing the violations has
elapsed.580 Moreover, fines are not considered a productive instru-
ment of enforcement in occupational safety and health matters.531
tional inspection files and inspection planning. See e.g., Jahresbericht des Gewerbeaufsicht in
Bayern, at 10 (1984) (Annual Report of the Occupational Inspectorate in Bavaria) (copy on
file with author).
526. This represented 27% of their total jurisdiction of 1,389,208 enterprises. A total of
1,470,678 violations (Beanstandungen) were noted during these visits. Accident Prevention Re-
port 1985, supra note 522, at 47-48. However, it is difficult to determine the nature and scope
of these inspections. A survey of occupational inspectors found that only three percent of in-
spection time concerned dangerous work substances. Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeitsschutz und
Unfallforschung, Forschungsbericht No. 232, 2 Arbeitsschutzsystem: Untersuchung in der
Bundestepublik Deutschland 501, 518 (1980), (Federal Institute for Labor Protection and
Accident Research, Research Reports, Labor Protection System: Investigation in the Federal
Republic of Germany) [hereinafter 2 LABOR PROTECTION SYSTEM]. The majority of time was
spent on industrial hygiene inspection. Id. An increasing amount of inspection time is dedi-
cated to enforcing environmental-related laws, including matters such as radiation testing at
nuclear power plants and testing lead concentrations in street vendors' food. See, e.g.,
Jahresbericht der Gewerbeaufsicht in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 58, 215 (1984) (Annual Report of
the Occupational Inspectorate of Nordrhein-Westfalen).
527. Some inspectors favor notice because they say it makes the inspection more de-
tailed and thorough than one without notice. 2 LABOR PROTECTION SYSTEM, supra note 526,
at 630.
528. The Ford plant near Cologne, for example, has never had a fine imposed in thirty-
three years. Interview with Professor M. Seeger, Chief Safety Engineer, Ford plant, Cologne
(April 23, 1986). See, e.g., JAHRESBERICHT DER ARBEITSKAMMER SAARLAND (ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE CHAMBER FOR EMPLOYEES IN SAARLAND) 195 (1984). Bremen and Saarland are
the only two Laender that retain a statewide council of employees. It is a vestige of the de-
mand for regional councils in the early days of the Weimar Republic. Supra note 30.
529. In 1984, 7,604 enforceable orders (Anordnungen), that is, orders to undertake a
certain action, were issued by the occupational inspectorates in the field of accident prevention
and health protection. ACCIDENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra note 522, at 53.
530. In dangerous situations, occupational inspectors may issue an immediate order.
531. In occupational safety and health matters a fine is a minor offense (Ordnungs-
widrigkeit, or a violation of order), records of which are destroyed after five years. The actual
level of fines is much lower than the maximum permitted fine of 20,000 DM (about $13,300 at
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They are permitted only after an order has been issued and has be-
come enforceable. In most cases they are issued only to repeat viola-
tors.532 Criminal prosecution after serious injuries or fatalities is sim-
ilarly unusual.5"3
Violations discovered during an inspection are detailed in a cor-
rection notice (Revisionsschreiben) which by itself is not enforcea-
ble. The notice simply advises the employer of the results of the in-
spection. It establishes no legal duties and therefore cannot be
contested. 534
An order (Anordnung), however, has legal mandatory effect. It
is an administrative act (Verwaltungsakt).3 5 An order can be ap-
pealed in a two-step process: first a reply (Widerspruch)"6 is made
before the administrative authorities; then a second judicial action
seeking nullification of the decision is presented before the adminis-
present exchange rates) per violation.
Occupational inspectors indicate in a 1980 survey that their fines were frequently reduced
or cancelled by the courts upon judicial contest. Some gave this as a reason for why they
avoided imposing fines. 2 LABOR PROTECTION SYSTEM, supra note 526, at 647-48.
532. Some 1,200 fines were issued by the occupational inspectorates in 1984, most of
them against operators of long distance hauling trucks.
533. See Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) § 330, supra note 203. About 100 criminal
charges (Strafanzeigen) were filed by the public prosecutor's office (Staatsanwaltschaft) in
1984 on behalf of the occupational inspectorate. The public prosecutor has discretion whether
to investigate fatal occupational accidents to determine if there was criminal endangerment or
criminal negligence by the employer or some other person that caused the accident. One such
investigation, conducted after a 1979 dust explosion in a Wupperthal welding firm killed eight
persons (seven of whom were Italian guestworkers), found no proof of negligence or fault by
the employer in entrusting the maintenance to one of the deceased workers. verfuegung der
staatsanwaltschaft wuppertal, No. 26JS492/79 (June 23, 1980) (copy on file with author).
This report implicitly raised the question of how many occupational fatalities are suffered by
foreign guest workers in West Germany. It is probable that fewer occupational precautions are
taken by and for foreign guestworkers than German workers. On the other hand, it is probably
also true that guestworkers tend to work in the dirtiest, more dangerous jobs, making them
more susceptible to fatal accidents. In one case described by union officials, after a metal
worker claimed occupational illness due to exposure to tetrachlorethane in a cleaning solution,
the firm subcontracted cleaning of the equipment to an outside company. Kaiser & Konstanty,
aspekte betrieblicher und ueberbetrieblicher mitbestimmung der arbeitnehmer im kampffuer
gesundheit in der arbeitswelt, 34 SOZIALE SICHERHEIT: (ZEITSCHRIFT FUER SOZIALPOLITIK
72, 73 (1985). Foreign guestworkers are more likely to be employed by small, outside subcon-
tractors and are less likely to file claims.
Courts handed down criminal penalties in fifty cases during 1984 in occupational safety
and health matters. ACCIDENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra note 522. Most of these
probably were fined for the use of long distance truck drivers on double shifts without the
required rest periods. In one such case, a freight forwarding manager was given a jail sentence
for ordering the driver of a long-distance truck to stay on the road despite knowledge of the
driver's exhaustion and his necessity to violate speed limits and working hour limitations in
order to accomplish his instructions. Judgment of December, 1985, Bundesgerichtshof (BGH),
No. 578/85, cited in Speditionsleiter macht sich strafbar, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Dec. 20, 1985, at 11, col. 6.
534. R. HERZBERG, DIE VERANTWORTUNG FUER ARBEITSSCHUTZ UND UN-
FALLVERHUETUNG IM BETRIEB 128 (1984).
535. The Federal Administrative Procedure Law (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) defines
an administrative act as "every disposition (Verfuegung), decision, or other sovereign measure,
which an official takes to regulate a single instance in the area of public law and which is
aimed at direct external legal effect." Verwaltungsverfahrensgestz § 35, 1976 BGBI.I 1253.
536. See Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, VwGO §§ 68-73 (Administrative Court Code).
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trative court.5 7 An order, like a fine, must be based on a legal stan-
dard and not on a general administrative regulation, technical rule,
or enforcement advice.
If the order is a final one, but is not complied with, the adminis-
trative execution laws 538 of the Laender offer three types of coercive
remedies: substitute performance (Ersatzvornahme); money coercion
(Zwangsgeld), and direct force (unmittelbarer Zwang). The substi-
tute performance remedy enables the occupational inspectorate to
cause a third party to undertake the required task at the offender's
cost. The second method allows the administrative court to levy a
fine, similar to American civil contempt citations, to coerce future
behavior. 53 9
If neither of the first two methods bring results, the administra-
tive court can impose incarceration as a substitute for coercion (Er-
satzzwangshaft). The occupational inspectorate can also apply direct
force itself when an inspector observes a machine whose operation
presents acute life-threatening danger. In such a case, the adminis-
trative execution laws of some Laender permit the inspector to halt
the unsafe operation immediately, even without issuing an oral or-
der.5' 0 In other Laender, the local police (Polizeivollzugsdienst-
kraefte) must carry out the order. 541 Because the reply (Wider-
spruch) acts as a stay of the order, these prejudgment execution
remedies are used only in exceptional cases. The usual method of
execution is by sheriff (polizeiliche Amtshilfe) after affirmance of
the order.
The imposition of a fine (Bussgeld) is reviewable by the crimi-
nal branch of the ordinary civil court (Amtsgericht, Strafkammer).
Its primary purpose is to punish past conduct. The public prosecutor
represents the occupational inspectorate when fines are contested.
Criminal charges are issued and prosecuted by the public prosecutor
are filed with the criminal branch of the ordinary civil court.
The rules of procedures that govern the judicial review of or-
ders, fines, and criminal charges differ from one another. Review of
orders is governed either by administrative procedure statutes of the
Laender if they exist, or otherwise by the federal administrative pro-
cedure statute. The state statutes are drawn on a uniform basis and
537. About forty percent of orders are contested. Some statutes provide for particular
types of orders, such as a prohibition on distribution (Untersagungsverfuegung) in the Equip-
ment Safety Law.
538. Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetze. See, e.g, Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz
Nordrhein-Westfahlen (VER wVOLLSTRG/NRW) § 57, (Administrative Execution Law of
Nordrhein-Westfahlen), 1980 GVNW 510.
539. The number of coercive fines (Zwangsgeldmassnahmen) is not included in the sta-
tistics published by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Order.
540. E.g., VERWVOLLsTGNRW supra note 539, § 55(2).
541. R. HERZBERG, supra note 534, at 131.
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contain virtually identical rules. Breaches of order (Ordnung-
swidrigkeiten) and criminal charges are governed by the federal
Criminal Procedure Law (Strafprozessordnung or STPO) unless the
Administrative Offenses Law (Ordnungswidrigkeitsgesetz) otherwise
applies. 542
Unlike nuclear energy and environmental hazards, occupational
safety and health laws have rarely been subject to public scrutiny
and criticism in recent years."' A reason for this relative quiet on
the judicial front is the nature of the process; decisions have a prece-
dential effect only for the particular case. Thus, the potential con-
flicts in interpretation between the criminal and administrative
courts do not arise in practice.
Although the administrative interpretation of undefined legal
concepts has been held by the highest administrative court to be
fully reviewable by the courts, the courts rarely deviate from the ad-
ministrative interpretation and the technical rule relied upon by the
inspectorate. Usually the courts rely on these technical rules, their
publication by the federal minister of labor, and the legal standards
as expert judgments determinative of the outcome.
Some commentators 54" advocate giving administrative authori-
ties virtually unreviewable discretion in determining undefined legal
concepts.54 5 The highest administrative court has accepted this anal-
ysis only for a narrow range of administrative decisions, such as civil
examinations and the decisions of experts or interest group repre-
sentatives in independent committees. 54' The lower administrative
courts are under no legal compulsion to follow the judgments of the
highest administrative court in different cases, but in practice they
follow this doctrine.5 47 Although published case law is sparse, the
few cases available indicate that the practice of the criminal branch
of the ordinary courts generally follows the view of the highest ad-
ministrative court. Usually experts are called to testify by the court
only in nuclear plant licensing proceedings. The administrative
courts carefully review orders of the occupational inspectorate. 5,
542. Ordnungswidrigkeitsgesetz § 46, 1987 BGBI.I 602.
543. In contrast, the production or use of dioxin, formaldehyde, and other chemicals by
factories has aroused controversy primarily because of the environmental effect on the sur-
rounding community.
544. See, e.g., ULE, GEDAECHTNISSCHRIFr FUER W. JELLINEK 309 (1955), cited in H.
MAUER. ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 101 (4th ed. 1985).
545. Using concepts similar to American administrative law, they urge that agencies
should be given a degree of free evaluation (Beurteilungsspielraum) or acceptance of any jus-
tifiable decision (Veriretbarkeitslehre). Id.
546. E.g., Judgment of June 25, 1981, BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHT (BVERwG), 62
BVERwGE 330, 337 (1982).
547. H. MAUER, supra note 545, at 104.
548. In a case involving dust in a furniture factory, the local inspectorate ordered a filter
for air vacuuming that would reduce the dust level to .5 mg pro cbm. Judgment of Jul. 13,
1981, Verwaltungsgericht Minden, docket no. 5k 264/81 (copy on file with author). This fig-
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2. Vocational Insurance Associations.-The vocational insur-
ance associations fulfill their statutory duty to prevent occupational
accidents and diseases by providing training to individuals in the
workplace and by promulgating and enforcing accident prevention
regulations. (Unfallverhuetungsvorschriften or UVV) Because of
their functional and regional organization, they are able to concen-
trate on particular occupational hazards and diseases that specifi-
cally affect their members. They undertake the largest role in medi-
cal disease prevention and monitoring outside of workplace
institutions. "9
The inspection strength of the vocational insurance associations
is relatively high. 5 ' Consultation is the first and primary means of
achieving compliance after an inspection. As with the occupational
inspectorate, there is no separation of personnel in consultation and
other enforcement methods.551 In 1984, 1.5 million medical examina-
ure was .3 mg below a recent recommendation of the professional association of machinery and
equipment constructors and more than four times lower than the existing chemical concentra-
tion MAK-value. The court was uncertain whether to find that no generally accepted technical
rule had yet evolved or, in the alternative, that the recommendation of .8 mg constituted the
generally accepted technical rule and the order fell short. The court therefore rested its deci-
sion on an abuse of discretion by the occupational inspectorate; the order stated it was "medi-
cally desirable" to reduce the dust level to .5 mg, but the court responded that the appropriate
standard was not what is "desirable" but what is legally required.
549. Beginning in 1936, a regulation required insurance carriers to guarantee necessary
medical treatment to an insured person and to prohibit him from working when the danger
existed that, by further employment in the enterprise, an occupational disease would arise,
reoccur or worsen. Dritte Verordnung ueber die Ausdehnung der Unfaliversicherung auf
Berufskrankheiten, 1938 RGBI. 1117.
Two examples of vocational insurance associations' coordinated medical programs are
those directed at silicosis and asbestosis. As a result of medical examinations in the mining and
ceramic industries in the late 1950s, silicosis declined dramatically. Silicosis, however, still
represents the second highest category of occupational illness pensions, though the number of
filed claims (3,398) was less than 10% of total filed claims. In 1984, 891 pensions were
awarded because of silicosis, comprising 20% of pensions given for occupational illness. AccI-
DENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra note 522, at chart 18. In 1972, a national clearing-
house was established for asbestos-endangered employees, and medical records of employees
with exposure rates were first kept by a single entity. Not until 1979, however, did a prohibi-
tion on asbestos spraying become part of an accident prevention regulation. See Schutz gegen
gesundheitsgefaehrlichen mineralischen Staub (Protection Against Health Endangering Min-
eral Dust) (accident prevention regulation), cited in Konstanty, Berufsgenossenschaften und
praeventive Gesundheitspolitik, WSI Mitteilingen 193-94 (1985). No similar clearinghouse
exists for other workplace cancers.
550. It consisted of 1,610 persons in 1984, all of whom were assigned to one of the
statutory accident insurance carriers. ACCIDENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra note 522,
at 46. Approximately the same number of persons (1,464) are employed as support staff for
the inspectors. Id. The insurance inspectors (technische Aufsichtsbeamte) are often more
respected than the state occupational inspectors since the former are specialized by industrial
function and are not burdened with enforcement of social labor protection or environmental
laws.
551. Although the Occupational Disease Regulation obligates the accident insurance
carriers to inform the state-employed industrial doctors (Gewerbeaerzte) of preventive mea-
sures regarding occupational illness and to seek their opinions, according to one such doctor
from Bremen, this hardly ever occurs; the exchange is limited to examinations for pension
claims. Gensch, Verwirklichen die Berufsgenossenschaften den praeventiven Auftrag der
Berufskrankheitenverordnung? Beobachtungen aus gewerbeaerztlicher Sicht, 34 Soziale
Sicherheit: Zeitschrift fuer Sozialpolitik 170, 173 (1985).
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tions were conducted by reason of the accident insurance carriers'
principles (Grundsaetze). Almost half concerned noise.552 Other tests
were for drivers, 553 protective breathing equipment, 554 and video dis-
play terminals. 555 "Medical reservations," which lead to automatic
employment restrictions or changes in the workplace, were given in
only one percent of the examinations.556
The industrial and trade (gewerbliche) vocational insurance as-
sociations insure over 85% of the workforce. 51 Their expenditures on
accident prevention in 1984 totalled 384 million German marks. 58
Training courses occupied a large percentage of their preventive ac-
tivity in 1984. More than 60,000 persons participated in association-
sponsored training courses lasting over three days. 5 59
Even allowing for frequently coordinated inspections with the
state occupational inspectorate, the number of inspections by the vo-
cational insurance associations remains substantial.56 0 Dangerous
substances get slightly more attention in insurance carrier inspec-
tions than in state occupational inspections.561  The inspections in
1984562 covered about 20% of all insured workplaces.56 3
The orders do not start off with a correction notice but directly
with an enforcement order (Anordnung). Over 430,000 such orders
were issued in 1984, of which total nearly half5 " came from agricul-
tural insurance associations. Unlike the occupational inspectorate,
the technical inspection officials of the vocational insurance associa-
tions can issue immediately enforceable orders where there is danger
in delay.5 5  Self-insurance carriers (Eigenunfallversicherungs-
552. Forty-two percent.
553. Ten percent - mostly long-distance truck drivers.
554. Eight percent.
555. Eight percent.
556. Limited reservations or no reservations under specific assumptions comprised al-
most 10 percent (9.6%) of the examinations. Statistics of the Landesverbaende der gewer-
blichen Berufsgenossenschaften, 33 Soziale Sicherheit: Zeitschrift fuer Sozialpolitik 70
(1985). Limited reservations require employees to take certain measures, such as using noise
protection aids. See Raithel, Neue Unfallverhuetungsvorschriften - Unfallverhuetungsvor-
schrift "Arbeitsmedizinische Vorsorge" (VBG 100), 35 ZENTRALBLATT FUER ARBEITSMEDIZIN,
ARBEITSSCHUTZ, PROPHYLAXE UND ERGONOMIE 1, 3 (1985).
557. ACCIDENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra note 522, at 54.
558. Id. at 55. This is more than $125 million at 1984 exchange rates.
559. Sixty thousand took courses lasting two to three days, and eighty thousand took one
day courses. Id. at 56-57.
560. There were 880,696 inspections in 562,096 enterprises in 1984. Id. at 50-51. This
sum includes 300,524 inspections by agricultural insurance associations whose members are
agricultural enterprises and farms. Id.
561. They still ranked extremely low at five percent of the total inspection time expendi-
ture in 1980. 2 LABOR PROTECTION SYSTEM, supra note 526, at 557.
562. The trades (gewerbliche) vocational insurance associations inspected 338,711 estab-
lishments out of a total of 1.6 million.
563. ACCIDENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra note 529, chart 30, at 50-51.
564. Two hundred and one thousand. Id. chart 32 at 52.
565. SOCIAL INSURANCE CODE § 714(1)[5]. Five thousand orders requiring immediate
removal of accident dangers were issued in 1984. ACCIDENT PREVENTION REPORT 1985, supra
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traeger), and carriers of federal, state, and some local governments
lack the authority to issue orders or fines; they must rely on direc-
tives (Dienstanweisungen).
Negligent violations of accident prevention regulations, unlike
administrative regulations which require international violation, may
result in fines up to 20,000 German marks. Grossly negligent or in-
tentional behavior must be fined. 56 The vocational insurance as-
sociations cannot issue orders against nonmembers or noninsured
employees. Therefore, the manufacturer of a dangerous substance or
piece of equipment can only be reached by a referral to the state
occupational inspectorate.
Actions to nullify (Anfechtungen) enforcement orders are filed
before the social courts (Sozialgerichte). The procedure is governed
by the Social Court Code (Sozialgerichtsgesetz). Unlike the state
occupational inspectorate, the insurance carriers may fine and issue
orders to employees based on the statutory authority to prevent occu-
pational accidents.567 Another dissimilarity from the rules for the oc-
cupational inspectorate is that a reply to an order from a technical
inspector does not stay the order. Coercive measures to enforce or-
ders of insurance carriers are thus more common than they are with
the state occupational inspectors. Having no police power the techni-
cal inspectors lack authority to shut down dangerous machines them-
selves and instead must rely on local police authorities to apply di-
rect force.568
Contested fines are heard by the criminal branches of ordinary
courts as are fines imposed by the occupational inspectorate. The
federal Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung or STPO)
governs these proceedings.
The highest social court follows the doctrine of "free judicial
evaluation of indefinite legal concepts." While stressing its indepen-
dence from administrative interpretation of concepts such as the gen-
erally accepted rules of technology, this court nevertheless in prac-
tice defers to the privately set standards in defining the concept in
the individual case. 569
3. Federal Government.-The vocational insurance associa-
note 522, chart 32, at 52.
566. SOCIAL INSURANCE CODE § 701. Of the 11,000 fines imposed by the vocational
insurance associations on employer members in 1984, over 9,000 were levied by the agricul-
tural association. Only 1,845 were issued by the trades associations. ACCIDENT PREVENTION
REPORT 1985, supra note 522, chart 32, at 52. Twelve insurance associations issued no fines at
all. Id. In 750 cases, fines were imposed by the associations on individual employees. Id.
567. SOCIAL INSURANCE CODE § 708(1)[2].
568. R. HERZBERG, supra note 534, at 134.
569. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1974, Bundessozialgericht, BSozG, 38, BSozGE 278; Judg-
ment of June 29, 1978, Bundessozialgericht, BSozG, 47 BSozGE 3, 6.
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tions are public institutions, and the Social Insurance Code5 0 gives
the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Order (Bundesarbeits-
ministerium) inspection authority over them. This authority, how-
ever, is loosely exercised.57" ' The Federal Labor Ministry does not
have the staff to engage in detailed auditing or control of the more
than ninety accident insurance carriers. 572 The Basic Law573 gives
the federal government power to review enforcement of federal laws
by the Laender. This rarely occurs in practice. Instead, the Laender
confer among themselves regularly in order to establish common en-
forcement plans, usually with little effect. Thus, the federal govern-
ment is much more involved in the law-creating process in occupa-
tional safety and health matters than in enforcement of those laws.
B. Private
1. Regional.-Enforcement by private organizations at the re-
gional level is considerable, especially in the area of equipment test-
ing. Product testing required by the Equipment Safety Law is con-
ducted by a number of testing centers approved by the vocational
insurance associations. Many private technical inspection associa-
tions (technische Ueberwachungsvereine) are active in testing prod-
ucts and in discovering environmental hazards. The biggest role of
these private associations is the annual checking of automobile safety
required for each vehicle registered in West Germany.
The role of private associations in inspections is growing. For
example, the 1986 Dangerous Substances Regulation increased the
environmental work measurements required of employers. Standards
for private testing organizations (Messstellen) are issued by the
Dangerous Substances Committee.574 Only organizations approved
by the network (Arbeitskreis) of testing organizations of the Dan-
gerous Substances Committee may carry out tests under the Danger-
ous Substances Regulation. 5  Insurance associations also offer medi-
cal and safety services on a regional basis to small enterprises. The
570. RVO, see supra note 44.,
571. In one instance, the Federal Labor Ministry ordered an insurance association to
hire more technical inspectors and to perform more inspections. Such intervention is rare.
572. The Division of Labor Protection (Abteilung Arbeitsschutz) has less than twenty
professional employees, of whom one is a lawyer in addition to the division chief. There are
thirty six commercial and industrial (gewerbliche) vocational insurance associations, nineteen
in the agricultural sector, and forty-odd governmental accident insurance carriers.
573. Grundgesetz (GG), art. 85 (3), (4). See supra note 8.
574. See Technische Regel (Technical Rule) 400.
575. The Committee requires an inspection visit by two members of the work group and
information on the qualification of the director, the number and qualifications of the staff, the
types of substances measured, equipment, organization of measurement taking, and experience
of the organization. Schuetz & Blome, Messtechnische Ueberwachung, Bundesarbeitsblatt 30
(1986). Some vocational insurance associations and government institutions also have approved
testing facilities.
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largest of these associations is the Vocational Insurance Medical
Health Service.5 76
2. Workplace.-The greatest amount of private enforcement,
however, occurs at the workplace level through the various bodies
and posts statutorily entrusted with occupational safety and health
duties. Although the qualifications of many occupational doctors are
questioned by unions, their required presence at an establishment
and the existence of safety engineers provides technical competence
that would otherwise be left to the employers' discretion. 5 "
Where a work council exists, it usually considers occupational
safety and health issues and its members participate in hiring safety
and health personnel.5 8 In the same manner, the statutory-man-
dated employer-employee safety committee is active in plant level
supervision. The individual employee theoretically has an individu-
ally enforceable right to a safe and healthful workplace guaranteed
by the Civil Code 579 that permits him to refuse dangerous work and
still claim wages.5 80 In practice, public inspections and plant level
institutions supplant this right. Work councils, joint safety commit-
tees and their members are protected from lawsuit by a qualified
immunity that does not extend to deliberately wrongful activity. Em-
ployees, work councils or unions with members in the affected plant
may seek relief from the civil or labor courts to both force the em-
ployer to comply with his duty of welfare (Fuersorgepflicht),581 and
576. Berufsgenossenschaftlicher Arbeitsmedizinische Dienst. It has seventeen centers
and forty fulltime occupational doctors (Arbeitsmediziner). See 100 Jahre 1885-1985 Mas-
chinenbau-und Kleineisen Industrie Berufsgenossenschaft 24 (n.d.).
577. Only the large enterprises are required to have fulltime occupational doctors and
safety engineers.
578. See supra text accompanying notes 338-54.
579. BGB §§ 618, 273. The [BGB] theory on which recovery of wages is permitted is
that the employer has delayed offering his part of the bargain: a safe and healthful workplace.
Id.
580. Work council members are also protected from discharge during the terms of their
service for all reasons except for deliberate misconduct or economic layoffs. G. SCHAUB,
Arbeitsrechtshandbuch 869-77 (5th ed. 1983).
581. For example, where an employer had warned several times of deficiencies several
times by officials, a labor court ordered the employer to take measures or issue instructions
that would exclude further endangerment. Judges have sometimes shown hostility to individual
workers who have sought relief from dangerous working conditions from persons outside the
enterprise. These cases arise when the employer discharges the worker for disloyalty and the
employee sues within three weeks, the period of limitations contained in the Dismissal Protec-
tion Law. In one case from 1976, a welder complained about skin, eye and nose irritation to
his union regional office after having gotten no response from his company's engineer or the
local public health office. The union contacted the occupational inspectorate, which resulted in
the employer being cited for violation of safety and health regulations. The court upheld the
dismissal because the determination of a safety and health citation inspired by an employee
prevented further trustworthy (vertrauensvolle) cooperation in the labor relationship.
Landesarbeitsgericht Baden-Wuerttemberg, [ArbG] No. 6 5a 51/76 (copy on file with au-
thor). With the creation of statutory protection for individual complaints, this attitude can be
expected to change.
An interesting use of environmental law in the workplace setting occurred in permitting
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in some instances, to obtain damages for the employee.
3. Private Compensation Litigation.-Accident insurance sup-
plants the civil liability of the employer or other employees in the
event of an occupational accident or disease unless the employer or
work colleague intentionally caused the injury or was grossly negli-
gent .5 2 In that rare event, the insurance carrier may raise a claim
either as an original matter in a reverse claim (Regressanspruh)85
or by transfer of the claim as a statutory matter from the insured to
the accident insurance carrier. 84 The insured gets no extra benefits
because the insurance carrier is entitled to obtain and keep the reim-
bursement of insurance payments. 88 Damage compensation to the
employee is unusual.586 Usually the lack of deliberate intent or gross
negligence by the employer prevents liability for "positive contrac-
tual breach" (positive Vertragsverletzung) or defective performance
of a contract (Schlechterfuellung). Delictual liability is excluded,
even where the employer is at fault,587 except that the employer re-
mains liable for negligence in choosing and supervising his
assistants. 88
Pain and suffering compensation in delictual cases is contingent
upon proof that the employer intentionally caused the injury and
an employee to contest the licensing of an installation at his workplace under the same terms
as a resident neighbor of the plant according to the Federal Emissions Protection Law. The
court stated that an occasional presence in adjacent parts of the workplace would not have
sufficed. Here, however, the employee spent one-third of the day where the installation was
located and was exposed in a similar degree as if he were in his residence. Judgment of Apr. 6,
1985, Oberverwaltungsgericht, OVERWG, No. 7B16/83, quoted in Otto, Klage des Arbei-
tnehmers gegen Genehmigung einer Anlage an seinem Arbeitsplatz 45 STAUBREINHALTUNG
DER LuFT.
582. RVO §§ 640, 548, 550.
583. Id. § 1542.
584. Id. § 640.
585. Estimates of recoveries by the vocational trade and industrial insurance associations
from such claims range from three to ten percent of their total compensation payments.
Weyers, Gutachten A zum 52. Deutschen Juristentag 1978 at A 114, printed in I Verhan-
diungen des zweiundfuenfzigsten Deutschen Juristentages (1978); the ten percent figure is
cited in BUNDESARBEITGEBERUNFALLVERSICHERUNG 1977 in VON HIPPEL, HAFTUNGSPERSATZ
DURCH VERSICHERUNGSSCHUTz, REFERAT, at 40.
586. The unusual case of damage compensation to the employee has occurred where an
employer permitted an employee not to wear protective clothing and injury occurred. Judg-
ment of June 9, 1970, Arbeitsgericht Arnsberg, abstracted in Arbeitsrecht in Stichworten
[ARSt] 175 (1970).
587. This is due to the exemption for assistants. Section 831(1) of the Civil Code
provides:
Whoever hires someone to do something is obligated to replace the damage
the employee illegally causes in carrying out the job. The duty to compensate
does not exist when the employer, in the selection of the person and, insofar as
he creates tools or performs work, in the performance or conduct of the work,
observes the care required in commerce or when the damage even by application
of this case would have arisen.
BGB § 831(l).
588. Id.
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both knew about and desired the accident." 9 For these reasons,
claims of compensation for pain and suffering (Schmerzensgeldan-
sprueche) stemming from occupational accidents are rarely raised in
the form of product liability actions and are even more rarely
upheld.5 9°
Civil litigation against product manufacturers and distributors
in both consumer and workplace injuries is increasing. The duty of
"safety in dealing" (Verkehrssicherungspflicht) is often measured by
compliance with guidelines and accident prevention regulations.
Strict liability does not exist for injuries occurring in the
workplace.5 91
Technical rules provide the standard for the required care in
dealing. Violation of these rules is negligence per se,592 and the Civil
Code provides a basis for recovery.5 93 Nevertheless, adherence to
technical rules is not an absolute defense. The highest civil court re-
cently ruled:
The rules of technology, as they find their shape in the standard
[before the court], can be used to define the duties of safe deal-
ing (Verkehrssicherungspflichten) and often represent a usable
standard for the required duty of care, especially when they
have been developed by expert commissions. Nevertheless they
do not always determine the most that can be demanded in a
particular case, but rather are supplementable 94
Litigation against manufacturers or users may also arise under sales
contracts (Kaufrecht) and service contracts (Werkvertragsrecht) in a
claim for guarantee of performance or warranty (Gewaehrleistungs-
anspruch) by relying on a violation of either an accident prevention
589. BGB § 847(1) provides: "In the case of injury of the body or of health as well as in
the case of deprivation of freedom, the injured person can also demand a fair compensation in
money for damages which are not intangible losses."
590. In these few cases, pain and suffering tables exist for judges to use which are con-
siderably lower than the damage verdicts awarded in the United States. They are paid in the
form of an annuity, not as a lump sum.
591. For example, the highest civil court held a boarding school delictually liable under
section 832(l) of the Civil Code for failing to ensure that stair bannisters were slide-proof. A
twelve year old boy slid down the bannister, slipped, and fell three floors. The court used
guidelines issued by a vocational insurance association concerning school construction and
equipment as the measure of the duty of safe dealing (Verkehrssicherungspflicht). The stu-
dent's claims for damages for pain and suffering were upheld. (Medical costs are covered by
social insurance and are not awarded when insurance applies.) Thus, the guidelines have be-
come a compulsory measure of the duty of safe dealing. The court noted, however, that the
guidelines would not be compulsory if shown in the particular case by an expert to be techno-
logically unfeasible. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, No. VI ZR 66/79,
reprinted in Rundschreiben No. 53/80 of the Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Unfallver-
sicherungstraeger der oeffentlichen Hand e.V., Jul. 15, 1980 (copy on file with author).
592. See BGB § 276(1) for the definition of negligent conduct: "whoever lacks the nec-
essary care in acting."
593. Id. § 823(1).
594. Judgment of Nov. 22, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), 37 Neue Juristishche
Wochenschift [NJW] 801 (1984) ("Eishockeypuck" decision).
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regulation or a guideline of an accident insurance association. 595
Equipment testers may also be liable under delictual rules, although
cases in practice are rare.
Two factors, however, curb private compensation litigation. The
first is the system of legal fees. Legal fees in cases before the ordi-
nary civil courts are limited according to the amount in contro-
versy.56  In addition, the losing party pays part of all of the other
party's legal fees depending on the outcome of the case. 597 While the
"losers pay" rule does not apply before the administrative, social, or
labor courts, these courts do not handle damage suits. Therefore,
limits on legal fees in cases before them are even more stringent.
The second factor dampening the urge to litigate under tort law
is that insurance, pensions, and other benefits 598 compensate most
595. The defect is measured by the average quality of an item or service, or the use
foreseen by the particular contract. BGB §§ 459, 633. Average quality depends on the usage of
dealing (Verkehrsanschauung), which in technical areas is governed largely by experts. There-
fore, technical rules developed in a proper proceeding by experts appear often as the standard
applied by the courts. In one case, the connection of water softener without the inclusion of an
attachment for oxidation (Be- und Entlueftung) as prescribed by a DIN standard was held to
be a defect in construction. See Betriebsberater (BB) 239 (1971).
In another, the failure to have a construction crane tested by an inspection association as
required by an accident prevention regulation was sufficient to establish a defect (Sachmangel)
in the sale. Judgment of Feb. 22, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 90 BGHZ 198 (1984).
An unusual attempt by a competitor of a manufacturer of pipe threadcutting machines to
use competition laws to enforce accident prevention regulations was confronted by the highest
civil court in 1980. The competitor complained that the manufacturer failed to include a pro-
tective device with the sale of the machine, as was required by an accident prevention regula-
tion. By selling and advertising the machine at a price that did not include the accessory, the
competitor alleged that the manufacturer violated the Law Against Unfair Competition. Sec-
tion 1 of that law states that acts in commerce for purposes of competition that violate good
morals (gute Sitten) can be enjoined, and compensation can be awarded for damages. Section
3 permits enjoining misleading statements by a person in business for purposes of competition.
The court declined to accept the invitation to expand occupational safety and health ad-
ministrative protection through private competition law. First, it found the alleged violation of
the accident prevention regulation lacked the clarity needed to constitute an offense against
good morals (sittenwidrig). The threading machine could cut smaller pipes without the protec-
tive device that needed to be attached under accident prevention regulations. Second, the court
separated the pipethread cutting machine from the protective device that is attached to the
pipe to be cut, and stated that the machine could be used properly without the protective
device, since the device is attached to the pipe and not the machine. The court's decision may
be more easily explained on policy grounds. The complainant had contacted the occupational
inspectorate about the situation before suing. For whatever reasons, the inspectorate appar-
ently did not seek to prohibit sale of the machine. The court did not want to expand the
enforcement of the Equipment Safety Law to include private parties, or to allow business
competitors to use technical safety law as part of competition law.
596. Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebuehrenordnung, (Federal Legal Fee Code) 1959 BGBI.I
565, as amended.
597. Zivilprozessordnung (Federal Civil Procedure Code) §§ 91-127a.
598. The coverage and level of benefits is much higher in West Germany than in the
United States. The principle of the "social state" is enshrined in the Constitution as a basic
principle of the state along with the democratic and federal forms of government. Grundge-
setz, art. 20, see supra note 8.
Among the general social benefits not unusual for Europe, but unknown in American
statutory law, are the obligation of the employer to pay the first six weeks of sick leave at full
pay, Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz § I (Salary Continuation Law) 1969 BGBI.I 946, as amended;
benefits paid to young mothers together with four months of paid leave Mutterschutzgoesetz, §
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tangible losses caused by occupationally-related injury. The arena of
dispute is thus transferred to the vocational insurance associations
and social courts.
The insurance and pension scheme in occupational accident or
illness is complicated. "Injury money" (Verletztengeld) is paid with-
out time limit as a substitute for wages when the injured person ei-
ther is incapable of performing his pre-injury work or upon so doing,
risks worsening his health condition. 599 The insured person is paid
"transition money" (Uebergangseld)600 during rehabilitation. "Tran-
sition benefits" (Uebergangsleistungen) may be paid to persons who
must give up their former occupation becuase of the danger of the
existence, reoccurrence, or worsening of an occupational illness.""
Rehabilitation services are divided into medical and career ser-
vices. 6 2 The latter includes training for and adjustment to new pro-
fessions. The insured person receives an "injury pension"
(Verletzenrente) only when a reduction of employment capability
(Minderung der Erwerbsfaehigkeit) of at least twenty percent still
exists three months after the accident. 60 3
Occupational illnesses are compensated where they result either
from one of the occupational illnesses recognized by regulation, °4 or
from one treated "like an occupational illness" when the necessary
11, 1968 BGBI.I 315.); and benefits payable for children until they are eighteen years of age
(Kindergeld). Health insurance is mandatory, and it pays for medical expenses where occupa-
tional benefits or services are denied for reasons of eligibility or causation. According to one
commentator, health insurance rather than accident insurance is the primary rehabilitation
and compensation carrier for most occupational illnesses. J. Spinnarke,,Soziale Sicherheiten
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 89 (3d ed. 1985).
599. This type of benefit pays eighty percent of the injured person's salary. There is no
limit to the amount payable other than that the person's net salary may not be exceeded. Since
taxes are not paid on these benefits, most payments reach 100% of previous net compensation.
600. This comprises 65%-75% of the "injury money" benefits when the injured person
has at least one child or lives with a spouse who cannot work, either because he cares for the
injured spouse or he requires care himself.
601. These benefits last for five years and are paid at 100% of previous salary in the first
year, declining 1/5th each year, with the maximum amount the full pension level, or 2,/rds of
annual compensation.
602. Everyone who has paid insurance contributions six times on a monthly basis in the
past two years is entitled to medical rehabilitation. However, an injury pension or fifteen years'
insurance contributions is required as a condition to eligibility for professional rehabilitation
services.
603. RVO §§ 1236-1244. A full pension, payable upon 100% employment disability, is
two-thirds of annual employment earnings. RVO § 580(l). It begins upon work incapability
(Arbeitsunfaehigkeit), and lasts until the death of the insured, regardless of whether the in-
sured actually resumes employment or not. A supplement is paid for children under eighteen
years of age with a disability of fifty percent or more. Id. § 581(l)[1]. A widow's pension is
30%-40% of the insured's annual employment earnings, depending on age and number of de-
pendents. Id. § 583. A widower's pension is paid in the same amount, but only if the wife was
the primary source of family support. Orphans' pensions range up to thirty percent for a full
orphan, and are payable until the twenty-fifth year of age. Id. § 590. Lump sum payments are
permitted only for pensions extending to a 25% permanent disability; pensions with a higher
percentage of permanent disability may be converted to a five or ten year payout.
604. RVO § 551(1), (2).
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causation becomes shown by new knowledge. 605 In addition to the
social insurance available from the accident insurance carriers, the
general pension insurance scheme provides for a disability pension
when the insured can earn less than half what a healthy person could
earn. This pension may first begin five years after the occupational
accident or onset of illness.
VIII. Recommendations
This article has described approaches adopted by West Ger-
many to occupational safety and health problems. German and
American approaches have in common the characteristic of exter-
nally directed behavior, mostly from the state in the United States
and from incorporative associations in West Germany. Private and
public standard-setting and enforcement, as well as state and federal
activity are similar. Once differences in language, history and values
are bridged, there is much that each country can learn from the
other in the field of occupational safety and health regulation.
A. United States
The United States could strive to create a more comprehensive
occupational accident and disease system that involves employers,
employees, private industry, and all levels of government. To this
end, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act6 6 could be
amended to permit concurrent federal and state enforcement. Con-
flicts could then be avoided by administrative cooperation. State and
local public health agencies could also include federal OSHA regula-
tions where possible in their enforcement and inspection activities.
Cooperation and training of insurance companies, union stewards,
plant workers and professionals in safety engineering and occupa-
tional medicine could be encouraged to complement administrative
enforcement and to obtain maximum effectiveness in preventing job
illness and injury.
A combination of private insurance companies that issue acci-
dent prevention regulations may run into antitrust problems absent
legislative exemption. On the other hand, a requirement in state law
that insurance companies provide certain types of services for their
members would not exceed the states' police powers nor delegate to
private parties powers of public regulation. 07
605. Id.; Berufskrankheitenverordnung (Occupational Disease Regulation) 1976
BGBI.1 721.
606. See supra note 7.
607. A link between accident insurance and prevention programs is not unique to West
Germany. A survey of forty seven countries found that a legal requirement or permission for
the insurance carrier of accident insurance to have functions of accident prevention is more the
rule than the exception. The list includes France, Canada, Belgium and Spain. The survey
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Regional workplace-oriented occupational safety and health ser-
vices could be mandated by state or federal statute. The services
could test workplaces on a continuous basis as part of a program of
environmental measurement.
Compliance is a continual process and not merely the' result of a
singular inspection. Successful compliance is not shown by the main-
tenance of a certain threshold on a single day, but by a continual
program of prevention. Requirements for regular measurements and
document retention are therefore instruments to achieve self-regula-
tion, not tools of government intervention. An initial first step to-
wards drafting such legislation would be a review of existing com-
pany policies and union-employer committees in the United States.
Consultation and regular inspection could be combined without
requirement to issue citations upon existence of a violation. The Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act" °8 could be changed to make shut-
down or affirmative injunctive orders simpler to obtain. Administra-
tive agencies could then use this procedure where consultation fails.
The number of inspectors and inspections could be vastly increased.
The belief that employers listen only to sanctions is not sup-
ported in practice. Reliance on voluntary standards for the vast ma-
jority of chemicals and voluntary policies for medical testing and
safety engineering in the workplace bear this out. The general duty
clause could incorporate voluntary technical standards. The same ob-
ligation that exists in the law post facto in product liability lawsuits
could also be incorporated into preventive legal norms. Advisory
committees could be given authority to promulgate standards with
the agency retaining veto power.
Restrictions on litigation concerning workplace injury or illness
could be coupled with occupational health insurance programs to en-
sure prompt, fair, and reasonable compensation and rehabilitation.
Moreover, regional or workplace-centered participatory institutions
for occupational safety and health could be required to be elected
upon petition of a group of employees. These institutions could be
concerned primarily with ergonomics.
B. West Germany
West Germany could strive to create individual incentives to en-
sure compliance with the bewildering array of institutions and con-
cerns with job safety and health. Individual rights of redress on oc-
found that seventeen countries give the carrier of statutory accident insurance the authority to
issue autonomous legal norms in the form of legal regulations, guidelines, or both. Report of
the Tripartite Mission on the Effectiveness of Labor Inspection in the Federal Republic of
Germany (I.L.O., 1984).
608. See supra note 7.
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cupational safety and health measures within the plant establishment
could be expanded to give the individual a remedy where collective
institutions fail. It may be that the more benefits there are the less
the individual initiative in preventing illness or injury. However, the
West German example illustrates an occupational safety and health
system that promotes both accident prevention and a high level of
benefits.
Another goal could be to foster more open and public discussion
of proposed occupational safety and health regulations, direct judi-
cial review of their validity, and the possibility of obtaining judicial
relief requiring administrative action or standard-setting in the event
of administrative inaction.
Thirdly, there could be better data collection on enforcement
programs, compliance evaluation, and epidemiology. More attention
in inspections is due to health concerns. More occupational doctors
for the occupational inspectorate and more technical inspectors with
medical backgrounds are needed. Better coordination of data collec-
tion on occupational illnesses is needed, as well as greater attention
in practice to engineering to prevent exposure to dangerous sub-
stances rather than relying on medical detection and treatment.
IX. Conclusion
Similar occupational safety and health problems pervade each
state, yet comparative knowledge of their regulation remains
sketchy. Eighty years ago Louis D. Brandeis submitted d 112-page
brief to the Supreme Court of the'United States, seeking to uphold
for the State of Oregon a law establishing a maximum of ten hours'
work per day for women employed in manufacturing. Two pages of
Brandeis' brief contained legal argument, the remainder described
similar state and foreign laws and reports on working conditions
from around the world, including those of German occupational in-
spectorates. "0 9 No less than then, Brandeis' sociological method of
jurisprudence is in order to persuade public institutions - particu-
larly the legislatures in the United States and the courts in West
Germany - to adopt policies to better safety and health at work.
609. See P. Strum, Louis D. Brandeis - Justice for the People 112 (1984). Brandeis
persuaded the Supreme Court to uphold the law's constitutionality. Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 421 (1908). More lastingly, his brief is considered to have inspired the sociological
method of jurisprudence in the United States. P. STRUM, id.
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